JBS USA: $1.1 million settlement with NY AG regarding misleading ‘Net Zero by 2040’ marketing claims Nov 2025

The November 2025 Stipulation: Analyzing the $1. 1 Million Penalty

JBS USA agreed to pay $1. 1 million in November 2025 to resolve allegations from the New York Attorney General regarding deceptive environmental marketing. This settlement concludes a legal battle initiated in February 2024, which accused the meat producer of misleading consumers with unsubstantiated “Net Zero by 2040” claims. The agreement, formally an Assurance of Discontinuance, requires JBS to cease using definitive language such as “pledge” or “commitment” when referring to its 2040 emissions.

The financial component of this stipulation directs the entire $1. 1 million sum to Cornell University’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. These funds are earmarked specifically for the New York Soil Health and Resiliency Program to support climate-smart agriculture initiatives. Legal documents clarify this payment is not a civil penalty or fine. JBS USA neither admitted nor denied the Attorney General’s findings agreed to the monetary terms to avoid further litigation after a state court dismissed the original complaint in January 2025 with leave to amend.

Operational restrictions in the settlement impose strict transparency on JBS for the three years. The company must reframe its 2040 target exclusively as a “goal” or “ambition” in all U. S. consumer-facing materials. also, any public statement claiming progress toward this goal must include the specific, verifiable steps taken to achieve it. JBS is also required to conduct annual internal compliance reviews of its environmental marketing and submit these reports directly to the Office of the Attorney General through 2028.

Stipulation Compliance Matrix

The following table outlines the specific linguistic and operational shifts mandated by the November 2025 Assurance of Discontinuance.

Marketing Component	Prohibited Terminology	Mandated Terminology
2040 Emissions Target	“Pledge”, “Commitment”	“Goal”, “Ambition”
Progress Claims	Vague assertions of “action”	Specific, disclosed steps
Oversight method	Unverified internal audits	Annual reports to NY AG (2026-2028)

Procedural Timeline: From February 2024 Filing to November 2025 Settlement

Initial Filing and Core Allegations (February 2024)

The legal confrontation began on February 28, 2024, when New York Attorney General Letitia James filed a lawsuit against JBS USA Food Company and JBS USA Food Company Holdings (shared “JBS USA”) in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County (Index No. 450682/2024). The complaint alleged violations of New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, citing deceptive business practices and false advertising.

The state’s case centered on JBS USA’s “Net Zero by 2040” marketing campaign. Prosecutors argued that the company’s claims, including slogans like “Bacon, chicken wings and steak with net zero emissions. It’s possible”, were unsubstantiated. The Attorney General’s office contended that JBS absence a feasible plan to achieve these, noting that the company planned to increase production, which would seemingly contradict a net-zero trajectory without massive, unproven offsets.

The Defense: Motion to Dismiss (May 2024)

On May 3, 2024, JBS USA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (NYSCEF Doc. No. 12). The defense argued that the “Net Zero by 2040” statement was an aspirational goal rather than a guarantee of current results, and thus not actionable as consumer fraud. JBS legal counsel posited that reasonable consumers would interpret the claims as future ambitions. They further argued that the company had indeed invested in sustainability measures, such as a $1 billion sustainability-linked bond and partnerships for agricultural research, which demonstrated intent to meet the goals.

Judicial Ruling: Dismissal Without Prejudice (January 2025)

The case reached a serious juncture on January 10, 2025, when Justice Andrew Borrok of the New York State Supreme Court dismissed the Attorney General’s complaint without prejudice (NYSCEF Doc. No. 45). In his ruling, Justice Borrok found that the initial complaint did not sufficiently allege that JBS absence the intent or a plan to achieve its goals at the time the statements were made. The court noted that JBS had modified language to “ambition to achieve,” which further complicated the state’s argument that consumers were being misled by a definitive pledge.

yet, the dismissal was not a total victory for JBS. The court granted the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) leave to file an amended complaint, originally setting a deadline of April 10, 2025, which was later extended to October 31, 2025. This allowed the state to gather more evidence to prove that the claims were deceptive even as aspirations.

Investigative Escalation (February , October 2025)

Following the dismissal, the Attorney General’s office intensified its scrutiny rather than retreating. On February 5, 2025, the OAG issued an investigative subpoena pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12), demanding internal documents related to JBS’s environmental planning and marketing strategies. Over the subsequent months, JBS made eight separate document productions to the state.

During this period, JBS attempted to its environmental credentials publicly. In April 2025, the company released a “Climate Action Playbook,” detailing specific initiatives intended to reduce scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions. even with this, the state continued to probe the feasibility of these plans against the company’s production growth forecasts.

Key Procedural Dates:

• Feb 28, 2024: Initial Complaint Filed (Index No. 450682/2024).
• May 3, 2024: JBS Files Motion to Dismiss.
• Jan 10, 2025: Court Dismisses Complaint Without Prejudice.
• Feb 5, 2025: OAG problem Investigative Subpoena.
• Oct 31, 2025: Deadline for Amended Complaint (Pre-empted by Settlement).

The Settlement Agreement (November 2025)

As the October 31, 2025 deadline for the amended complaint method, negotiations between the parties culminated in a resolution. On November 3, 2025, the Attorney General announced a stipulation of settlement (Assurance of Discontinuance). Under the terms, JBS USA agreed to pay $1. 1 million to the New York Soil Health and Resiliency Program at Cornell University. Crucially, the company agreed to cease using the unqualified “Net Zero by 2040” language in its U. S. marketing materials, shifting instead to terms like “goal” or “ambition,” and to clarify that such are aspirational.

The settlement allowed JBS to resolve the legal threat without admitting liability, while the Attorney General secured a financial penalty and a modification of the company’s advertising practices, closing the docket on the 2024 filing.

The “Anchor” Asset: The April 2021 New York Times Ad

The centerpiece of the New York Attorney General’s case was a full-page advertisement that ran in *The New York Times* in April 2021. This asset served as the primary exhibit for the state’s argument that JBS USA had moved beyond corporate goal-setting into the of deceptive consumer solicitation. The ad copy was explicit, linking specific high-demand consumer products to a carbon-neutral future. The headline read: **”Agriculture can be part of the climate solution. Bacon, chicken wings, and steak with net zero emissions. It’s possible.”** Legal analysts note that the inclusion of specific menu items, “bacon, chicken wings, and steak”, was a serious tactical error in the marketing strategy. By attaching the “Net Zero” claim to the physical products rather than the corporate entity, the ad conveyed to a reasonable consumer that the meat itself was, or would soon be, carbon neutral.

“The advertisement did not say ‘JBS Operations be Net Zero.’ It said ‘Steak with Net Zero emissions.’ To the average shopper, that implies the entire lifecycle of the cow, from feed to slaughter, is carbon neutral. The data showed JBS had no route to achieve that.”
, Internal memo, NY AG Office (Redacted), in Feb 2024 filing.

Digital Proliferation: The “Pledge” vs. The “Goal”

Following the print campaign, JBS USA updated its digital footprint to align with the “Net Zero by 2040” narrative. Between 2021 and 2024, the company’s primary US website featured a dedicated “Sustainability” landing page that utilized definitive language. The investigation highlighted three specific digital assets that remained live as late as February 2024: 1. **The Banner Declaration:** A site-wide header stating, “JBS is committing to be net zero by 2040.” 2. **The Investor Deck:** A publicly available PDF titled “Global Commitment to Achieve Net-Zero Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2040,” which was circulated to shareholders and ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) rating agencies. 3. **The “Journey” Graphic:** An infographic timeline that placed “Net Zero” as a confirmed milestone for 2040, visually indistinguishable from past historical achievements like acquisitions or plant openings. The semantic distinction between a “commitment” and a “goal” became the fulcrum of the settlement. The NY AG argued that “commitment” implies a binding contract with a defined roadmap, whereas JBS USA later argued in court filings that the phrase was “aspirational in nature.”

The Scope 3 Sleight of Hand

The most technically damning aspect of the marketing materials was the omission of Scope 3 emissions. In carbon accounting, Scope 1 and 2 refer to direct emissions from company facilities (e. g., electricity for the slaughterhouse). Scope 3 covers the supply chain, specifically, the methane emitted by cattle and the carbon cost of growing animal feed. For a meat processor, Scope 3 accounts for approximately **97% of total emissions**. The marketing materials, yet, presented a “Net Zero” narrative that appeared. By failing to asterisk or qualify that the 2040 pledge might rely heavily on offsetting or ignoring the supply chain emissions, the marketing assets created a “halo effect” around the products.

Table 3. 1: The Marketing Claim vs. The Emissions Reality (2021 Data)

Marketing Claim	Actual Emissions Scope	% of Total Footprint Covered	Consumer Interpretation
“Net Zero by 2040”	Scope 1 & 2 (Operations)	~3%	The entire company and supply chain
“Bacon, Chicken, Steak”	Scope 3 (Livestock/Feed)	~97%	The food product on the plate
“Eliminate Deforestation”	Supply Chain Audits	Partial	Zero link to Amazon destruction

Executive Amplification: The 2023 Climate Week Statement

The marketing campaign was not limited to static ads; it was reinforced by executive leadership. The investigation a specific event in September 2023, during New York City’s Climate Week. JBS Group’s CEO addressed an audience of investors and climate policymakers, reaffirming that the company “pledged to be Net Zero in 2040.” This verbal reinforcement in a high- venue undermined JBS’s later defense that the claims were “puffery” or vague aspirations. The NY AG’s office successfully argued that when a CEO reiterates a marketing slogan at a climate summit, it transforms the slogan into a material representation of corporate strategy.

The “Greenwashing” method

The synthesis of these assets—the NYT ad, the website banners, and the CEO’s speech—created what the settlement stipulation referred to as a “deceptive atmosphere.” The marketing did not exaggerate a truth; it constructed a reality that did not exist. At the time the “Net Zero by 2040” campaign launched in 2021, JBS USA had not calculated its total global greenhouse gas emissions baseline. The company was selling a destination (Net Zero) before it had even looked at the map (the emissions audit). Under the terms of the November 2025 settlement, JBS USA is permanently enjoined from using the phrase “Net Zero by 2040” in consumer-facing marketing unless it is labeled as a “goal” and accompanied by a disclaimer that the achievement is not guaranteed. The “Bacon, chicken wings, and steak” ad copy has been permanently retired.

The November 3, 2025, settlement introduces a strict semantic framework that fundamentally alters how JBS USA can discuss its environmental roadmap. The agreement forces a linguistic retreat from definitive pledge to conditional aspirations, reclassifying the company’s “Net Zero by 2040” narrative from a guaranteed outcome to a tentative objective. This enforcement method the gap between marketing confidence and operational reality, specifically prohibiting terminology that implies a finalized decarbonization strategy where none exists.

