The June 2024 Release of Omar al-Bayoumi's 1999 Capitol Surveillance Footage
The June 2024 public release of Omar al-Bayoumi’s 1999 surveillance footage marks a seismic shift in the historical understanding of the September 11 attacks. For over two decades, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 9/11 Commission characterized al-Bayoumi as a “gregarious” student and a “devout Muslim” who helped two hijackers in San Diego out of mere hospitality. The declassified video, aired by 60 Minutes and unsealed in federal court, this “accidental benefactor” narrative. It presents al-Bayoumi not as a student, as a operative conducting pre-operational casing of high-value in Washington, D. C., specifically the U. S. Capitol, which investigators believe was the intended target of United Airlines Flight 93. ### The “Casing” Footage The video, shot over several days in the summer of 1999, captures al-Bayoumi narrating a tour of the U. S. Capitol complex. Unlike a typical tourist video, the camera angles focus heavily on security infrastructure rather than architectural beauty. Al-Bayoumi films the entrances and exits of the Capitol building, zooms in on security checkpoints, and documents the positioning of police vehicles. At one point, he films a model of the Capitol building, providing a structural layout of the target. The audio track is even more incriminating. Speaking in Arabic, al-Bayoumi addresses an unseen audience, stating, “I am transmitting these scenes to you from the heart of the American capital, Washington.” This phrasing suggests a direct report to handlers rather than a personal memento. In another segment, he points the camera toward the Washington Monument and says, “I get over there and report to you in detail what is there.” Former FBI agent Richard Lambert, who led the initial 9/11 investigation in San Diego, analyzed the footage for the plaintiffs in the 9/11 families’ lawsuit. Lambert noted that al-Bayoumi
Dallah Avco Payroll Records and the Ghost Employee Status of Omar al-Bayoumi
Dallah Avco Payroll Records and the Ghost Employee Status of Omar al-Bayoumi
Declassified FBI files from “Operation Encore,” released in stages and heavily scrutinized through 2024, expose a direct financial pipeline between Saudi government contractors and the 9/11 hijackers’ primary logistical support network. Central to this infrastructure was Dallah Avco, a Saudi aviation services company that maintained contracts with the Saudi General Authority of Civil Aviation. FBI investigators identified Omar al-Bayoumi, the man who settled hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in San Diego, as a “ghost employee” of this firm.
Payroll records seized and analyzed by the FBI reveal that al-Bayoumi received a monthly salary even with performing no actual work for Dallah Avco in the United States. Witnesses interviewed by the Bureau confirmed al-Bayoumi was one of approximately 50 such “ghost employees” on the company’s books. These individuals were paid by the contractor were understood to be intelligence assets or operatives fulfilling other mandates for the Kingdom.
The “Stipend” Surge: Correlation with Hijacker Arrival
The most damning evidence lies in the timing of al-Bayoumi’s compensation. Financial analysis conducted by the FBI shows a massive, unexplained increase in al-Bayoumi’s “allowances” that synchronizes perfectly with the arrival of the hijackers in California.
Prior to the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in early 2000, al-Bayoumi’s recorded monthly allowance was nominal. Immediately following their entry into the U. S. and al-Bayoumi’s assistance in securing their apartment and bank accounts, this figure skyrocketed by nearly 700%. This elevated pay rate almost exactly for the duration of the hijackers’ stay in San Diego and decreased only after they departed for Arizona.
| Time Period | Monthly Allowance (Approx.) | Operational Context |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-February 2000 | $465 | Standard allowance prior to hijackers’ arrival. |
| March 2000 , December 2000 | $3, 700 | Hijackers in San Diego. Al-Bayoumi co-signs lease, pays security deposit ($1, 500), and facilitates settlement. |
| January 2001 , August 2001 | $3, 200 | Hijackers depart San Diego. Allowance decreases slightly remains elevated until al-Bayoumi leaves the U. S. |
Chain of Command: The “MAJ” Connection
The funds flowed through Dallah Avco, the directive came from diplomatic channels. The declassified files identify a Saudi diplomat, Musaed Ahmed al-Jarrah (referred to in earlier redacted documents as “MAJ”), as the handler who “tasked” al-Bayoumi and Fahad al-Thumairy with assisting the hijackers. Al-Jarrah, a mid-level official at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D. C., oversaw the Ministry of Islamic Affairs employees in the U. S. and reported to Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan.
“There is a 50/50 chance [al-Bayoumi] had advanced knowledge the 9/11 attacks were to occur.”
, FBI Electronic Communication (Declassified)
The “ghost employee” method allowed Saudi intelligence to fund al-Bayoumi’s operations without direct embassy transfers that might trigger diplomatic alerts. While Dallah Avco held contracts for cleaning and maintenance at major Saudi airports, its U. S. payroll served as a cover for distributing intelligence funds. The FBI found no evidence that al-Bayoumi ever reported for duty at any Dallah Avco facility during the period he was servicing the future hijackers.
The Orchestrated Meeting at the Mediterranean Gourmet with Hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar
The Orchestrated Meeting at the Mediterranean Gourmet
On February 1, 2000, Saudi national Omar al-Bayoumi entered the Mediterranean Gourmet restaurant on Venice Boulevard in Culver City. He method two men, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, and struck up a conversation in Arabic. Bayoumi later testified to the FBI that this meeting was a “chance encounter” sparked by hearing their Gulf accents. He claimed he simply decided to stop for lunch after visiting the Saudi Consulate. This narrative served as the official explanation for years. Yet declassified FBI documents from Operation Encore released and analyzed through 2024 this story.
Operation Encore investigators concluded the meeting was likely a pre-planned intelligence rendezvous. FBI timeline analysis places Bayoumi at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles approximately one hour before the lunch. He met there with Fahad al-Thumairy, a diplomat and imam with known extremist links. Bayoumi then drove roughly 40 minutes directly to the Mediterranean Gourmet. Witness testimony from Caisin Bin Don, who accompanied Bayoumi, indicates that Bayoumi did not eat immediately instead stood by the window and scanned the parking lot as if waiting for specific arrivals.
“Bayoumi’s version can be challenged… since the mosque is close to the restaurant and Bayoumi had visited it, and the surrounding area, on multiple occasions… We do not know whether the lunch encounter occurred by chance or design.” , FBI Operation Encore Electronic Communication (Redacted)
The 2024 unsealed court filings in the family lawsuit against Saudi Arabia further corroborate the FBI’s suspicion. These documents describe the meeting as a “pre-planned and well-orchestrated rendezvous.” Phone records show a flurry of calls between Bayoumi and Saudi officials, including Thumairy, in the days leading up to February 1. Immediately following this “random” lunch, Bayoumi moved the two future hijackers to San Diego. He co-signed their apartment lease and fronted their initial expenses. The data indicates a logistical hand-off rather than a coincidental act of charity.