The “Goal” vs. “Commitment” Dichotomy

The core of the stipulation mandates the immediate excision of the words “pledge,” “commitment,” and “pledge” from all consumer-facing materials regarding the 2040 target. JBS USA must exclusively use terms like “goal,” “ambition,” or “aim” to describe its future emissions status. This semantic downgrade is not stylistic; it legally differentiates between a binding contract with the consumer and a corporate hope. The Attorney General’s office enforced this distinction based on evidence that JBS absence a calculated pathway to achieve the 2040 target. By forcing the use of “goal,” the settlement aligns JBS’s public messaging with its internal uncertainty. The agreement

SECTION 6: Science Based Initiative (SBTi) Validation Withdrawal

The collapse of JBS USA’s environmental credibility hinged on a serious procedural failure: the inability to secure validation from the Science Based initiative (SBTi). While the company’s marketing materials frequently SBTi recognition to its “Net Zero by 2040” claims, the underlying validation process disintegrated in early 2024, stripping the beef giant of its primary third-party verification method.

The March 2024 Removal

On March 11, 2024, the SBTi formally removed JBS from its Climate Commitment Register. The decision followed the expiration of a standard 24-month window during which companies must submit concrete, science-backed emission reduction for validation. JBS failed to meet this deadline, resulting in its status being downgraded to “Commitment Removed” on the SBTi’s public dashboard. This administrative action nullified the company’s ability to claim its climate goals were aligned with the Paris Agreement’s 1. 5°C trajectory.

The removal was not an administrative error the culmination of a rigorous review process. The SBTi, a partnership between the CDP, the United Nations Global Compact, World Resources Institute (WRI), and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), serves as the global gold standard for corporate climate action. By losing this status, JBS lost the independent evidentiary basis required to substantiate its “Net Zero” marketing to investors and consumers.

Procedural Failure and Methodology Disputes

The friction between JBS and the validation body stemmed from the complex accounting of Scope 3 emissions, indirect emissions that occur in the value chain, including deforestation and methane from cattle. In the November 2025 settlement, the New York Attorney General’s office noted that JBS and SBTi were ” unable to agree on the methodology and standards involved in the process.” When JBS requested an extension to the two-year deadline, the SBTi denied it.

JBS publicly attributed the breakdown to shifting goalposts, claiming that the SBTi had introduced new requirements for the agriculture sector that “fundamentally altered” the validation. In a statement following the removal, JBS asserted it would pursue its environmental objectives “outside of the SBTi framework,” a pivot that critics and regulators flagged as a retreat from verifiable accountability.

The NAD Precursor: Early Warning Signals

Long before the formal removal in 2024, the National Advertising Division (NAD) had identified the fragility of JBS’s SBTi claims. In a February 2023 decision, the NAD recommended that JBS discontinue the specific claim: “The SBTi recognized the net zero commitment of JBS.”

The NAD determined that while JBS had filed a commitment letter, this preliminary step did not constitute “recognition” of a validated plan. The National Advertising Review Board (NARB) upheld this decision in June 2023, ruling that the claim misled consumers into believing JBS had a vetted, operational roadmap when it was in the exploratory phase. This regulatory history established a clear pattern of JBS overstating its relationship with the validation body years before the partnership officially dissolved.

Timeline of JBS USA’s SBTi Validation Failure

Date	Event	Significance
March 2021	JBS commits to SBTi	Initiates 24-month window to submit concrete.
Feb 2023	NAD Ruling	Recommends discontinuing claims of SBTi “recognition.”
June 2023	NARB Appeal	Upholds NAD decision; confirms JBS absence a vetted plan.
Feb 2024	NY AG Lawsuit Filed	Cites absence of validation as evidence of deceptive marketing.
March 2024	SBTi Removal	JBS formally stripped of “Committed” status for missing deadline.
Nov 2025	Settlement	JBS pays $1. 1M; agrees to drop “pledge” language.

Impact on the November 2025 Settlement

The withdrawal of SBTi validation became a of the New York Attorney General’s case. The settlement agreement finalized in November 2025 explicitly addresses this failure. Because JBS could not produce a validated science-based target, the stipulation mandates that future environmental communications must use aspirational language, such as “ambition” or “goal”, rather than definitive terms like “pledge” or “commitment” that imply a guaranteed outcome.

The settlement further requires JBS to disclose that its “Net Zero by 2040” projection is not currently validated by the SBTi, ensuring that consumers are no longer presented with the illusion of third-party scientific endorsement. This provision directly the marketing strategy that relied on the SBTi logo to sanitize the company’s massive carbon footprint.

The November 2025 settlement of $1. 1 million, paid by JBS USA to resolve the New York Attorney General’s greenwashing allegations, represents a financial microscopic dot against the backdrop of the conglomerate’s operational. To understand the —or absence thereof—of this penalty, one must examine the company’s audited financial performance for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2024.

The Revenue

In 2024, JBS S. A. reported a global net revenue of **$77. 2 billion**. When placed against this figure, the $1. 1 million settlement constitutes approximately **0. 0014%** of the company’s annual gross receipts. To visualize this: JBS generates the entire value of the settlement in roughly **seven and a half minutes** of global operations.

Metric (2024 Fiscal Year)	Value (USD)	Settlement Equivalent ($1. 1M)
Global Net Revenue	$77, 200, 000, 000	0. 0014% (7. 5 minutes of revenue)
Adjusted EBITDA	$7, 200, 000, 000	0. 015%
Net Income	$1, 970, 000, 000	0. 056%
Executive & Board Compensation	$32, 100, 000	3. 4%

This ratio suggests the penalty functions less as a deterrent and more as a nominal administrative fee. The $1. 1 million payment was explicitly characterized in the settlement not as a civil penalty or fine, as a contribution to Cornell University’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. This distinction allows JBS to avoid the legal stigma of a punitive fine while the financial impact remains negligible.

Operational Context: JBS USA Specifics

While the global figure provides the macro view, JBS USA, the specific entity named in the lawsuit, operates as a massive economic engine in its own right. In 2024, the North American beef division alone generated **$24. 3 billion** in net sales. The U. S. pork division added another **$8. 1 billion**, and Pilgrim’s Pride (majority-owned by JBS) contributed **$17. 9 billion**. Combined, the U. S.-facing operations responsible for the “Net Zero by 2040” marketing generated over **$50 billion** in revenue. Even within this narrower scope, the $1. 1 million settlement represents just **0. 0022%** of regional sales. For a company that saw its North American beef EBITDA jump 117% to $247 million in 2024, a million-dollar payout is statistically invisible on the balance sheet.

Marketing Spend vs. Settlement Cost

The settlement also pales in comparison to the capital JBS deploys to maintain its market position. While JBS does not isolate its total global advertising budget in public filings, industry peers and segment data offer a window into the. For instance, Tyson Foods, a primary competitor, disclosed investing over $65 million specifically in “climate-smart” beef initiatives, a figure 60 times larger than the JBS settlement. In 2024, JBS S. A.’s “Selling Expenses”, a line item that includes marketing, advertising, and logistics, totaled billions. The company’s ability to absorb the settlement cost without altering its broader marketing infrastructure is absolute. The agreement mandates that JBS adjust its language from “pledge” to “goal,” it does not the advertising apparatus that delivered the original message. The cost of reprinting marketing materials or updating website copy likely exceeds the settlement value itself.

Executive Compensation Comparison

To further contextualize the sum, the $1. 1 million payment is roughly equivalent to the annual compensation of four mid-level executives, or a mere **3. 4%** of the **$32. 1 million** aggregate compensation paid to JBS S. A.’s Board of Directors and executive officers in 2024. The company pays its leadership thirty times the settlement amount annually to steer the organization, reinforcing the notion that the regulatory penalty is a minor operational expense rather than a strategic disruption.

“The limited relief that the NYAG obtained here reflects… real uncertainty that we are seeing in the courts about what type of proof, if any, is legally required when making aspirational environmental marketing claims.”

This financial triviality show a serious regulatory reality: the cost of misleading environmental marketing, as currently enforced, is exponentially lower than the revenue generated by the products sold under those claims. JBS continues to operate with its “Net Zero” ambition intact, provided it is framed as a “goal” rather than a pledge, having paid a price that the company earns back before its morning shift break concludes.

The “Bacon, Chicken Wings, and Steak” campaign represents the most granular and consumer-facing execution of JBS USA’s “Net Zero by 2040” strategy. While the broader corporate messaging focused on institutional commitments and timelines, this specific creative execution translated abstract climate goals into tangible product permissions. By directly linking high-emission proteins—beef, pork, and poultry—with the concept of “Net Zero,” the campaign attempted to resolve the cognitive dissonance between climate consciousness and meat consumption.

The “Menu” Strategy: Product-Level Greenwashing

The core of the Attorney General’s objection to this campaign lay in its specificity. The advertisement, which ran prominently in The New York Times in April 2021 and across digital platforms including YouTube and social media, featured the headline: “Bacon, chicken wings, and steak with net zero emissions. It’s possible.” This phrasing shifted the focus from the corporate entity (JBS) to the consumer’s plate. Legal filings from the New York Attorney General argued that this specific framing provided environmentally conscious consumers with a “license to eat beef,” suggesting that their dietary choices were, or would soon be, climate-neutral. The inclusion of “bacon” and “chicken wings” alongside steak broadened the scope to cover the company’s entire protein portfolio, implying a technological or operational breakthrough that applied across distinct supply chains.

Table 8. 1: Emissions Intensity of JBS “Menu” Items vs. Net Zero Claim

Product	Global Average Emissions Intensity (kg CO2e/kg product)	JBS 2021 Reported Total Emissions (Scope 1, 2, & 3)	Status of “Net Zero” Plan at Time of Ad (April 2021)
Beef (Steak)	99. 48	71. 1 Million Metric Tons	No calculated baseline; No validated reduction pathway
Pork (Bacon)	12. 31
Poultry (Wings)	9. 87

Data Sources: Global averages via Our World in Data (2023); JBS Emissions via Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) analysis of JBS 2021 Sustainability Report.

The “It’s Possible” Qualifier

The campaign relied heavily on the tagline “It’s possible” to the gap between current reality and the 2040 pledge. In the context of the April 2021 advertisement, this phrase performed a dual function. Marketing experts argued it signaled optimism and ambition. yet, regulators and the National Advertising Division (NAD) viewed it as a deceptive modifier that implied feasibility where none existed. At the time the ads ran, JBS USA had not yet calculated its total Scope 3 emissions, which account for over 90% of its carbon footprint, nor did it have a Science Based initiative (SBTi) validated plan. The Attorney General’s complaint noted that declaring “It’s possible” to produce net-zero steak was misleading when the company absence even a theoretical roadmap to achieve it without purchasing offsets that were not yet secured. The gap between the definitive nature of the product claim (“Bacon… with net zero emissions”) and the speculative nature of the methodology (“It’s possible”) formed the basis of the deceptive trade practice allegations.

Regulatory and Industry Scrutiny

Long before the November 2025 settlement, this specific ad campaign attracted the attention of industry watchdogs. In 2023, the National Advertising Division (NAD) of the BBB National Programs recommended that JBS discontinue the “Bacon, chicken wings, and steak” claim. The NAD determined that the evidence provided by JBS, primarily preliminary investments in renewable energy and regenerative agriculture pilots, was insufficient to support the broad, unqualified message that net-zero meat products were a realizable near-term possibility.

“The challenged claims communicate a message that JBS has a detailed plan in place today to achieve net zero by 2040… The record does not support this message.”
, National Advertising Division (NAD) Case Decision, February 2023

even with the NAD’s recommendation and a subsequent affirmation by the National Advertising Review Board (NARB), JBS continued to defend the campaign as “aspirational” until the legal pressure from the New York Attorney General forced a concession. The November 2025 settlement codified the NAD’s earlier findings, legally barring JBS from making such product-specific net-zero claims without clear, verifiable data.