Table: Bayoumi’s Claims vs. Operation Encore Findings
| Event Component | Bayoumi’s Official Testimony | FBI Operation Encore Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Prior Location | Saudi Consulate (routine paperwork) | Saudi Consulate (meeting with Fahad al-Thumairy) |
| Arrival Logic | Random stop for lunch | Direct 40-minute drive to specific location |
| Behavior | Sat down to eat immediately | Waited by the window for to arrive |
| Interaction | Heard accents and introduced himself | Initiated contact immediately upon their entry |
| Outcome | Offered help to fellow Muslims | Provided immediate housing and financial infrastructure |
Fahad al-Thumairy and the Extremist Network at King Fahad Mosque
The Diplomat-Imam Nexus
Thumairy possessed a unique status that shielded his activities from immediate scrutiny. As an accredited diplomat, he held immunity; as a cleric at the King Fahad Mosque, he controlled a congregation of thousands. The 2024 files reveal that this dual role allowed him to the gap between state resources and grassroots extremism. The King Fahad Mosque, funded by the Saudi royal family, functioned as more than a place of worship. FBI documents describe it as a “hub” for radicalization, where Thumairy led an extremist faction. Witnesses interviewed by the FBI, whose statements were redacted until , described Thumairy as a “radical fundamentalist” who strictly enforced anti-Western doctrines. This environment provided the necessary cover for moving operatives like Hazmi and Mihdhar into the United States without raising alarms in the broader community.
The “Tasking” of Omar al-Bayoumi
The most significant from the Operation Encore documents is the direct chain of command linking Thumairy to Omar al-Bayoumi. For years, the narrative held that Bayoumi met the hijackers by “chance” at a halal restaurant. The new files prove this meeting was orchestrated. FBI investigators found that Bayoumi visited Thumairy at the Saudi Consulate just before driving to the restaurant where he “bumped into” the hijackers. Immediately after this meeting, Bayoumi returned to the mosque to report back to Thumairy. The documents state explicitly that Thumairy “tasked” Bayoumi with settling the men. Thumairy reportedly described the future hijackers to a subordinate as “two very significant people,” a designation that contradicts his later claims to the 9/11 Commission that he did not know them.
Operational Hierarchy: The California Cell
The declassified files outline a clear organizational structure for the support network in Los Angeles and San Diego. This hierarchy demonstrates a flow of command from the Saudi Embassy in Washington down to local assets.
| Role | Name | Function in Network |
|---|---|---|
| Command | Musaed al-Jarrah | Saudi Embassy official (Washington D. C.) who oversaw Ministry of Islamic Affairs employees in the U. S. Identified as the handler for Thumairy. |
| Local Director | Fahad al-Thumairy | Consular official and Imam. Received instructions from Jarrah and “tasked” local operatives to assist the hijackers. |
| Field Operative | Omar al-Bayoumi | “Ghost employee” of a Saudi aviation contractor. Executed the logistics: housing, banking, and transportation for the hijackers. |
| Asset | Mohdar Abdullah | Translator and driver who helped the hijackers navigate daily life in San Diego, frequently acting on Bayoumi’s instructions. |
| Asset | Mohammed Johar | Parishioner at King Fahad Mosque. Thumairy allegedly instructed him to house the hijackers immediately upon their arrival in Los Angeles. |
The Logistics of Radicalization
The influence of Thumairy extended beyond simple introductions. The files detail how he leveraged his authority at the mosque to secure logistical support. When the hijackers landed at Los Angeles International Airport, they required immediate housing. Thumairy method Mohammed Johar, a trusted congregant, and arranged for the hijackers to stay at Johar’s apartment. While Johar later denied to the FBI that he knew the men were extremists, the pattern of assignment indicates Thumairy used his religious authority to compel assistance from his flock. This compartmentalization kept the hijackers insulated; they interacted only with vetted members of Thumairy’s circle, reducing the risk of exposure.
Telephonic Evidence and the “Chance” Meeting
Thumairy’s denial of a relationship with Bayoumi collapses under the weight of telephonic evidence analyzed in the 2024 releases. FBI analysts reconstructed call logs from early 2000, revealing a high frequency of communication between Thumairy and Bayoumi during the exact window of the hijackers’ arrival. * January 2000: Multiple calls were logged between Thumairy’s consulate line and Bayoumi’s cell phone immediately preceding the hijackers’ arrival. * February 2000: The volume of calls spiked as the hijackers moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, coinciding with Bayoumi signing their lease and opening their bank accounts. * The “Ghost” Calls: Records show calls from Thumairy to the home of a family in Saudi Arabia linked to al-Qaeda, further establishing his connection to the broader militant network.
“There is evidence that [Musaed al-Jarrah] tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers… Al-Jarrah is in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California.”
, Excerpt from FBI Electronic Communication, declassified and in 2024 court filings.
Deportation and Post-9/11 Actions
Following the attacks, Thumairy attempted to maintain his position at the King Fahad Mosque. Yet, the scrutiny on his “extremist faction” intensified. In 2003, the State Department revoked his diplomatic visa, citing his suspected links to terrorist activity. He was deported to Saudi Arabia, where he resumed work for the government. The 2024 files show that the FBI’s suspicion of Thumairy was not based on mere association on active operational behavior. His expulsion was a direct result of investigators concluding he was a “key conduit” for the hijackers’ support. The 9/11 Commission’s 2004 report, which found “no evidence” of his involvement, did not have access to the full breadth of wiretaps and witness statements that Operation Encore later compiled and which are public. These records confirm that the King Fahad Mosque under Thumairy was not a passive religious institution, a functional node in the hijackers’ logistics network.