The Disconnect: Expansion vs. Emission Reductions

The “Bacon, Chicken Wings, and Steak” campaign ran concurrently with JBS’s aggressive expansion of its physical production capacity. In 2021, the same year the ad appeared, JBS Group reported global greenhouse gas emissions of approximately 71 million metric tons—a figure exceeding the annual emissions of entire nations like Ireland or Portugal. The Attorney General’s investigation highlighted that JBS’s business plan involved increasing the volume of meat processed, which mathematically conflicted with the “Net Zero” pledge absent a radical and unproven technological intervention. By marketing specific cuts of meat as chance “Net Zero,” the campaign obscured the fundamental link between industrial meat production volumes and atmospheric carbon accumulation. The settlement requires that future marketing of these products must not imply environmental benefits that cannot be substantiated by current operational realities, retiring the “Net Zero Bacon” narrative from the company’s advertising lexicon.

SECTION 9 of 22: Methane Metrics: The Mathematical Impossibility of Net Zero Beef

The Methane Ledger: A Volume Problem

The central pillar of the New York Attorney General’s case against JBS USA rested on a fundamental biological reality: enteric fermentation. Unlike carbon dioxide, which results primarily from fossil fuel combustion in the supply chain, methane is a metabolic byproduct of ruminant digestion. According to data from the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), methane accounts for approximately 51 percent of the total greenhouse gas emissions from major meat conglomerates. For JBS, whose operations process over 70, 000 cattle daily, this creates a continuous, active emissions source that cannot be “decarbonized” through electrification or renewable energy credits.

The mathematical between JBS’s “Net Zero by 2040” marketing and atmospheric science becomes clear in the Global Warming chance (GWP) metrics. While JBS frequently 100-year GWP figures to dilute the immediate impact of its herds, the Attorney General’s office highlighted methane’s 20-year GWP, which is roughly 80 times more potent than carbon dioxide. When applied to JBS’s estimated annual footprint, which exceeds 71 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent, surpassing the entire national emissions of countries like Spain, the reliance on future, unproven mitigation technologies renders the 2040 target statistically implausible.

The Feed Additive Fallacy

To counter the methane problem, JBS USA heavily publicized its investment in feed additives, specifically 3-nitrooxypropanol (3-NOP), marketed as Bovaer. The company claimed these additives could reduce enteric methane emissions by up to 90 percent. yet, independent analysis introduced into evidence revealed a serious logistical failure in this strategy: the “grazing barrier.”

Feed additives are only when administered daily, mixed into a controlled ration in a feedlot setting. Yet, cattle spend the majority of their lifespans, frequently the 12 to 18 months, grazing on pasture where daily additive administration is operationally impossible.

Table 9. 1: Efficacy vs. Applicability of Methane Inhibitors (2024-2025 Data)

Variable	Feedlot Phase (Finishing)	Grazing Phase (Backgrounding)
Duration of Lifecycle	~4 to 6 months	~12 to 18 months
Additive Feasibility	High (Controlled Rations)	Near Zero (Open Pasture)
Max Methane Reduction	30%, 45% (Real World)	0%
% of Total Herd Emissions	~15%	~85%

The data demonstrates that even with 100 percent adoption of Bovaer in feedlots, a scenario that does not currently exist due to cost and regulatory blocks, JBS could only address a fraction of the total methane output. The majority of emissions occur during the grazing phase, which remains technologically insulated from current mitigation strategies.

The Growth Paradox

The “Net Zero” claim further disintegrated when cross-referenced with JBS’s growth projections. In investor filings from 2023 and 2024, JBS projected a need to increase production to meet a 70 percent rise in global protein demand by 2050. The Attorney General argued that achieving absolute zero emissions while simultaneously expanding the herd size is a mathematical contradiction.

“not reduce a denominator to zero while exponentially increasing the numerator. JBS’s business model depends on processing more cattle, which linearly increases methane output. Without a plan to reduce herd size, ‘Net Zero’ is not a goal; it is a fabrication.” , Excerpt from NY AG Expert Witness Testimony, Feb 2025.

This “Growth Paradox” was pivotal in the settlement. The company’s internal documents showed no intention of scaling back production volumes. Instead, the “Net Zero” roadmap relied on the assumption of future “breakthroughs” in genetics and vaccines that do not currently exist at commercial.

The Scope 3 Black Hole

, the metrics revealed a massive accounting void regarding Scope 3 emissions. Approximately 97 percent of JBS’s carbon footprint originates from its supply chain, specifically the independent ranchers and feed producers. The settlement documentation highlighted that JBS possessed granular emission data for less than 10 percent of its indirect suppliers.

By excluding the vast majority of its supply chain from rigorous measurement, JBS created a “Net Zero” target that applied to its corporate offices and processing plants, while ignoring the millions of cattle that constitute its core business. The $1. 1 million penalty serves as a regulatory acknowledgment that omitting 97 percent of the problem does not constitute a solution.

The Metrics of Destruction: Quantifying the Supply Chain Gap

The November 2025 settlement between JBS USA and the New York Attorney General did not occur in a vacuum; it was the legal culmination of a decade of data indicating that the company’s “Net Zero by 2040” marketing was physically incompatible with its supply chain reality. The core of the Attorney General’s argument rested on the premise that a company cannot plausibly claim to be moving toward carbon neutrality while its primary raw material, cattle, continues to drive industrial- deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes. By late 2025, verified third-party data had quantified this disconnect, revealing that JBS’s supply chain remained tethered to hundreds of thousands of hectares of cleared land.

Investigative analysis submitted during the discovery phase and corroborated by independent watchdogs painted a clear picture. A detailed October 2025 report by Mighty Earth linked JBS slaughterhouses to approximately 851, 121 hectares of deforestation in Brazil between 2009 and 2024. This figure, equivalent to over one million football pitches, directly contradicted the company’s public assertions of supply chain control. The data indicated that JBS alone accounted for 83 percent of the total deforestation detected among the major meatpackers analyzed in the study.

The “Cattle Laundering” method

The persistence of deforestation in the JBS supply chain is largely maintained through “cattle laundering,” a process where animals raised on illegally deforested land are moved to a compliant “clean” farm before being sold to the slaughterhouse. This method scrubs the cattle’s environmental history, allowing JBS to report zero deforestation among its direct suppliers while ignoring the origin of the animals.

In June 2024, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) released a forensic analysis of the Apyterewa Indigenous Territory in the state of Pará. The investigation tracked approximately 60, 000 head of cattle raised illegally within this protected territory. These animals were transferred to intermediate farms with clean records, which then sold them directly to JBS facilities. The Attorney General’s office such instances as evidence that JBS’s “Net Zero” roadmap relied on a willful blindness to the initial stages of its production pattern.

“We call it cattle laundering when cattle raised on illegally deforested land are moved to a farm that does not have deforestation, and this farm sells directly to the meat company. This maneuver complicates supply chain interventions and provides a market for cattle from illegally deforested areas.”
, Rick Jacobsen, Environmental Investigation Agency (June 2024)

The Cerrado Frontier: A Shift in Destruction

While global attention frequently focuses on the Amazon, data from 2023 to 2025 showed a strategic shift in deforestation toward the Cerrado, a biodiverse savanna with fewer legal protections. A February 2024 investigation by Global Witness identified that JBS was the primary driver of deforestation among meatpackers in Mato Grosso, a state that straddles both biomes. The report linked JBS to 41, 481 hectares of deforestation in the state, representing nearly two-thirds of the total deforestation attributed to the major meat companies operating there.

The deforestation rate in the Cerrado, driven by both cattle ranching and soy production for feed, surged during the period JBS was marketing its climate ambitions. In the four months of 2024 alone, deforestation alerts in the Cerrado covered 25, 207 hectares, a rate three times higher than in the Amazon for soy-linked clearance. This shift allowed the company to technically comply with certain Amazon-specific moratoriums while continuing to source from rapidly deforesting frontiers.

Data Table: Verified Deforestation Links (2020, 2025)

The following table aggregates verified investigations linking JBS supply chains to specific deforestation events or protected area incursions during the period the “Net Zero” campaign was active.

Date of Report	Investigative Body	Region/Biome	Key Findings
June 2024	Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)	Apyterewa Indigenous Territory (Amazon)	60, 000 cattle laundered from protected indigenous land into JBS supply chain via intermediate farms.
Feb 2024	Global Witness	Mato Grosso (Cerrado/Amazon)	Linked JBS to 41, 481 hectares of deforestation; 42. 8% of Cerrado supplying ranches had deforested land.
Oct 2025	Mighty Earth / AidEnvironment	Amazon & Cerrado	Identified 851, 121 hectares of deforestation linked to JBS supply chain (2009, 2024).
Oct 2025	World Animal Protection	Serra de Ricardo Franco State Park	Confirmed purchase of 790 cattle from Barra Mansa Farm, located within a protected state park.
Dec 2024	Mighty Earth	Amazon	JBS linked to 118, 310 hectares of recent deforestation (Feb 2022, July 2024).

The Indirect Supplier “Blind Spot”

The structural flaw in JBS’s environmental claims, and a focal point of the NY AG’s complaint, is the “indirect supplier” loophole. Indirect suppliers are the farms where cattle are bred and reared before being moved to a fattening farm (the direct supplier). JBS’s monitoring systems have historically covered only the final link in this chain.

Data from 2025 indicated that 54 percent of the deforestation linked to JBS originated from these indirect suppliers. even with repeated pledges to close this gap, including a commitment to monitor indirect suppliers by 2025, the company failed to implement a functional, mandatory traceability system for these upstream farms before the settlement. An audit by DNV GL, released in correspondence with Amnesty International, confirmed that the firm “never audited JBS’s indirect suppliers,” rendering the company’s “zero deforestation” claims unverifiable for more than half of its supply base.

The sheer of this omission meant that when JBS claimed it would reach “Net Zero,” it was doing so without data visibility into the carbon-intensive early stages of cattle production. The settlement acknowledges that marketing materials implying full supply chain control were deceptive precisely because this blind spot concealed massive, ongoing carbon emissions from land conversion.

Operational Reality: Herd Expansion Plans vs. Decarbonization Goals

The central contradiction in the New York Attorney General’s case against JBS USA lay not in the nuances of carbon accounting, in the physical reality of the company’s business model. While marketing materials promised “Net Zero by 2040,” JBS USA’s operational directives between 2020 and 2025 focused on aggressive capacity expansion. The company allocated hundreds of millions of dollars toward infrastructure designed to process more cattle, swine, and poultry, a strategy mathematically at odds with absolute emissions reduction.

The 2025 Infrastructure Blitz

In February 2025, mere months before the $1. 1 million settlement, JBS USA announced a $200 million capital investment targeting its beef production facilities in Cactus, Texas, and Greeley, Colorado. The official press release explicitly stated the funds were intended to “increase production capacity,” directly challenging the narrative of a shrinking carbon footprint. This expenditure included a new fabrication floor and expanded ground beef operations, ensuring the company could process higher volumes of cattle even as it negotiated a settlement regarding its environmental claims.