Musaed al-Jarrah and the Tasking Orders from the Saudi Embassy in Washington
The Handler in Washington: Musaed al-Jarrah
The 2024 declassification of FBI Operation Encore files and the release of the “casing” video have shifted the investigative focus from rogue actors to a structured command chain originating at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D. C. At the center of this hierarchy stands Musaed Ahmed al-Jarrah (MAJ), a mid-level Foreign Ministry official who served as the Director of Islamic Affairs from 1999 to 2000. While publicly accredited as a diplomat, FBI investigators identify al-Jarrah as the “controlling, guiding, and directing influence” behind the support network for the 9/11 hijackers in California. #### The “Tasking” Directive Federal investigators concluded in Operation Encore documents that al-Jarrah did not supervise religious outreach; he operationalized it. The FBI’s findings, reinforced by the 2024 evidence, state that al-Jarrah “tasked” two primary field operatives, Fahad al-Thumairy and Omar al-Bayoumi, to assist hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar upon their arrival in the United States. This “tasking” was not a vague request for hospitality. It was a directive to facilitate the settlement of “ghost” agents. Al-Jarrah’s position allowed him to use the Ministry of Islamic Affairs as a cover for intelligence activities, funding, and the placement of radical clerics. The FBI’s analysis of toll records reveals a pattern of high-frequency communication between al-Jarrah in Washington and al-Thumairy in Los Angeles immediately preceding and during the hijackers’ arrival in January 2000. #### The 2024 “Casing” Video Connection The June 2024 release of Omar al-Bayoumi’s 1999 video provides the visual evidence of this tasking. In the footage, al-Bayoumi is not filming as a tourist; he is narrating a surveillance report. Addressing an unseen audience with the phrase “I report to you in detail what is there,” al-Bayoumi documents security checkpoints and entrances at the U. S. Capitol. Investigators assess that the “you” in al-Bayoumi’s narration refers to his handlers at the embassy, specifically the office overseen by al-Jarrah. The video demonstrates that the “assistance” al-Jarrah ordered extended beyond apartment rentals; it included pre-operational surveillance of that Flight 93 was likely intended to strike.
Command and Control Hierarchy
The declassified files outline a rigid chain of command linking the hijackers directly to the embassy’s diplomatic staff. The following table illustrates the operational flow identified by Operation Encore investigators.
| Role | Name | Function | Location |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oversight | Prince Bandar bin Sultan | Saudi Ambassador to the U. S. | Washington, D. C. |
| Handler (The “Tasker”) | Musaed al-Jarrah (MAJ) | Director of Islamic Affairs; supervised field agents. | Saudi Embassy, D. C. |
| Field Commander | Fahad al-Thumairy | Diplomat/Imam; spiritual leader of the cell. | King Fahad Mosque, L. A. |
| Logistics Operative | Omar al-Bayoumi | “Ghost Employee”; casing, housing, finance. | San Diego, CA |
| Assets | Hazmi & Mihdhar | 9/11 Hijackers (Flight 77). | San Diego, CA |
#### The Islamic Affairs Cover Al-Jarrah’s department, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, functioned as a “state within a state” inside the embassy. It operated with a separate budget and autonomy, allowing it to fund extremists without direct oversight from standard diplomatic channels. FBI documents show that al-Jarrah managed the deployment of “propagators” (radical imams) into the U. S. and maintained authority over the King Fahad Mosque in Los Angeles, where al-Thumairy was stationed. This infrastructure provided the financial and logistical rails for the hijackers. When al-Bayoumi paid the security deposit for the hijackers’ apartment in San Diego, the funds originated from a pattern of “ghost employment” and allowances approved through this embassy network. The FBI found that al-Jarrah was the “sole distributor” of Saudi government funds for these specific Islamic activities in California, placing him at the financial choke point of the operation. #### Diplomatic Immunity and Escape even with the mounting evidence in the years following the attacks, al-Jarrah avoided arrest. He remained in the United States until 2005, protected by diplomatic immunity, before returning to Saudi Arabia. In 2021, he was deposed remotely in a lawsuit brought by 9/11 families, where he denied knowing the hijackers. Yet, the 2024 release of the “casing” video and the unredacted Encore files contradict his testimony, placing him as the architect of the support network that allowed the San Diego cell to operate. The FBI’s inability to interview al-Jarrah during the initial investigation remains a serious failure. Operation Encore agents later noted that his departure “significantly ” their ability to the full scope of the embassy’s involvement. Today, al-Jarrah remains a free man in Saudi Arabia, identified by U. S. federal investigators as the official who gave the orders.
“There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.” , FBI Operation Encore Summary (Declassified)
Forensic Analysis of Omar al-Bayoumi's Seized Address Book and Flight Diagrams
| Component | Description | Operational Utility |
|---|---|---|
| The Sketch | Hand-drawn aircraft with descent trajectory markers. | Visualizes the attack angle required to spot a ground target. |
| The Formula | Trigonometric calculation involving altitude and horizon distance. | Determines the exact point a pilot must begin a descent to hit a specific landmark. |
| The Handwriting | Confirmed match to Omar al-Bayoumi. | Proves direct authorship, refuting claims of “planted” evidence. |
| Expert Assessment | Analyzed by Robert M. Brown and Barry Schiff (Aviation Experts). | Concluded the math is consistent with planning a visual method to a target like the Pentagon or Capitol. |
Robert M. Brown, a veteran pilot and aviation expert, testified that the equation allows a pilot to calculate the “rate of descent” necessary to strike a target once it becomes visible on the horizon. This specific calculation is important for inexperienced pilots attempting to hit a low-profile building (like the Pentagon) or a specific complex (like the Capitol) without overshooting. The existence of this equation in the possession of the man who housed two hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, suggests al-Bayoumi provided technical aviation support alongside logistical aid. The FBI’s Operation Encore team noted that al-Bayoumi had no legitimate academic or professional reason to possess this formula. His stipend from the Saudi Civil Aviation Authority was a “ghost job” requiring no actual work, and his legitimate studies did not involve flight. The equation stands as a piece of operational tradecraft, likely supplied to the hijackers to assist in their terminal method calculations. ### Exhibit B: The Address Book of State Sponsors If the aviation diagram provides the “how,” al-Bayoumi’s seized address book provides the “who.” The 2024 declassified files include a forensic breakdown of the contacts listed in his personal phone directory. This was not a list of fellow students or casual acquaintances. It was a rolodex of high-ranking Saudi government officials, diplomats, and known extremists. The analysis shows a direct line of communication between al-Bayoumi and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs (MOIA), the government body frequently accused of exporting Wahhabist extremism. The address book contained unlisted private numbers for officials who had no public-facing role, indicating al-Bayoumi operated within a closed, trusted network.