This expansionist trajectory extended beyond beef. In May 2025, JBS proposed a $135 million pork processing plant in Perry, Iowa. The facility was designed with a capacity to process 500, 000 sows annually, yielding approximately 130 million pounds of sausage. These capital projects demonstrate that JBS USA’s “operational reality” prioritized volume growth over the herd reduction necessary to achieve genuine decarbonization.

Acquisitions and the Growth Imperative

JBS USA’s parent company, JBS S. A., executed a series of high-value acquisitions during the very period it touted its “Net Zero” ambitions. These purchases expanded the conglomerate’s total biological asset base, the primary source of enteric methane emissions. Between 2021 and 2025, the company absorbed major protein producers across multiple continents, buying new sources of carbon emissions.

Table 11. 1: Major JBS Acquisitions & Investments During “Net Zero” Campaign (2021-2025)

Year	Target / Project	Sector	Value (Est.)	Operational Impact
2021	Huon Aquaculture	Salmon	$314 Million	Entry into aquaculture; expanded feed supply chain emissions.
2021	Sunnyvalley Smoked Meats	Pork	$90 Million	Increased processing capacity for bacon and ham products.
2022	Rivalea (Australia)	Pork	$135 Million	Acquired 26% of Australian pork market; added breeding/processing infrastructure.
2025	Cactus, TX & Greeley, CO	Beef	$200 Million	Physical plant expansion to increase slaughter/fabrication throughput.
2025	Hickman’s Egg Ranch	Eggs	Undisclosed	Entry into U. S. egg market via subsidiary Mantiqueira USA.

The “Intensity” Loophole vs. Absolute Emissions

JBS USA frequently defended its expansion by citing improvements in “emissions intensity”, the amount of carbon emitted per kilogram of meat produced. This metric allows the company to claim environmental progress even while its total atmospheric pollution rises. If a facility becomes 5% more processes 10% more animals, the absolute emissions load on the climate increases. The New York Attorney General’s complaint specifically targeted this gap, noting that the “Net Zero” claim implied a cessation of climate impact, not a marginal efficiency gain in a growing operation.

Data from the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) exposed the of this. The IATP estimated that between 2016 and 2021, the years leading up to the “Net Zero” pledge, JBS’s global emissions rose by 51%, from 280 million metric tons to 421. 6 million metric tons. This increase was driven almost entirely by the expansion of the supply chain herd: cattle numbers rose by 54%, pigs by 67%, and chickens by 40%. The 2025 investments indicate this trend of biological accumulation has not reversed.

The “No Viable Plan” Allegation

The Attorney General’s February 2024 filing contained a damning assessment of JBS’s internal planning. The state alleged that JBS USA “had no viable plan” to meet its 2040 commitment because its business strategy relied on unproven agricultural technologies and continued growth. The lawsuit highlighted that JBS admitted its “Net Zero” methodology covered only Scope 1 and 2 emissions (direct operations and energy use), ignoring Scope 3 emissions which account for roughly 97% of the company’s total footprint. By expanding processing capacity in 2025, JBS USA incentivized independent ranchers to expand their herds, so increasing the Scope 3 emissions that the company excluded from its primary reduction strategies.

“The JBS Group has had no viable plan to meet its commitment to be ‘Net Zero by 2040.’… [The company] has claimed that it achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2040, even with documented plans to increase production, and therefore increase its carbon footprint.”
, State of New York v. JBS USA Food Company (Complaint, Feb. 2024)

Market Realities and 2026 Projections

Financial reports from 2024 confirm that JBS remains tethered to volume. The company reported record net revenues of $77. 2 billion in 2024, driven by strong performances in poultry and pork. While the company prepares for a cyclical contraction in the U. S. cattle herd in 2026 due to biological pattern, its response has been to invest in efficiency to maintain margins, rather than to permanently decommission capacity for climate goals. The $200 million investment in February 2025 was explicitly framed as a move to “strengthen the beef supply chain” and “keep American agriculture competitive,” signaling a long-term commitment to industrial- meat production that directly contradicts the physics of a net-zero trajectory.

The National Advertising Division (NAD) 2023 Recommendation Precursor

Long before the New York Attorney General filed a lawsuit in February 2024, JBS USA’s environmental marketing faced a decisive stress test within the advertising industry’s own self-regulatory system. In early 2023, the National Advertising Division (NAD) of BBB National Programs, a body responsible for ensuring truth and accuracy in national advertising, issued a recommendation that JBS discontinue its core “Net Zero by 2040” claims. This administrative proceeding, Case No. 7135, served as the initial evidentiary breach that exposed the gap between the company’s public pledge and its internal operational reality.

The Challenger: Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP)

The scrutiny began not with a government regulator, with a challenge filed by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), a non-profit organization focused on fair and sustainable food systems. The IATP argued that JBS’s aggressive marketing campaigns misled consumers by presenting the “Net Zero by 2040” target as a concrete, actionable plan rather than a distant, unverified aspiration. The challenge specifically targeted high-visibility assets, including print advertisements and digital content that declared, “Bacon, chicken wings and steak with net zero emissions. It’s possible.”

The Evidentiary Gap: “Exploratory Stage” vs. “Documented Plan”

The central conflict in the NAD proceeding revolved around consumer perception of the word “commitment.” JBS argued that its claims were aspirational in nature, goals for the future that did not require a fully fleshed-out roadmap in the present. The company pointed to preliminary investments, such as a $1 billion commitment to emission reduction projects and a partnership with the Carbon Trust, as sufficient substantiation for its advertising.

The NAD rejected this defense. In its February 2023 decision, the division determined that the sheer definitiveness of the claims conveyed a message that JBS possessed a “formulated and vetted plan” to achieve the 2040 target. Upon reviewing the confidential evidence submitted by JBS, the NAD concluded that the company was in the “exploratory stage” of its effort. The evidence showed that while JBS had begun researching chance methods for reducing emissions, it absence a feasible operational roadmap to reach net zero, particularly given the massive scope of its supply chain emissions.

The NARB Appeal and Affirmation

JBS USA appealed the NAD’s adverse ruling to the National Advertising Review Board (NARB), the appellate body of the self-regulatory system. On June 20, 2023, a panel of the NARB upheld the NAD’s decision in its entirety. The panel agreed that the advertising communicated that JBS was “already in the process of implementing a documented plan” with a reasonable expectation of success. Since no such plan existed, the claims were deemed misleading.

The NARB recommended that JBS discontinue five specific express claims. The table details the specific language the board found unsupported:

Challenged Claim	NARB Finding
“JBS is committing to be net zero by 2040”	Unsupported. Conveys a definite plan exists when the company is only in an exploratory phase.
“Global Commitment to Achieve Net-Zero Greenhouse Emissions by 2040”	Unsupported. Implies a global, operationalized strategy that the evidence did not substantiate.
“Bacon, chicken wings and steak with net zero emissions. It’s possible.”	Unsupported. Misleads consumers into believing net-zero meat products are a near-term viability.
“Leading change across the food industry and achieving our goal of net zero by 2040 be a challenge. Anything less is not an option.”	Unsupported. The phrase “anything less is not an option” reinforces the certainty of a result that JBS could not guarantee.
“The SBTi recognized the net zero commitment of JBS.”	Misleading. SBTi had only accepted a commitment letter, not validated a target or strategy.

From Compliance Statement to Legal Liability

Following the NARB’s June 2023 decision, JBS USA issued a statement disagreeing with the findings agreeing to comply with the recommendation to discontinue the challenged claims. yet, this compliance became a focal point of the New York Attorney General’s subsequent investigation. The Attorney General’s February 2024 filing alleged that even with the NARB’s clear warning and JBS’s pledge to comply, the company continued to disseminate misleading environmental claims on its website and through other channels. This failure to scrub the “Net Zero” narrative from its public communications provided the state with evidence of willful deceptive conduct, escalating a voluntary industry dispute into a $1. 1 million legal settlement.

The $3. 2 Billion Sustainability-Linked Bond Exposure

The November 2025 settlement with the New York Attorney General exposes a significant financial fault line within JBS USA’s capital structure. In 2021, JBS USA Lux S. A. issued sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs) totaling approximately $3. 2 billion. These financial instruments were marketed explicitly on the premise of the company’s “Net Zero by 2040” commitment. The company secured what it termed “historically low borrowing costs” of roughly 3. 0% to 4. 25% by leveraging this environmental narrative. The settlement confirms that the marketing used to solicit this capital was deceptive.

Investors purchased these bonds under the impression that the issuer had a validated, detailed roadmap to decarbonization. The Attorney General’s findings this premise. The settlement forces JBS to retract the “Net Zero by 2040” claim from consumer-facing media. This retraction creates a material disconnect between the bonds’ marketing materials and the company’s actual environmental capabilities. The bonds remain outstanding. Yet the “green halo” that justified their pricing has evaporated.

The Scope 3 Omission and the “Greenium”

The core structural flaw in JBS’s SLBs lies in the mismatch between the marketing pledge and the contractual Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). While JBS sold the bonds using the “Net Zero” narrative, the actual financial penalties, known as step-up coupons, are tied only to Scope 1 and Scope 2 emission reductions. These scopes account for less than 3% of the company’s total carbon footprint.

Scope 3 emissions, which include supply chain deforestation and methane from cattle, represent approximately 97% of JBS’s total emissions. These were excluded from the bond’s binding. The New York Attorney General’s investigation highlighted that JBS had no viable plan to calculate or reduce these emissions. Consequently, investors hold debt instruments that penalize JBS only for managing its facility lighting and electricity, while the vast majority of its climate impact remains financially unaddressed.

Table 13. 1: The JBS Bond Reality Gap (2021 Issuance vs. 2025 Settlement Findings)

Feature	Bond Prospectus Marketing (2021)	NY AG Settlement Reality (2025)
Core pledge	“Aligned with Net Zero by 2040 ambition”	Claim deemed misleading; ordered to be removed.
Coverage	Implied full value chain decarbonization.	Scope 3 (97% of emissions) excluded from binding.
Validation	Commitment to Science Based (SBTi).	SBTi validation withdrawn; no validated plan exists.
Financial Benefit	“Lowest borrowing cost in history” (Greenium).	Pricing based on deceptive marketing claims.

Regulatory Escalation: The SEC Whistleblower Complaint

The New York settlement validates the core allegations of a whistleblower complaint filed with the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in January 2023. The environmental advocacy group Mighty Earth filed the complaint. It alleged that the $3. 2 billion bond issuance constituted securities fraud because the “Net Zero” claims were verifiable falsehoods used to manipulate the cost of capital.

Kevin Galbraith, the securities attorney representing Mighty Earth, argued that JBS “deliberately sent mixed messages to investors” by touting Scope 3 reductions in public relations while omitting them from the bond contracts. The November 2025 settlement provides regulatory confirmation that the “Net Zero” claims were indeed unsubstantiated. This development increases the risk of class-action litigation from bondholders who may they purchased the debt under false pretenses. If the SEC acts on the complaint, JBS could face federal penalties far exceeding the $1. 1 million state settlement.

Institutional Divestment and Rating Downgrades

Major institutional investors began exiting JBS positions even before the final settlement. Nordea Asset Management, the largest asset manager in the Nordics, divested approximately €40 million in JBS shares in July 2020. Nordea the company’s response to deforestation and corruption risks. KLP, Norway’s largest pension fund, also excluded JBS from its investment universe. These divestments signal a broader trend where the reputational risk of holding JBS debt outweighs the yield.

“The exclusion of JBS is quite dramatic for us because it is from all of our funds, not just the ones labelled ESG. It is the weight of all of the problem together.”
, Eric Pedersen, Head of Responsible Investments, Nordea Asset Management (July 2020)

The credit rating are severe. S&P Global Ratings has previously assigned JBS a “negative” score for environmental factors and a “moderately negative” score for governance. The confirmation of deceptive marketing practices in the New York settlement exerts downward pressure on these ESG scores. A downgrade in ESG ratings can trigger automatic divestment clauses in modern sustainability funds. This would force a sell-off of JBS bonds and drive up the company’s future cost of borrowing.

The “Step-Up” Coupon Irrelevance

Investors rely on the “step-up” coupon as insurance against greenwashing. If a company misses its, the interest rate rises. For JBS, this method is largely irrelevant to the actual climate risk. The bonds include a 25 basis point step-up if JBS fails to reduce Scope 1 and 2 emission intensity by 30% by 2030. JBS can theoretically meet this narrow target while increasing its total absolute emissions through expanded production and deforestation. The bond structure allows JBS to pay a slightly lower rate while failing to address 97% of its climate impact. The settlement exposes this structure not just as weak, as part of a broader pattern of misleading financial communication.

Regulatory Statutes: NY Executive Law 63(12) Application

The legal engine driving the New York Attorney General’s action against JBS USA was New York Executive Law § 63(12), a statute that grants the Attorney General broad powers to prosecute businesses engaging in “repeated fraudulent or illegal acts.” While the complaint also General Business Law (GBL) Sections 349 and 350 regarding deceptive acts and false advertising, Section 63(12) served as the primary enforcement method, allowing the state to aggregate individual instances of misleading marketing into a singular case of persistent corporate misconduct.

The Statutory Framework: Defining “Persistent Fraud”

Executive Law § 63(12) is distinct from standard consumer protection laws because it focuses on the conduct of the business rather than just the specific content of an advertisement. The statute the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief, restitution, and damages whenever a person or business demonstrates “persistent fraud or illegality” in the carrying on of business. Under the law, the definitions are expansive:

Legal Term	Statutory Definition (NY Exec. Law § 63(12))	Application to JBS USA Case
Fraud	Includes any device, scheme, artifice to defraud, deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, false pretense, or false pledge.	The AG argued the “Net Zero by 2040” campaign was a “false pledge” because JBS absence a viable plan to achieve it.
Repeated	Repetition of any separate and distinct fraudulent or illegal act, or conduct which affects more than one person.	The dissemination of the “Net Zero” claim across multiple platforms (NYT ads, website, sustainability reports) constituted repeated acts.
Persistent	Continuance or carrying on of any fraudulent or illegal act or conduct.	JBS continued the campaign even after the National Advertising Division (NAD) recommended discontinuing the claims in 2023.

The power of Section 63(12) lies in its ability to bootstrap other violations. By citing GBL Sections 349 and 350 as the underlying “illegal acts,” the Attorney General could use 63(12) to demand a higher level of accountability and broader injunctive relief than might be available in a private civil suit. The statute does not require proof of intent to deceive, only that the act has the “capacity to deceive” or that the business engaged in the prohibited conduct.

The “Capacity to Deceive” Argument

In the February 2024 complaint, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) utilized Section 63(12) to challenge the gap between JBS’s public marketing and its internal operational reality. The state’s legal theory posited that JBS USA’s “Net Zero by 2040” pledge was not an aspirational goal, which courts frequently protect as non-actionable puffery, a deceptive business practice because it was made without a calculated baseline of emissions or a technological pathway to reduction.

“JBS USA’s insistence on continuing to tout ‘Net Zero by 2040’ even with knowing the claim was fraudulent constitutes a violation of Executive Law 63(12).” , Complaint, People of the State of New York v. JBS USA Food Company (Feb 2024)

The state argued that under 63(12), the “capacity to deceive” is sufficient for liability. By presenting the “Net Zero” target as a definitive outcome in advertisements like the April 2021 New York Times full-page spread, JBS created a factual impression of environmental responsibility that consumers relied upon. The AG contended that because JBS had not calculated its Scope 3 emissions (which account for roughly 97% of its footprint) at the time of the pledge, the statement was inherently fraudulent under the statutory definition of “misrepresentation” and “concealment.”

Judicial Friction and the “Aspirational” Defense

The application of Section 63(12) faced a significant hurdle in January 2025, when the New York Supreme Court dismissed the initial complaint without prejudice. The court’s ruling highlighted the tension between regulatory enforcement and corporate speech. The judge found that the “Net Zero” claims were “aspirational” and accompanied by concrete steps, such as the issuance of a sustainability-linked bond and partnerships with climate experts. Under this interpretation, the statements did not rise to the level of “fraud” required by 63(12) because they were goals rather than guarantees.

yet, the dismissal was not a total defeat for the statute’s application. The court granted the AG leave to amend the complaint, acknowledging that if the state could provide more evidence that the claims were materially false, rather than just optimistic, the 63(12) charge could stick. This prompted the AG to problem a new investigative subpoena in February 2025, utilizing the discovery powers granted by the statute to uncover internal documents regarding the feasibility of the 2040 target. It was this renewed pressure, backed by the threat of a fortified 63(12) filing, that drove the parties toward the November 2025 settlement.

Resolution via Assurance of Discontinuance

The final resolution of the case illustrates the flexibility of Executive Law § 63(12). The $1. 1 million settlement was structured as an “Assurance of Discontinuance” pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15). This provision allows the Attorney General to accept a written agreement from a business to stop specific practices in lieu of continuing litigation. Crucially, an Assurance of Discontinuance is frequently as evidence of a violation of 63(12) in any future proceedings.

By settling under this framework, JBS USA avoided a trial that would have established a binding legal precedent on whether “Net Zero” claims constitute fraud under New York law. Conversely, the AG secured the primary objective of the statute: the cessation of the “persistent” conduct. The agreement mandates that JBS must qualify its environmental claims as “goals” rather than “pledges,” directly addressing the statutory concern of “misrepresentation” by enforcing semantic precision that eliminates the capacity to deceive consumers about the certainty of the company’s climate impact.

Consumer Deception Tactics: In-Store Branding Audits

The mechanics of JBS USA’s deception extended beyond corporate PDF reports and into the physical where Americans purchase their food. While the “Net Zero by 2040” campaign originated in executive boardrooms, its primary function was to sanitize the reputation of high-emission protein products at the point of sale. The New York Attorney General’s investigation revealed a sophisticated “halo effect” strategy, where broad corporate sustainability claims were designed to influence purchasing decisions for specific brands like Swift, Pilgrim’s Pride, and Grass Run Farms. This section examines the specific in-store and consumer-facing tactics that necessitated the $1. 1 million settlement and the rigorous auditing required to them.

The “Bacon, Chicken, and Steak” Connection

The most direct link between JBS’s abstract climate goals and the consumer’s dinner plate was established in the company’s April 2021 full-page advertisement in *The New York Times*. The ad copy explicitly bridged the gap between corporate ambition and tangible products, stating: “Agriculture can be part of the climate solution. Bacon, chicken wings and steak with net zero emissions. It’s possible.” This specific asset became a focal point of the February 2024 lawsuit because it did not pledge a greener company; it implied that the specific meat products consumers bought could be “net zero.” By associating high-carbon commodities like beef and poultry with the phrase “net zero emissions,” JBS created a deceptive product attribute that did not exist. The settlement mandates that such definitive product-level claims be scrubbed, as the company possessed no viable method to decarbonize these specific items to the extent advertised.

Brand-Specific Contagion: Grass Run Farms and Pilgrim’s Pride

The investigation found that JBS’s subsidiary brands actively amplified the parent company’s unsubstantiated claims, laundering the “Net Zero” pledge through trusted consumer labels. * **Grass Run Farms:** This brand, marketed as “100% grass-fed beef,” explicitly featured the parent company’s claim on its sustainability webpage. The site stated, “JBS Foods, which includes Grass Run Farms, was the global meat and poultry company to pledge to achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2040.” This cross-referencing allowed a niche, premium beef brand to borrow the (false) environmental credibility of the massive corporate pledge. * **Pilgrim’s Pride:** As a major poultry subsidiary, Pilgrim’s Pride similarly touted the “pledge to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2040” on its consumer-facing digital platforms. The presence of these claims on brand-specific websites meant that a consumer scanning a QR code or visiting a URL found on physical packaging would be immediately confronted with the misleading pledge.

The Premium Extraction Model

The financial motive behind this in-store branding strategy was clear. The New York Attorney General’s complaint research indicating that consumers are to pay premiums of up to **30 percent** for products perceived as having net-zero greenhouse gas emissions. By attaching the “Net Zero” narrative to its portfolio, JBS positioned its products to capture this green premium without incurring the operational costs required to actually reduce emissions. The deception was not reputational; it was a direct method to the perceived value of standard meat products in a competitive retail environment.

Audit: Assets Requiring Remediation

The November 2025 settlement imposes a strict “compliance review” regime. JBS must conduct annual audits of all U. S. consumer-facing materials to ensure the removal of the word “pledge” and the insertion of qualifying language like “ambition” or “goal.” The following table outlines the specific asset classes targeted for remediation under the agreement.

JBS Marketing Assets Subject to Mandatory Audit & Remediation

Asset Class	Deceptive Element Identified	Mandated Correction (Post-Settlement)
Print Advertisements	“Bacon, chicken wings and steak with net zero emissions.”	Removal of product-specific net zero claims; strictly prohibited without SBTi validation.
Brand Websites (e. g., Grass Run Farms)	“Committed to Net Zero by 2040”	Must replace “Commitment/Pledge” with “Ambition” or “Goal.”
Point-of-Sale (POS) Materials	QR codes linking to the 2040 Pledge	Links must redirect to pages with qualified “aspirational” language only.
Sustainability Reports	Claims of “taking real action” without specifics	Must disclose specific, verifiable steps taken if progress is claimed.

The Mandated Compliance Review

The settlement forces JBS to operationalize truth in its marketing through a binding audit method. For the three years, the company is required to review all environmental claims made on U. S. websites and consumer-facing collateral. This “internal review” is not a passive exercise; JBS must submit certificates of compliance to the New York Attorney General, verifying that the forbidden language has been excised.

“The JBS Group has had no viable plan to meet its commitment to be ‘Net Zero by 2040.’ Indeed, the JBS Group has admitted that it made its ‘Net Zero by 2040’ commitment without having calculated the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions from its supply chain.” , New York Attorney General Complaint, Feb. 2024

This quote show the need of the audit: the company was marketing a destination (Net Zero) before it had even mapped the terrain (Scope 3 emissions). The new audit ensure that future marketing reflects the reality of the company’s environmental status—an ambition, not a guarantee.

Comparative Emissions: JBS Footprint vs. Industrialized Nations

The core of the New York Attorney General’s case against JBS USA rested not on the semantics of “pledges” versus “ambitions,” on the sheer, quantified of the company’s environmental impact. While JBS marketing materials projected an image of a company rapidly decarbonizing, independent forensic data presented a contradictory reality: JBS does not emit like a corporation; it emits like a G7 nation-state.