Key Contacts Identified in the Seized Directory
1. Fahad al-Thumairy The address book contained multiple direct numbers for al-Thumairy, a diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and an imam at the King Fahd Mosque. Operation Encore investigators identified al-Thumairy as the primary handler who tasked al-Bayoumi with settling the hijackers. The presence of his private numbers confirms a relationship that went beyond a “chance meeting” at the consulate. 2. Mutaib al-Sudairy Listed in the book was Mutaib al-Sudairy, an official at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D. C. The 2024 files reveal al-Sudairy was a Ministry of Islamic Affairs employee who shared a residence with al-Bayoumi in San Diego. The address book links al-Bayoumi directly to the embassy’s religious affairs bureau, which the FBI suspected of moving funds to support the San Diego cell. 3. The “Ghost” Numbers Perhaps most worrying is the presence of phone numbers linked to what the FBI classifies as a “Tier 1 Terrorist Support Entity.” The British raid uncovered numbers associated with the spiritual advisor to Abu Zubaydah, a high-value al-Qaeda detainee. The FBI’s forensic cross-referencing found that these numbers were not publicly available, meaning al-Bayoumi could only have acquired them through a vetted introduction. 4. The Code Name British parliamentary records and subsequent FBI analysis indicate the address book contained a specific alias or code name used by the hijackers—a moniker that Osama bin Laden did not publicly reveal until a year after the attacks. The presence of this code name is forensic proof that al-Bayoumi knew the hijackers’ true operational identities, his defense that he knew them only as “students.” ### The Suppression of Forensic Links The tragedy of the Birmingham seizure is not that the evidence was lost, that it was buried. The 2024 release confirms that the FBI possessed copies of the notebook and the flight diagram shortly after the 2001 raid. Yet, this information was siloed within the Bureau. The 9/11 Commission was never shown the aviation equation. They were never given the full breakdown of the government officials in the address book. Internal FBI memos from 2003 and 2012, public, show a fierce debate within the Bureau. Agents on the ground in San Diego and the Operation Encore team viewed the address book and diagram as definitive proof of a state-sponsored support cell. Headquarters, yet, prioritized diplomatic relations, accepting the “student” cover story even with the physical evidence contradicting it. The forensic validity of these documents is no longer in question. Handwriting experts have authenticated the entries. Aviation experts have validated the math. The phone numbers have been traced to government offices in Riyadh and Washington. The seizure of these items in 2001 should have triggered an immediate, aggressive investigation into the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Instead, al-Bayoumi was allowed to leave the UK for Saudi Arabia, where he lives freely today, shielded by the very government whose officials populated his contact list. ### Conclusion of Forensic Review The physical evidence seized in Operation Encore—specifically the aviation equation and the government-linked address book—serves as the concrete foundation for the “casing” video’s visual narrative. The video showed al-Bayoumi selecting the target; the notebook showed him calculating the method; the address book showed who paid for the operation. This triad of evidence, fully assembled only in 2024, moves the needle from “suspicion” to “material support.” The files demonstrate that al-Bayoumi was not a hospitable neighbor a technically proficient operative within a state-run network, equipped with the mathematical tools of terror and the rolodex of a diplomat.
The Riggs Bank Financial Pipeline Linking Princess Haifa to Bayoumi's Associates
The Princess Haifa Stipends
At the center of this financial network was a series of accounts held at Riggs Bank in Washington, D. C., controlled by the Saudi Embassy and specifically by Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the wife of Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Between 1998 and 2002, Princess Haifa’s account issued monthly cashier’s checks ranging from $2, 000 to $3, 500 to Majeda Dweikat, the wife of Osama Basnan. The stated purpose for these payments was humanitarian aid for Dweikat’s thyroid treatment. Yet, the 2024 declassified files provide a darker context. Investigators found that the payments to Dweikat far exceeded reasonable medical costs and continued long after her treatment would have concluded. More damningly, the funds did not stay with Dweikat. FBI files reveal that of these cashier’s checks were endorsed by Dweikat and immediately signed over to her husband, Osama Basnan. Basnan, a known associate of the “Blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel-Rahman, then funneled funds to Omar al-Bayoumi. This created a three-step laundering method: from the Ambassador’s wife to a “charity case,” to a radical intermediary, and to the intelligence asset handling the hijackers.
The Basnan-Bayoumi Handshake
The relationship between Osama Basnan and Omar al-Bayoumi is the serious link that transforms the Riggs Bank payments into terror financing. While both men denied knowing each other well during initial post-9/11 interrogations, the 2024 document releases confirm they were close associates who were in frequent contact during the hijackers’ time in San Diego. Basnan, a Saudi national living in California, had no visible means of income that could support his lifestyle or the large sums of money flowing through his accounts. The FBI’s Operation Encore documents indicate that Basnan acted as a financial cut-out. After receiving the funds originating from Princess Haifa, Basnan provided cash and support to Bayoumi. Bayoumi, in turn, used these resources to settle Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar into the United States. He co-signed their lease at the Parkwood Apartments, paid their initial security deposit of $1, 500, and covered their month’s rent. The timing is precise: the flow of “charitable” money from Washington D. C. to San Diego spiked exactly when the hijackers arrived and required logistical support.
The Riggs Bank Oversight Failure
Riggs Bank, a venerable institution in Washington D. C. known for banking diplomats, played a functional role in this pipeline by failing to enforce Know Your Customer (KYC). The Saudi Embassy accounts were treated with a “hands-off” deference that allowed large, unexplained transfers to go unflagged. Federal regulators later fined Riggs Bank $25 million in 2004 for willful violations of anti-money laundering laws, specifically citing their handling of Saudi accounts. The bank failed to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) on the tens of thousands of dollars flowing from the Ambassador’s wife to the family of a known radical in California. The 2024 files suggest this was not negligence a structural blindness that allowed the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) to move funds within the U. S. banking system without alerting the Treasury Department.
Visualizing the Terror Finance Pipeline
The following table details the flow of funds as reconstructed from FBI financial analysis and the 2024 declassified exhibits.
| Originator | Intermediary A | Intermediary B | Operational Asset | End Users |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Princess Haifa bint Faisal (Riggs Bank, D. C.) |
Majeda Dweikat (Wife of Basnan) |
Osama Basnan (San Diego Extremist) |
Omar al-Bayoumi (Saudi GIP Agent) |
Hazmi & Mihdhar (9/11 Hijackers) |
| Source of Funds | “Medical” Cover | The Cut-Out | The Handler | The Operatives |
| Monthly Cashier’s Checks ($2, 000+) | Endorsed Checks | Cash / Shared Resources | Rent, Security Deposits, Fees | Housing, Flight School |
The “Ghost Employee” Salary Supplement
The Riggs Bank payments must be viewed alongside Bayoumi’s other income stream. As detailed in Section 3, Bayoumi was a “ghost employee” of Dallah Avco, a Saudi aviation contractor. He received a monthly salary of approximately $3, 000 even with rarely showing up for work. The FBI’s Operation Encore investigation posits that the Dallah Avco salary covered Bayoumi’s personal living expenses, while the Riggs Bank funds—laundered through Basnan—provided the “walking around money” necessary to cultivate the hijackers. This dual-funding stream allowed Bayoumi to maintain the appearance of a student living on a stipend while simultaneously financing the housing and travel of two Al-Qaeda operatives. The 2024 release of Bayoumi’s video casing the Capitol removes the “plausible deniability” that protected these transactions for two decades. If Bayoumi was working for Saudi intelligence, the money he received from the Ambassador’s wife was not a gift. It was a budget.