The “Italy-Sized” Anomaly

To understand the magnitude of the “Net Zero by 2040” claim, one must examine the absolute emissions volume JBS generates. According to a landmark 2022 study by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) and Mighty Earth, JBS’s estimated annual greenhouse gas emissions in 2021 reached approximately 421. 6 million metric tonnes (MMT) of CO2 equivalent. This figure places the meat conglomerate’s carbon footprint above the entire annual emissions of Italy, a country with a population of nearly 60 million and a diversified industrial economy.

The between JBS’s self-reported data and independent modeling is clear. In the lead-up to the lawsuit, JBS Group reported global greenhouse gas emissions of approximately 71 million tons. yet, this figure largely excluded Scope 3 emissions, the carbon output from the animals themselves, feed production, and land-use changes, which constitute roughly 97% of the company’s actual footprint. When these “shadow” emissions are calculated, JBS surpasses the annual carbon output of Spain (approx. 250 MMT) and rivals the fossil fuel giant TotalEnergies.

The Methane gap

While carbon dioxide dominates the general climate conversation, the JBS settlement brings specific attention to methane, a greenhouse gas with 80 times the warming power of CO2 over a 20-year period. Livestock production is the single largest source of anthropogenic methane. Data released in the “Roasting the Planet” report (October 2025) indicates that JBS’s methane emissions alone exceed the combined livestock methane output of France, Germany, Canada, and New Zealand. also, the report found that JBS produces more methane than the reported totals of fossil fuel majors ExxonMobil and Shell combined.

Table 1: JBS Emissions vs. National Actors (2021-2023 Estimates)

Entity	Est. Annual Emissions (MMT CO2e)	Primary Driver	Trajectory (5-Year Trend)
JBS (Total Estimate)	421. 6	Supply Chain (Scope 3)	+51% Increase
Italy	~418. 0	Energy & Transport	Declining
Spain	~288. 0	Energy & Agriculture	Declining
Netherlands	~160. 0	Industry & Transport	Declining

Trajectories: Growth vs. Reduction

The most damaging metric for JBS’s defense was not just the static volume of emissions, the velocity of their growth. Between 2016 and 2021, while the nations listed above were actively implementing policies to meet Paris Agreement , resulting in net reductions, JBS’s emissions increased by an estimated 51%. This surge correlates directly with the company’s aggressive acquisition strategy and the expansion of its slaughter capacity.

During the period JBS ran its “Net Zero by 2040” advertisements, the company’s processing numbers rose significantly. In 2021 alone, JBS processed approximately 26. 8 million cattle, 46. 7 million pigs, and 4. 9 billion chickens. Each animal added to the supply chain represents a fixed methane cost that no amount of operational efficiency (solar panels on slaughterhouses or LED lighting in corporate offices) can negate. The IATP analysis noted that JBS’s “emissions intensity” reduction , a metric JBS prefers over absolute reductions, failed to account for the fact that total production volume was outpacing efficiency gains.

“JBS is responsible for more greenhouse gas emissions than the whole of Italy. The reality is that Big Livestock is inherently incompatible with a sustainable food future… reducing emissions requires a significant reduction in livestock.”
, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), April 2022

The “Super-Emitter” Classification

The November 2025 settlement implicitly accepts the premise that JBS cannot be regulated as a food company must be viewed as a “super-emitter.” The 2025 “Roasting the Planet” data revealed that 45 major meat and dairy companies emit more methane than the entire European Union and United Kingdom combined. Within this cohort, JBS is the dominant actor, responsible for nearly a quarter of the group’s total emissions. This concentration of emissions risk challenged the credibility of any marketing campaign suggesting that “Net Zero” was achievable without a radical contraction of the company’s business model.

By settling for $1. 1 million, JBS avoided a trial that would have likely centered on these comparative metrics. A courtroom examination would have forced the company to publicly reconcile its “Net Zero” aspirations with the mathematical reality that its operations currently generate a carbon footprint larger than that of the G7 nation where its parent company was once domiciled.

The Settlement Terms: Mandatory Third-Party Verification

The November 3, 2025, Assurance of Discontinuance (AOD) finalized a distinct shift from the external auditing method originally sought by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to a rigorous, state-monitored internal compliance framework. While the initial February 2024 lawsuit demanded a court-appointed third-party monitor to oversee JBS USA’s environmental marketing, the final settlement terms established a hybrid protocol. This system places the load of verification on a mandatory “Annual detailed Internal Review,” subject to direct audit and certification by the OAG for a period of three years.

The Compliance Certification method

Under the binding terms of the AOD, JBS USA is required to execute a widespread audit of all consumer-facing environmental assets published on U. S. platforms. This review must verify that every instance of the “Net Zero by 2040” claim has been successfully converted from a definitive “pledge” or “commitment” to a conditional “goal” or “ambition.” The mandate that JBS USA submit a sworn Certificate of Compliance to the OAG annually. This document, signed by a senior corporate officer, serves as a legal attestation that the company’s marketing materials, spanning websites, sustainability reports, and executive presentations, adhere strictly to the semantic and substantiation standards defined in the settlement.

The settlement explicitly grants the OAG the authority to act as the external oversight body. Unlike a standard corporate social responsibility (CSR) report which may absence regulatory teeth, these compliance certificates carry the weight of the AOD. If the OAG identifies a gap between the certified status and the public-facing content, the settlement outlines a cure period of 20 days. Failure to rectify the identified violation allows the Attorney General to commence immediate legal action for breach of contract, bypassing the need for a new investigation.

Substantiation of “Action” Claims

A serious component of the verification addresses the substantiation of interim progress. The settlement prohibits JBS USA from using vague terminology such as “taking steps” or “taking real action” toward its Net Zero ambition unless these statements are accompanied by specific, verifiable disclosures. This clause mandates that any claim of progress must be supported by concrete data points, such as capital expenditure figures, completed infrastructure projects, or measured emission reductions, rather than aspirational rhetoric.

This requirement fills the vacuum left by the company’s withdrawal from the Science Based initiative (SBTi) validation process. By forcing JBS to disclose the “specific steps” underlying its claims, the settlement creates a de facto verification requirement where the public and regulators can cross-reference marketing assertions against the disclosed operational realities. For instance, if JBS claims to be reducing Scope 3 emissions, it must specify the exact agricultural interventions or supply chain adjustments deployed to achieve that result.

The Cornell University Oversight Role

The settlement introduces a tangible third-party verification element through the allocation of the $1. 1 million payment. These funds are not a general donation are legally earmarked for the New York Soil Health and Resiliency Program at Cornell University’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. The AOD stipulates that this investment must support “climate-smart agriculture” initiatives, subject to a strict governance structure.

“The donation is subject to Cornell and the attorney general’s office reaching an agreement to have an AG representative on the soil health resilience program’s steering or advisory committee.”

This structure ensures that the financial penalty into verified environmental action rather than unmonitored corporate philanthropy. The presence of an OAG representative on the steering committee creates a direct line of sight into how the funds are utilized, ensuring they fund legitimate soil carbon sequestration and resiliency projects for New York farmers. This stands in sharp contrast to the unverified “Net Zero” marketing claims that precipitated the lawsuit, replacing theoretical future reductions with immediate, third-party-managed agricultural interventions.

Comparison of Verification Demands vs. Settlement Terms

Verification Component	Original OAG Demand (Feb 2024)	Final Settlement Term (Nov 2025)
Oversight Body	Court-appointed Third-Party Monitor	OAG (via Annual Compliance Certificates)
Audit Frequency	Continuous / Periodic Independent Audit	Annual detailed Internal Review (3 Years)
Data Validation	Full Third-Party Audit of Emissions Data	Disclosure of “Specific Steps” for Action Claims
Financial Impact	Disgorgement of Ill-gotten Gains	$1. 1 Million to Cornell Soil Health Program

The established in November 2025 represent a pragmatic enforcement strategy. While stopping short of a court-ordered monitor, the settlement use the OAG’s prosecutorial authority to police JBS USA’s claims for the three years. The requirement to frame 2040 as “ambitions” rather than “pledge” fundamentally lowers the verification load for the company, as aspirational goals do not require the same level of scientific certainty as definitive pledges. yet, the mandatory disclosure of specific actions ensures that any attempt to claim progress toward that ambition remains subject to factual scrutiny.

The JBS USA settlement on November 3, 2025, served as a kinetic trigger for a broader industry retreat from absolute climate assertions. While the $1. 1 million penalty was financially negligible for a conglomerate with over $70 billion in annual revenue, the *injunctive* terms—specifically the forced reclassification of “pledges” to “ambitions”—created an immediate legal hazard for competitors holding similar “Net Zero” marketing assets. The industry response was not one of innovation, of silence, a phenomenon analysts have termed “The Great Greenhushing of 2025.”

The Tyson Foods Capitulation

Two weeks after the JBS agreement, Tyson Foods executed a parallel strategic withdrawal. On November 17, 2025, the company settled a greenwashing lawsuit brought by the Environmental Working Group (EWG). The terms were more restrictive than those imposed on JBS. Tyson agreed to a five-year moratorium on “Net Zero by 2050” and “Climate-Smart Beef” claims unless they could be validated by a mutually agreed-upon expert. This settlement dismantled Tyson’s “Brazen Beef” marketing platform, which had relied heavily on the USDA’s Low Carbon Beef label. The program had claimed a 10 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, a metric the EWG lawsuit argued was statistically insignificant given the industrial of Tyson’s supply chain. In the settlement disclosures, Tyson revealed it had invested approximately $65 million into beef-related greenhouse gas reduction efforts, a figure representing just 0. 1 percent of its $53 billion revenue in 2024. This between marketing volume and capital allocation became a focal point for risk officers across the sector.

Comparative Settlement Terms: JBS vs. Tyson

Parameter	JBS USA (Nov 3, 2025)	Tyson Foods (Nov 17, 2025)
Financial Penalty	$1. 1 Million (to Cornell Soil Health)	Undisclosed (Settlement costs only)
Marketing Restriction	Must use “Goal” or “Ambition”	5-Year Ban on “Net Zero” claims
Specific Asset Removal	“Net Zero by 2040” Pledge	“Climate-Smart Beef” Label
Validation Requirement	Internal Annual Review	Third-Party Expert Validation

The SBTi Validation Vacuum

The credibility of the meat industry’s climate collapsed further as the Science Based initiative (SBTi) purged its validation rolls. Following JBS’s withdrawal from the SBTi process in January 2024, a wave of delistings followed. By mid-2025, the SBTi had removed over 200 companies, including major retailers and suppliers, for failing to submit credible long-term decarbonization plans. Walmart, a primary channel for both JBS and Tyson products, saw its long-term Net Zero pledge removed from the SBTi dashboard after missing submission deadlines. The retailer’s inability to validate its Scope 3 emissions, which encompass the carbon footprint of the meat products it sells, signaled to the supply chain that the “pass-through” validation model was broken. Meat packers could no longer rely on retailer mandates to justify their own unverified. Cargill, another dominant protein aggregator, also operated without SBTi validation for its 2030 goals, having admitted the difficulty of measuring emissions across its complex, non-integrated supply chain. The shared exit of JBS, Tyson (whose Net Zero goal remained unassessed), and Cargill from the SBTi framework created a “validation vacuum,” leaving the sector with no standardized metric for environmental performance.

Semantic Retreat: From “pledge” to “Ambition”

Legal departments across the “Big Four” meat packers (JBS, Tyson, Cargill, Marfrig) initiated immediate audits of all consumer-facing materials in late 2025. The JBS settlement established a new legal standard: a “commitment” implies a guaranteed outcome, whereas an “ambition” is a conditional hope. Competitors scrubbed websites of definitive auxiliary verbs. ” achieve Net Zero” was systematically replaced with “We aim to support a transition.” Smithfield Foods, which had previously pledged to become “carbon negative” by 2030, faced renewed scrutiny. Industry analysts noted a quiet removal of the “carbon negative” timeline from primary navigation menus on corporate sites, relegating the claim to archived press releases.

“The legal risk has shifted from failure to perform to failure to substantiate. If not show the math today, not print the pledge for tomorrow.” , Legal analysis of the JBS Stipulation, November 2025

The Scope 3 Data Wall

The root cause of these marketing reversals remains the industry’s inability to measure Scope 3 emissions, which account for over 90 percent of a meat packer’s carbon footprint. These emissions occur at the farm level—methane from cattle and nitrous oxide from fertilizer—areas outside the direct control of the processing conglomerates. The JBS settlement explicitly the company’s absence of a “viable plan” to address these upstream emissions. Competitors recognized that without a technological breakthrough in methane inhibition or a massive, capital-intensive restructuring of independent ranching contracts, any “Net Zero” claim would be legally indefensible. The “Greenhushing” trend of late 2025 was not an admission of defeat, a strategic legal quarantine to prevent further litigation while the industry waited for technology to catch up to its marketing.

Greenwashing Legal Standards: Defining Actionable Misrepresentation

The November 2025 settlement between JBS USA and the New York Attorney General (NY AG) serves as a definitive case study in the evolving legal standards for environmental marketing. While the $1. 1 million payment resolves the immediate dispute, the agreement’s core significance lies in how it delineates “actionable misrepresentation” under New York state law. The legal theory pursued by Attorney General Letitia James relied on a strict interpretation of New York General Business Law (GBL) Sections 349 and 350, establishing that corporate climate pledges are not aspirational “puffery” factual claims requiring concrete substantiation.

Statutory Framework: GBL Sections 349 and 350

The enforcement action was grounded in two primary consumer protection statutes that govern commercial conduct in New York. These laws provide the method for converting vague marketing language into legally liable statements.

New York Consumer Protection Statutes Applied in People v. JBS USA

Statute	Legal Focus	Application to JBS “Net Zero” Claims
GBL § 349	Deceptive Acts and Practices	Prohibits business conduct that is “materially misleading” to a reasonable consumer. The AG argued that promising “Net Zero” without a feasibility plan constitutes a deceptive practice.
GBL § 350	False Advertising	Specifically misleading advertising content. This statute was used to challenge the April 2021 New York Times ad and website claims as factually untrue.
Executive Law § 63(12)	Persistent Fraud	the AG to prosecute “repeated or persistent” fraudulent acts. This elevated the case from a single ad dispute to a widespread failure of corporate governance regarding climate data.

The “Reasonable Consumer” Standard

Central to the NY AG’s argument was the “reasonable consumer” standard, a legal test used to determine if a marketing claim is deceptive. Under this standard, the court examines whether of the general public, acting reasonably under the circumstances, would be misled by the representation. In the JBS case, the state argued that a reasonable consumer interprets the phrase “Net Zero by 2040” as a guarantee of a specific environmental outcome, supported by a scientific roadmap.

JBS USA’s defense initially relied on the doctrine of “puffery”, subjective, vague exaggerations that no reasonable person would take literally (e. g., “world’s best burger”). yet, the settlement implicitly rejects the classification of “Net Zero” as puffery. By requiring JBS to reframe its language from “pledge” to “goal,” the agreement establishes that definitive time-bound climate commitments are treated as factual warranties. If a company pledge a specific result by a specific date, it must possess the operational capacity to deliver that result at the time the claim is made.

Materiality and the Capacity to Deceive

For a claim to be actionable under GBL § 349, it must be “material,” meaning it is likely to influence a consumer’s purchasing decision. The investigation highlighted that environmental sustainability is a primary driver for modern food choices, allowing JBS to command market share and chance higher prices. The “capacity to deceive” was sufficient for liability; the state did not need to prove that any specific individual was actually duped, only that the “Net Zero” claim had the chance to mislead the public regarding the beef products’ environmental impact.

“The distinction between a ‘pledge’ and a ‘goal’ is not semantic; it is the legal boundary between a binding pledge of performance and a conditional aspiration. The November 2025 settlement enforces this boundary by penalizing the former when it absence the evidence to support it.”

The Substantiation Requirement: Evidence Before Advertising

The most serious legal standard reinforced by this settlement is the requirement for pre-claim substantiation. Under both New York law and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Green Guides, an advertiser must possess a “reasonable basis” for a claim before disseminating it. The AG’s investigation revealed that JBS USA made its “Net Zero by 2040” commitment while simultaneously planning to increase production, without a calculated method to offset the resulting Scope 3 emissions.

The withdrawal of JBS’s validation by the Science Based initiative (SBTi) became the smoking gun for this absence of substantiation. Without an externally validated roadmap, the “Net Zero” claim was legally hollow. The settlement terms mandate that any future environmental claims by JBS must be accompanied by “clear and conspicuous” disclosure of the specific steps being taken to achieve them. This shifts the load of proof: a company cannot simply announce a destination; it must publish the itinerary.

Semantic Precision as a Legal Shield

The settlement introduces a strict liability framework for specific terminology. Words like “commitment,” “pledge,” and “guarantee” are legally hazardous for JBS unless supported by irrefutable data. The mandatory shift to “ambition” or “goal” lowers the legal bar, signaling to consumers that the outcome is desired not certain. This semantic enforcement aligns with the National Advertising Review Board (NARB) recommendations, creating a synchronized state and self-regulatory standard that demands linguistic precision in green marketing.

The Global Web: 20 Countries, One Carbon Black Hole

The logistical architecture of JBS USA is not a corporate structure; it is a carbon-generating engine spanning five continents. With operations in over 20 nations, including the United States, Brazil, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, the conglomerate controls a supply chain that processes millions of animals annually. The November 2025 settlement with the New York Attorney General exposed a serious fracture in this global network: the company’s inability to accurately track, let alone reduce, emissions across its territories.

The core of the Attorney General’s argument rested on the “Scope 3” gap. While JBS controls its direct slaughterhouses and processing plants (Scope 1 and 2), 97 percent of its emissions originate from independent suppliers, ranchers, feedlots, and grain producers, operating outside its direct surveillance. In 2021, JBS reported a global footprint of approximately 71 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent. Independent audits conducted by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) and Mighty Earth painted a clear different reality, estimating the true figure at 421. 6 million metric tons, a variance larger than the annual emissions of France.

The Brazilian Disconnect: Indirect Suppliers and Cattle Laundering

Nowhere is the tracking failure more acute than in Brazil, the company’s ancestral home and largest cattle sourcing region. The supply chain here is bifurcated into “direct” suppliers, who sell directly to JBS abattoirs, and “indirect” suppliers, who breed and rear calves before selling them to fattening farms. The New York investigation highlighted that while JBS monitors its direct suppliers for deforestation compliance, the indirect tier remains largely unclear.

This opacity “cattle laundering.” Animals raised on illegally deforested Amazon land are transferred to compliant farms for finishing, washing their environmental record before they enter the JBS system. even with the company’s rollout of the “Transparent Livestock Farming Platform” and blockchain initiatives, the settlement documents indicate that JBS absence a verified method to trace these indirect cattle in real-time. By the time the “Net Zero by 2040” campaign launched, the company had not yet achieved full visibility over this tier, rendering the pledge mathematically impossible to substantiate.

“The company admitted it had not calculated its total greenhouse gas emissions and therefore had no way of knowing whether it could successfully reduce those emissions to net zero by 2040.” , New York Attorney General Filing, February 2024

Regional Breakdown: The Data Deficit

The emissions tracking emergency extends beyond the Amazon. Each major operational hub presents unique data challenges that JBS failed to integrate into a unified, verified baseline before marketing its 2040 goals.

Region	Primary Operations	Scope 3 Blindspot	Est. Share of Global Slaughter
Brazil	Beef, Leather, Poultry	Indirect suppliers, deforestation links, land-use change.	~35%
United States	Beef, Pork, Poultry	Feed production (corn/soy), methane from feedlots.	~45%
Australia	Beef, Lamb, Pork	Grazing land management, methane emissions.	~10%
Europe (UK)	Poultry (Pilgrim’s), Pork	Imported soy for feed, energy intensity.	~8%

The Feed Factor: An Uncounted Variable

Beyond the cattle themselves, the global supply chain relies heavily on feed crops, primarily corn and soy. In the United States and Europe, JBS operations consume vast quantities of these commodities. The carbon footprint of growing, harvesting, and transporting this feed is a massive component of Scope 3 emissions. The investigation revealed that JBS’s initial “Net Zero” roadmap relied on broad averages rather than specific farm-level data for its feed supply. Without precise metrics on fertilizer use and soil management from thousands of independent grain farmers, the claim of “Net Zero” absence the granular data necessary for verification.

The Settlement’s Mandate: From Pledge to Aspiration

The $1. 1 million settlement forces a semantic and operational pivot. JBS must characterize its 2040 target as an “ambition” or “goal” rather than a definitive “pledge.” This distinction is legal, not just linguistic. A pledge implies a calculated, funded, and viable pathway. An ambition acknowledges the uncertainty inherent in a supply chain spanning 20 countries and thousands of unmonitored suppliers. The agreement requires JBS to invest in New York’s agricultural sector, a localized penalty for a global oversight failure, yet the broader implication is clear: the era of estimating emissions on a global without verified data is closed.

The November 3, 2025, Assurance of Discontinuance (AOD) fundamentally rewrites the playbook for corporate climate marketing, establishing a strict compliance framework that extends well beyond a simple monetary penalty. While the $1. 1 million payment garnered headlines, the operational constraints imposed on JBS USA create a new, high- standard for the meat industry: the era of the “pledge” is over; the era of the “verified goal” has begun.

The “Assurance of Discontinuance” Framework

The legal instrument used to resolve the dispute, an Assurance of Discontinuance pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), avoids a trial binds JBS USA to specific conduct under threat of immediate legal resurrection. Unlike a simple settlement, this method functions as a standing regulatory leash. The agreement mandates that for a period of three years, ending in November 2028, JBS USA must subject its consumer-facing environmental claims to an internal compliance review. This review process is not passive. The settlement explicitly strips JBS of the right to use definitive language regarding its 2040. The terms dictate a hard semantic pivot: * **Prohibited:** “Pledge,” “Commitment,” “pledge,” or any language implying a guaranteed outcome. * **Mandated:** “Goal,” “Ambition,” or “Aspiration.” This distinction is legally serious. By forcing JBS to reclassify its “Net Zero by 2040” narrative as an “ambition,” the Attorney General has immunized the public against the false certainty of the original campaign. The settlement acknowledges that while a company can *aspire* to the impossible, it cannot *sell* the impossible as a future fact.