The April 2016 FBI Electronic Communication Confirming Probability of Saudi Official Complicity
1. The “50/50” Probability of Foreknowledge
The most significant assessment in the April 2016 EC is the statistical probability assigned to Saudi foreknowledge of the attacks. The investigators wrote that based on the totality of evidence, there was a “50/50 chance” that Omar al-Bayoumi had “advanced knowledge the 9/11 attacks were to occur.” In the world of counterintelligence, where absolute certainty is rare, a 50% probability from seasoned FBI agents regarding a foreign government’s complicity in a mass casualty attack is a indictment. This assessment contradicts the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, which claimed there was “no credible evidence” that al-Bayoumi believed in violent extremism. The Encore investigators reached their “50/50” conclusion by analyzing the synchronization of al-Bayoumi’s actions with the hijackers’ logistics. The document notes that al-Bayoumi’s assistance was not limited to a single act of charity involved a sustained pattern of support, co-signing a lease, opening bank accounts, and providing car insurance, that began immediately after a meeting at the Saudi consulate. The agents argued that the “chance encounter” at the Mediterranean Gourmet restaurant was a pre-arranged operational meet, orchestrated to hand off the hijackers to their local handler.
2. Identification of the Command Chain: Mussaed al-Jarrah
The 2016 EC identifies Mussaed al-Jarrah (MAJ) as the high-level tasking officer responsible for the San Diego cell. Although his name was redacted in the initial 2021 release, an accidental unsealing by the FBI in 2020 and subsequent 2024 declassifications confirmed his identity. Al-Jarrah was a mid-level official at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D. C., ostensibly working in the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The Encore team concluded that al-Jarrah “tasked” both Fahad al-Thumairy and Omar al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers. This finding fundamentally alters the hierarchy of the plot. It places the direction not in a rogue mosque in California, within the diplomatic mission in the nation’s capital. The document details telephonic links and meetings between al-Jarrah in D. C. and al-Thumairy in Los Angeles, occurring in close proximity to the arrival of hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. The FBI posits that al-Jarrah acted as the between the embassy’s strategic objectives and the tactical execution by agents on the West Coast.
3. The “Ghost Employee” Status at Dallah Avco
The EC solidifies the evidence regarding al-Bayoumi’s employment status, characterizing him as a “ghost employee.” Al-Bayoumi was on the payroll of Dallah Avco, a Saudi aviation services company with extensive government contracts. The FBI found that even with drawing a monthly salary, al-Bayoumi rarely, if ever, showed up for work. Witnesses interviewed by the Encore team confirmed his absence from the office, yet his checks continued to arrive. This arrangement is a classic intelligence cover method. The document suggests that Dallah Avco served as a front to launder payments to al-Bayoumi for his work as an intelligence asset. The salary allowed him to live in the United States, maintain a high standard of living, and have the free time necessary to monitor the local Saudi dissident community and, in 2000, to manage the two future hijackers. The 2016 EC notes that this financial lifeline was severed shortly after the 9/11 attacks, further indicating that his “employment” was tied to his utility as an operative.
4. The “Militant Network” Conclusion
The investigators used the April 2016 document to redefine the nature of the Saudi presence in Southern California. They described a “militant network” created, funded, and protected by Saudi officials. This network was not a social circle an operational infrastructure capable of moving operatives, providing safe houses, and procuring legal documentation. The EC details how this network utilized the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City as a base of operations. Fahad al-Thumairy, an accredited diplomat and imam at the mosque, is described as a central figure in this radicalization hub. The document cites reports that al-Thumairy and his associates had “extremist” views and were in contact with other terror suspects. The FBI’s investigation found that this network was “tasked” to support al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, shielding them from U. S. law enforcement while they prepared for the attacks. The “militant network” terminology signals a departure from viewing the support as passive; the FBI viewed it as active, state-sponsored infrastructure.
| Subject Name | Official Cover | Operational Role (Per FBI) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mussaed al-Jarrah | Saudi Embassy Official (DC) | Tasking Officer; Directed support for hijackers. | Diplomatic Immunity (Left US) |
| Fahad al-Thumairy | Consulate Official / Imam (LA) | Local Handler; Spiritual advisor; Link to Jarrah. | Deported (2003) |
| Omar al-Bayoumi | Dallah Avco Employee (San Diego) | Forward Observer; Logistics provider (Housing/Finance). | Left US (2001) |
| Mohdar Abdullah | Student / Translator | Asset; Assisted hijackers with flight schools/translation. | Deported (2004) |
5. The “Emergency” Consulate Meeting
The document scrutinizes the timeline of February 1, 2000. On this date, al-Bayoumi drove from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. He spent approximately one hour inside the consulate, meeting with officials including al-Thumairy. Immediately after this meeting, he drove to the Mediterranean Gourmet restaurant, where he “happened” to meet the two hijackers, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. The April 2016 EC rejects the coincidence of this sequence. The investigators that the meeting at the consulate was an “emergency” briefing to pass instructions regarding the hijackers, who had just arrived in the country. The subsequent meeting at the restaurant was the execution of those orders. The document notes that al-Bayoumi’s behavior, inviting total strangers to move to San Diego and paying their initial expenses, is inconsistent with normal social interaction perfectly consistent with an intelligence hand-off. The “emergency” nature of the consulate visit suggests that the Saudi officials were reacting to the arrival of the operatives and activating their support.
6. Administrative Burial and the “Sub-File”
The existence of the April 2016 EC is itself evidence of the internal conflict within the US government. The document was written as a “closing” communication for the “sub-file” investigation. The Encore team had faced repeated bureaucratic blocks, including denials of requests to interview key witnesses or problem subpoenas that might embarrass the Saudi government. By writing this detailed summary, the agents ensured that their findings were entered into the official record before the investigation was formally shuttered. The document
Documented Logistical Support for Hijacker Housing and Identification in San Diego
The Orchestrated “Chance” Meeting
For two decades, the official narrative regarding the arrival of hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in California rested on a single adjective: “accidental.” The 9/11 Commission Report originally characterized their meeting with Saudi national Omar al-Bayoumi at the Mediterranean Gourmet restaurant in Culver City as a stroke of random hospitality. Declassified FBI files from Operation Encore, unsealed in 2024 as part of federal litigation, this coincidence. The documents show that on February 1, 2000, immediately before entering the restaurant, al-Bayoumi placed four telephone calls to Fahad al-Thumairy, a diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles known for extremist views. Investigators conclude this meeting was an intelligence “hand-off,” not a chance encounter.
Upon making contact, al-Bayoumi did not offer pleasantries; he executed a logistical relocation plan. Within hours of the meeting, he arranged for the two hijackers to move from Los Angeles to San Diego, a city where he maintained a strong support network. Operation Encore files reveal that al-Bayoumi helped the hijackers settle into the Parkwood Apartments, located at 6333 Mount Ada Road, directly across the street from his own residence. This proximity allowed for constant monitoring and support, a setup the FBI later identified as consistent with intelligence handler tradecraft.
The Lease and Financial Paper Trail
The logistical support provided to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar required documented financial intervention, which al-Bayoumi provided. Because the hijackers had no credit history, no social security numbers, and spoke little English, they could not legally lease an apartment. FBI forensic accounting confirms that al-Bayoumi co-signed the lease for the hijackers. He also covered the initial costs, providing a cashier’s check for approximately $1, 500 to cover the security deposit and the month’s rent. While al-Bayoumi later claimed the hijackers reimbursed him, the initial outlay of funds established the tenancy that allowed the 9/11 plot to take root on American soil.
The financial anomalies surrounding al-Bayoumi during this period are distinct. FBI memos note that prior to the hijackers’ arrival, al-Bayoumi received a monthly stipend of approximately $465 from the Saudi government via a contractor, Dallah Avco. Following the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, this stipend jumped to over $3, 700 a month. Investigators view this increase not as a salary adjustment, as operational funding to sustain the hijackers without generating a direct paper trail from the Saudi Ministry of Defense to the terrorists.
Table: Documented Logistical Support (San Diego Cell)
| Support Type | Facilitator | Specific Action | Verified Consequence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Housing | Omar al-Bayoumi | Co-signed lease at Parkwood Apartments; paid $1, 500 deposit. | Provided secure base of operations for 2000-2001 planning. |
| Banking | Omar al-Bayoumi | Facilitated opening of Bank of America accounts. | Allowed transfer of $10, 000+ from overseas al-Qaeda financiers. |
| Translation/Transit | Mohdar Abdullah | Tasked by al-Bayoumi to drive hijackers and translate. | Enabled flight school enrollment and purchase of vehicles. |
| Identification | Saudi Network | Assistance with DMV forms and procedures. | Hijackers obtained valid California state IDs used for flight boarding. |
Integration via Mohdar Abdullah
The 2024 declassifications bring renewed focus to Mohdar Abdullah, a Yemeni student whom the FBI identified as a key logistical asset for the hijackers. Operation Encore documents state that al-Bayoumi “tasked” Abdullah with the day-to-day care of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Unlike al-Bayoumi, who operated as a senior handler, Abdullah functioned as a fixer. He translated for the hijackers, helped them locate flight schools, and assisted them in purchasing a vehicle. Abdullah’s role was essential because the hijackers possessed almost zero functional English skills upon arrival, a deficiency that would have otherwise paralyzed their ability to navigate American bureaucracy.
Abdullah also facilitated the hijackers’ social integration. He and al-Bayoumi introduced the pair to the local Muslim community during a “welcome party” hosted at the apartment complex. This event served a dual purpose: it provided a cover of legitimacy for the new arrivals while simultaneously embedding them within a circle of associates who held anti-American sentiments. The FBI’s interviews indicate that Abdullah remained in close contact with the hijackers throughout their time in San Diego, acting as the primary interface between the operatives and the outside world.
Banking and Identification Logistics
Securing valid identification and banking channels was a prerequisite for the attacks. Al-Bayoumi personally guided the hijackers to a Bank of America branch to open personal accounts. These accounts were necessary to receive wire transfers from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other al-Qaeda financiers in the United Arab Emirates. Without al-Bayoumi’s intervention, specifically his existing relationship with the bank and his ability to vouch for the men, the hijackers would have faced significant scrutiny attempting to move thousands of dollars into the U. S. financial system immediately after arrival.
also, the support network assisted the hijackers in navigating the California Department of Motor Vehicles. Obtaining state identification cards was a serious step that allowed al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to board domestic flights. The declassified files show that the assistance provided was not translation, coaching on how to bypass standard residency checks. This systematic support structure allowed two known al-Qaeda operatives, who were already on CIA watchlists, to live openly in San Diego, rent property, bank at major institutions, and train for the attacks without triggering local law enforcement alarms.
The June 2017 FBI Report on GIP Cooptee Disclosures Regarding Prince Bandar
The June 14, 2017 Electronic Communication
Among the most consequential documents unsealed under Executive Order 14040 is an FBI Electronic Communication (EC) dated June 14, 2017. This report, previously withheld from the public and the 9/11 Commission, provides a definitive link between the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and Omar al-Bayoumi, the primary handler of hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. The document, identified by serial number EO14040-002638, explicitly categorizes al-Bayoumi not as a student or a charitable neighbor, as a paid “cooptee” of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP).
The FBI’s 2017 findings the long-standing defense that al-Bayoumi acted alone or out of random hospitality. Investigators determined that during the late 1990s and leading up to September 11, 2001, al-Bayoumi received a monthly stipend directly authorized by the GIP. The conduit for these payments was Prince Bandar bin Sultan. This financial arrangement places the Saudi Ambassador at the center of the intelligence network that supported the hijackers upon their arrival in California.
“In the late 1990’s and up to September 11, 2001, Omar Albayoumi was paid a monthly stipend as a cooptee of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) via then Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan Alsaud. The information Albayoumi obtained on persons of interest in the Saudi community in Los Angeles and San Diego… would be forwarded to Bandar.”