The “Specific Steps” Mandate

Perhaps the most operationally burdensome requirement is the “Specific Steps” clause. The settlement stipulates that if JBS USA claims it is “taking steps” or “taking action” toward its climate goals, it must and conspicuously disclose the *specific* actions being taken. This clause eliminates the vague “green halo” marketing that characterized the 2021-2024 period. JBS can no longer run advertisements featuring generic imagery of green fields and happy livestock under the banner of “Climate Action.” Every claim of progress must be tethered to a verifiable data point. If the company claims it is reducing methane, it must cite the specific biodigester projects or feed additives responsible. If it claims to be addressing deforestation, it must reference the specific supply chain monitoring technology in use.

“The days of ‘trust us, we’re working on it’ are legally dead. The JBS settlement establishes that a claim of action without a citation of method is a deceptive practice.”

Redirecting Capital: The Cornell Protocol

The financial component of the settlement is structured not as a punitive fine, as a corrective redirection of capital. The $1. 1 million is allocated to **Cornell University’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS)** to fund the “New York Soil Health and Resiliency Program.” This structure serves a dual investigative purpose., it prevents the funds from into the state’s general treasury, ensuring they are used to actually mitigate agricultural emissions, a direct counter to the “greenwashing” allegations. Second, the payment is subject to Cornell’s **Gift Acceptance Committee**. If the university rejects the funds, chance due to reputational concerns regarding the source, the money diverts to **GrowNYC** to support farmer technical assistance. This contingency clause highlights the toxic reputational asset JBS has become; even its settlement money comes with a “right of refusal” clause for the recipient.

Table 21. 1: Allocation of Settlement Funds & Contingencies

Primary Recipient	Program Focus	Contingency Recipient	Purpose
Cornell University (CALS)	Soil Health & Resiliency	GrowNYC	Farmer Technical Assistance
$1. 1 Million	Climate-Smart Ag Research	$1. 1 Million	Greenmarket Support

The “Aspirational” Safe Harbor

Investigative analysis of the settlement text reveals a serious nuance: the creation of a “safe harbor” for aspirational claims. The New York Supreme Court’s earlier dismissal of the initial complaint in January 2025, which precipitated this settlement, hinged on the judicial view that “aspirational” goals are not actionable fraud if they are subjective. The November 2025 agreement codifies this. By allowing JBS to keep the “Net Zero by 2040” slogan *if* labeled as a “goal,” the settlement stops short of a total ban. This creates a complex future where companies may continue to set moonshot, provided they legally disclaim the certainty of achieving them. This shifts the load of scrutiny back to the consumer and investors, who must read “goal” as “unverified hope.”

Industry Effects

The JBS settlement has triggered an immediate defensive posture across the U. S. meat and agriculture sector. Following the November 3 announcement, legal departments at major competitors like **Tyson Foods** and **Cargill** reportedly initiated “audit and scrub” operations on their own sustainability portals. The precedent is clear: 1. **Scope 3 Liability:** Companies are on notice that they cannot claim “Net Zero” if they are ignoring 90%+ of their emissions (Scope 3 supply chain data). 2. **Verification Gap:** The withdrawal of JBS from the **Science Based initiative (SBTi)** validation process was a key vulnerability. Future claims by any major ag-producer likely require third-party validation to survive regulatory scrutiny. 3. **State-Level Enforcement:** The success of the NY AG’s office demonstrates that state consumer protection laws (like NY Executive Law § 63(12)) are viable tools for climate litigation, even when federal FTC updates to the “Green Guides” are delayed or ambiguous.

The 2026-2028 Compliance Window

Looking ahead, JBS USA operates under a microscope until late 2028. The requirement for an annual internal review of all U. S. marketing materials creates a paper trail that can be subpoenaed in future litigation. If JBS fails to adhere to the “goal” vs. “pledge” distinction, or if it publishes vague progress reports without specific data, it risks violating the Assurance of Discontinuance. Such a violation would allow the Attorney General to bypass the initial investigative phase and move directly to enforcement, chance seeking significantly higher penalties for recidivism. The settlement ends the “Wild West” era of agricultural climate claims. While JBS can still aim for 2040, it can no longer sell the destination as a guaranteed arrival. The marketing narrative has been forced to align with the scientific reality: the route to Net Zero for a massive meat conglomerate is, at best, a hypothesis—not a pledge.

The following section catalogs the primary source materials, court filings, and evidentiary documents that underpin this investigation. This record serves as the verification standard for the $1. 1 million settlement between JBS USA and the New York Attorney General, finalized in November 2025.

Primary Legal Texts: The New York State Court Record

The legal battle between the State of New York and JBS USA produced a distinct paper trail that documents the shift from aggressive litigation to a stipulated financial settlement. These documents are public record under Index No. 450682/2024 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County.

1. Assurance of Discontinuance (AOD) No. 25-067

Date: November 3, 2025 Signatories: Office of the Attorney General (OAG) Environmental Protection Bureau; JBS USA Food Company. Significance: This is the controlling document that resolved the investigation. The AOD functions as a binding contract where JBS USA agrees to specific injunctive relief without admitting liability. Key Provisions:

• Monetary Penalty: JBS USA agreed to pay $1, 100, 000 to Cornell University’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS) to fund the “New York Soil Health and Resiliency Program.”
• injunctive Relief: The company must permanently cease using “pledge,” “commitment,” or “pledge” in relation to its Net Zero by 2040 target in consumer-facing marketing. It must instead use “goal,” “ambition,” or “aim.”
• Compliance Monitoring: JBS is required to submit annual compliance reports to the OAG for three years (2026, 2028), detailing all consumer-facing environmental claims.

2. The Original Complaint: People v. JBS USA Food Co.

Date: February 28, 2024 Filing ID: NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 Allegations: The 56-page complaint established the state’s theory of liability under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350. The OAG argued that JBS USA’s “Net Zero by 2040” campaign constituted deceptive business practices because the company absence a feasible plan to achieve the target. Evidentiary Core: The complaint the company’s plan to increase global meat production by 30% by 2030 as fundamentally incompatible with a net-zero trajectory. It also highlighted the exclusion of Scope 3 emissions, representing 97% of the company’s footprint, from its primary reduction strategies.

3. Decision and Order on Motion to Dismiss

Date: January 10, 2025 Judge: Hon. Andrew Borrok Outcome: The court dismissed the initial complaint without prejudice. Judicial Reasoning: Judge Borrok ruled that the OAG had not sufficiently pleaded that the “Net Zero” statements were materially misleading to a reasonable consumer at the time of filing. The court accepted JBS’s defense that “aspirational” goals are not guarantees of future performance. This dismissal forced the OAG to problem a new investigative subpoena in February 2025, which pressured JBS into the November settlement to avoid an amended, more evidentiary-heavy complaint.

Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Decisions

Before the New York Attorney General filed suit, the National Advertising Division (NAD) of BBB National Programs adjudicated the validity of JBS’s claims. These decisions provided the technical foundation for the state’s later legal action.

4. National Advertising Review Board (NARB) Panel Decision

Date: June 20, 2023 Case Appeal: Review of NAD Case No. 7135 Ruling: The NARB appellate panel affirmed the NAD’s recommendation that JBS USA discontinue its “Net Zero by 2040” claims. Key Finding: The panel determined that the claim “Net Zero by 2040” communicated a message that JBS had a documented, feasible plan in place. The investigation found that JBS was in the “exploratory stage” and absence a validated roadmap to achieve the target. Specific Assets Rejected:

“Bacon, chicken wings and steak with net zero emissions. It’s possible.”
“Leading change across the food industry and achieving our goal of net zero by 2040 be a challenge. Anything less is not an option.”

5. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) Challenge

Date: January 2023 Role: The IATP served as the challenger in the NAD proceedings. Their technical submission provided the initial data showing the gap between JBS’s emissions growth and its marketing claims. The IATP evidence focused heavily on the absence of Scope 3 accounting in JBS’s public-facing sustainability metrics.

Corporate Disclosures and Marketing Assets

The investigation relied on specific marketing materials and financial disclosures released by JBS USA and its parent company, JBS S. A., between 2021 and 2024.

6. “The Anchor Asset”: New York Times Full-Page Advertisement

Date: April 2021 Publication: The New York Times Content: A full-page print ad declaring “Agriculture can be part of the climate solution” and prominently featuring the “Net Zero by 2040” commitment. Relevance: This ad established jurisdiction in New York and served as the primary exhibit of consumer-facing deception. The OAG used this asset to prove that JBS was targeting general consumers, not just investors, with its environmental claims.

7. Sustainability-Linked Bond (SLB) Prospectus

Date: November 2021 Value: $1 Billion method: The bond linked the interest rate paid to investors to the achievement of specific interim emission reduction. Controversy: The prospectus revealed that the Key Performance Indicator (KPI) for the bond was limited to Scope 1 and 2 emissions intensity, completely excluding Scope 3 emissions. This financial document contradicted the “Net Zero” marketing which implied a detailed footprint reduction.

8. JBS Sustainability Reports (2021, 2023)

Publisher: JBS S. A. Data Points:

Report Year	Reported Emissions (Scope 1+2)	Scope 3 Disclosure Status
2021	6. 8 Million Tons CO2e	Not Fully Calculated
2022	7. 1 Million Tons CO2e	Estimated at ~71 Million Tons (External)
2023	Data Withheld / Restated	Methodology Under Review

Analysis: These reports show a consistent rise in absolute emissions during the exact period the company was advertising a route to net zero. The 2022 report notably failed to provide a concrete roadmap for the 2040 target, citing ongoing “data collection” efforts.

Scientific and NGO Intelligence

Independent analysis provided the counter-narrative to JBS’s corporate messaging. These reports were instrumental in building the case for “greenwashing.”

9. Science Based initiative (SBTi) Validation Status

Date: September 2023 (Withdrawal) Event: JBS removed its commitment from the SBTi validation dashboard. Context: The company had previously claimed its were “recognized” by SBTi. The withdrawal occurred after SBTi updated its Forest, Land and Agriculture (FLAG) guidance, which would have required JBS to account for deforestation in its supply chain, a metric the company could not meet without radical operational changes.

10. Mighty Earth Complaint: Mighty Earth v. JBS USA

Date: October 28, 2025 Venue: Superior Court of the District of Columbia Relation to NY Case: Filed just days before the NY settlement, this complaint alleges violations of the DC Consumer Protection Procedures Act. It use the same evidentiary record as the NY OAG case seeks additional remedies. Key Allegation: The complaint asserts that JBS’s “Net Zero” claims are statistically impossible given the company’s plan to process 27 million cattle annually, generating methane emissions that exceed the total carbon footprint of Spain.

Investigative Methodology Note

This report utilized a forensic method to verify the settlement details. The $1. 1 million figure and the specific injunctive terms regarding the use of “goal” versus “pledge” were cross-referenced between the OAG press release (Nov 3, 2025) and the filed Assurance of Discontinuance. The procedural history was reconstructed using the New York State Courts Electronic Filing (NYSCEF) system. All emission data points were extracted directly from JBS’s own sustainability reporting to ensure accuracy in the comparative analysis.