, FBI Electronic Communication, June 14, 2017 (Source: EO14040-002638)
The Intelligence Feedback Loop
The June 2017 report outlines a specific operational workflow between al-Bayoumi and the Saudi Embassy. Al-Bayoumi did not receive funds; he provided a service. The FBI found that he collected intelligence on “persons of interest” within the Saudi diaspora in San Diego and Los Angeles. He then transmitted this data to Prince Bandar. The Ambassador, in turn, would forward relevant items to the GIP headquarters in Riyadh for “further investigation/vetting or follow up.” This structure establishes a direct chain of command: GIP Riyadh → Prince Bandar (Washington) → Omar al-Bayoumi (San Diego).
This contradicts the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, which stated it found “no evidence” that the Saudi government or senior officials funded Al-Qaeda. The FBI’s 2017 assessment directly addresses this gap, noting that allegations of al-Bayoumi’s intelligence role were unconfirmed at the time of the Commission’s inquiry. The report concludes with a clear correction: “The above information confirms these allegations.”
The “Ghost Employee” method
To conceal his intelligence activities, al-Bayoumi maintained a cover status as an employee of the Saudi Civil Aviation Authority. The 2017 files indicate this was a “ghost” position. While on paper he worked for the aviation authority, his actual function involved monitoring dissidents and, as the 2024 video release suggests, casing chance. The stipend paid via Prince Bandar supplemented this cover, ensuring al-Bayoumi had the financial resources to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar with apartment security deposits, co-signing leases, and purchasing vehicles without maintaining a visible 9-to-5 job.
| Entity | Role in Network | Action Identified in 2017 Report |
|---|---|---|
| General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) | Saudi Intelligence HQ | Authorized monthly stipends; tasked requirements. |
| Prince Bandar bin Sultan | Saudi Ambassador to US | Conduit for payments; received intel reports from Bayoumi. |
| Omar al-Bayoumi | GIP Cooptee / Handler | Collected intel on local Saudis; supported 9/11 hijackers. |
Corroborating Financial Evidence
The 2017 report’s assertions regarding Prince Bandar’s financial role align with physical evidence recovered during earlier phases of the investigation. Specifically, the FBI tracked checks totaling tens of thousands of dollars from Prince Bandar’s account at Riggs Bank to Osama Bassnan, a close associate of al-Bayoumi who also lived in San Diego. Bassnan, who once bragged to an FBI asset that he did “more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi,” received these funds directly. One check for $15, 000 was issued in 1998.
Another physical link between the Ambassador’s domain and the hijackers involves Ghassan al-Sharbi, an Al-Qaeda bomb maker captured in Pakistan in 2002. Investigators discovered al-Sharbi’s U. S. flight training certificate buried near his safe house. The document was inside an envelope from the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D. C. This discovery, combined with the 2017 confirmation of Bandar’s role as a GIP paymaster, suggests the Embassy functioned as a logistical hub for Saudi operatives entering the United States for flight training.
The June 2017 document forces a re-evaluation of the “rogue elements” theory. The involvement of the Ambassador, the highest-ranking Saudi official in the United States, indicates that the support network for the hijackers operated with state sanction at the executive level. The FBI’s Operation Encore team concluded that the diplomatic and intelligence channels were not passive observers active participants in the infrastructure that allowed the 9/11 plot to mature on American soil.
Structural Analysis of the Capitol Video as a Target Casing Operation
The “Blueprint” Video: Deconstructing the Capitol Surveillance
The June 2024 release of Omar al-Bayoumi’s 1999 video recording by the FBI, following a federal court order, provides the public look at what intelligence experts classify as a “pre-operational casing” tape. While the 9/11 Commission originally dismissed al-Bayoumi as a “gregarious” student who aided hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar out of hospitality, the structural analysis of this footage that conclusion. The video does not exhibit the wandering curiosity of a tourist; it displays the methodical, checklist-driven behavior of an intelligence operative documenting a target for an aerial assault. The footage, recorded over several days in June and July 1999, aligns chronologically with the period when Al Qaeda leadership, specifically Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, finalized the decision to target the U. S. Capitol. FBI investigators assess that the Capitol was the intended target of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers revolted. Al-Bayoumi’s video served as the operational blueprint for that strike.
Visual Evidence: Security and Structural Integrity
A forensic examination of the video reveals a cameraman uninterested in history or aesthetics. Al-Bayoumi’s lens systematically ignores statues, art, and architectural beauty in favor of security infrastructure and structural vulnerabilities. * Perimeter Security: The camera lingers on concrete blocks, police posts, and vehicle checkpoints. Al-Bayoumi films the specific locations where authorized vehicles enter the Capitol grounds, capturing the retractable bollards and guard interactions. * Entry and Exit Points: The footage documents multiple public and restricted entrances, paying close attention to the flow of foot traffic and the positioning of metal detectors. * Roof and Elevation: In several sequences, al-Bayoumi captures the Capitol dome from various distances and angles, providing a 360-degree panoramic assessment. He films the roofline and structural supports, data necessary for calculating impact damage or method angles. * The Model: Perhaps most damning is the footage of a model of the Capitol complex on display inside the building. Al-Bayoumi films the model from above, simulating an aerial method. This allows a viewer to understand the spatial relationship between the dome, the House wing, and the Senate wing without needing to fly over the restricted airspace. Richard Lambert, the retired FBI agent who led the initial 9/11 investigation in San Diego, analyzed the footage for 60 Minutes in 2024. He noted that al-Bayoumi conducted a “360-degree panoramic view” of the target, a standard intelligence practice for site exploitation.
Audio Analysis: “The Plan” and “The Brothers”
The audio track of the recording is as incriminating as the visual feed. Al-Bayoumi narrates the video in Arabic, speaking directly to an audience he refers to as his “esteemed brothers.” This phrasing suggests the video was never intended for personal use was a deliverable product for a specific group. Throughout the recording, al-Bayoumi
State Secrets Privilege and the Two-Decade Delay in Declassifying Operation Encore
The Architecture of Silence: How State Secrets Delayed Justice
The twenty-two-year gap between the September 11 attacks and the 2024 release of Operation Encore files was not an accident of bureaucracy. It was a constructed legal blockade. For two decades, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) used the State Secrets Privilege (SSP) to prevent 9/11 families, the American public, and even federal judges from viewing evidence of Saudi official complicity. The release of the “casing” video and the 2016 Encore summary report in June 2024 dismantled the government’s long-standing argument that transparency would cause “exceptionally grave damage” to national security. The declassified records reveal that the “damage” feared was likely diplomatic embarrassment rather than the exposure of intelligence sources.
The following method detail how the Executive Branch maintained this wall of silence from 2001 until the judicial and executive breakthroughs of 2024 and 2025.
1. The “Sub-File” Shell Game
The FBI compartmentalized the investigation into Saudi ties to avoid disclosure. While the main 9/11 investigation, PENTTBOM, was ostensibly exhaustive, the Bureau opened a separate “sub-file” investigation in 2007 known as Operation Encore. This administrative separation allowed the FBI to answer Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding PENTTBOM with denials or “no records” responses concerning Saudi officials, as those records were technically housed in a different, active prosecutorial file.
By keeping Operation Encore classified as an “ongoing investigation” long after it was shuttered in 2016, the FBI utilized the law enforcement exemption to FOIA. This tactic prevented the 9/11 Review Commission (2015) and the families’ legal teams from accessing the files. The 2024 releases confirm that the Encore team had concluded in 2016 that Saudi diplomat Fahad al-Thumairy and intelligence agent Omar al-Bayoumi knowingly assisted the hijackers. Yet, the DOJ continued to represent to the court that no such conclusions existed or that the files remained too sensitive for release.
2. The Barr-Grenell State Secrets Assertion (2019-2020)
The Trump administration escalated the use of the State Secrets Privilege to an absolute shield. In September 2019 and April 2020, Attorney General William Barr and Acting Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell filed sworn declarations in federal court asserting that releasing the Operation Encore documents would threaten national security. Barr claimed the privilege over the very existence of the subject matter, arguing that even confirming or denying the identity of Saudi officials under suspicion would compromise intelligence relationships.
This assertion occurred simultaneously with a catastrophic redaction error by the FBI. In an April 2020 court filing, the Bureau accidentally failed to redact the name of Mussaed al-Jarrah, a mid-level Saudi Foreign Ministry official, identifying him as the handler who tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers. even with this public exposure, the DOJ continued to that al-Jarrah’s identity was a state secret, creating a legal paradox where the government demanded secrecy for information it had already published.
3. Executive Order 14040 and the “Strongest Possible Reasons” Standard
The turning point in the legal battle arrived on September 3, 2021, when President Joe Biden signed Executive Order 14040. This order mandated a declassification review of the 9/11 investigation files and, crucially, shifted the load of proof. The EO required agencies to disclose information unless the “strongest possible reasons” counselled otherwise. It specifically targeted the Operation Encore sub-files for review.
Compliance was neither immediate nor total. The FBI missed several deadlines and released heavily redacted documents throughout 2022 and 2023. It required intense pressure from the 9/11 families’ steering committee and federal magistrate judges to force the unredaction of key names and details. The June 2024 release of the unredacted 2016 Encore summary and the Bayoumi video represented the final collapse of the agency’s resistance to the 2021 order.
4. The Suppression of the “Casing” Video
The most egregious example of the delay involves the 1999 video of Omar al-Bayoumi casing the U. S. Capitol. The FBI obtained this video shortly after the attacks in 2001 when British authorities raided al-Bayoumi’s apartment in Birmingham, England. For 23 years, the FBI possessed footage of a Saudi intelligence agent narrating a structural survey of a primary 9/11 target, yet they never provided it to the 9/11 Commission or the public.
The Bureau characterized al-Bayoumi as a “harmless student” in public statements while sitting on video evidence of him referencing the “plan” and filming security checkpoints. The release of this video in June 2024 invalidated the “accidental benefactor” theory. The delay in releasing this specific piece of evidence suggests a deliberate effort to avoid contradicting the official narrative established in the 2004 Commission Report.
5. Internal Dissent and Whistleblowers
The wall of secrecy cracked from the inside. Former FBI agents, frustrated by the suppression of their work, began to provide declarations to the 9/11 families’ legal team. Stephen Moore, the former special agent in charge of the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force, submitted a declaration in 2017 stating that diplomatic and intelligence personnel of Saudi Arabia “knowingly provided material support” to the hijackers. Moore asserted that the refusal to release the files was not based on national security on a desire to protect the U. S.-Saudi diplomatic relationship.
Another agent, Richard Lambert, who led the initial investigation, filed a whistleblower suit alleging he was ostracized for pushing for a more aggressive probe. These internal testimonies undermined the DOJ’s court arguments that the files contained raw, unverified intelligence. The agents confirmed that the findings in Operation Encore were the result of rigorous investigative work that had been verified and closed.
6. The Sovereign Immunity Defense
The delay in declassification directly aided the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s legal defense. The Kingdom’s lawyers argued that the plaintiffs absence sufficient evidence to overcome the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), plaintiffs must show a factual basis that a foreign state committed a tortious act on U. S. soil. By withholding the Encore files, the U. S. government denied the families the very evidence required to meet the JASTA standard.
In August 2025, following the full release of the Encore documents, U. S. District Judge George Daniels denied Saudi Arabia’s motion to dismiss the case. The judge the newly declassified evidence, specifically the links between al-Jarrah, al-Bayoumi, and the hijackers, as sufficient to proceed to trial. The twenty-year delay had successfully stalled this ruling, allowing witnesses to die and memories to fade, the 2024 releases provided the evidentiary the court required.
| Year | Event | Impact on Transparency |
|---|---|---|
| 2004 | 9/11 Commission Report | Found “no evidence” of Saudi institutional support; Encore evidence withheld from Commissioners. |
| 2016 | Operation Encore Closed | FBI formally ends the probe keeps files classified as “law enforcement sensitive.” |
| 2019 | AG Barr Assertion | DOJ invokes State Secrets Privilege to block discovery of Encore files. |
| 2020 | The “Mussaed” Leak | FBI accidentally unmasks Mussaed al-Jarrah in a court filing, then attempts to claw it back. |
| 2021 | Biden EO 14040 | Orders declassification review; sets “strongest possible reasons” standard for secrecy. |
| 2024 | Video & Report Release | Court unseals Bayoumi “casing” video and full 2016 Encore summary. |
| 2025 | Motion to Dismiss Denied | Judge Daniels rules the case can proceed to trial based on the new files. |
The Cost of Delay
The two-decade delay in declassifying Operation Encore served to insulate the Saudi government from liability during the period of highest public scrutiny. The State Secrets Privilege, designed to protect nuclear codes and active spy networks, was applied to protect the identity of a foreign official who had been named in open court and to hide a video of a tourist site. The 2024 releases demonstrate that the “secrets” kept were not matters of U. S. national survival, evidence of a foreign partner’s betrayal.
