Forensic Analysis of Cloned Typography and Color Codes in Joy News Brand Imitations
The Anatomy of a Clone: Forensic Deconstruction of Joy News Imposters
Between November 2024 and January 2025, the “NewsCard”, a static, easily shareable graphic summarizing a news story, became the primary vector for electoral disinformation in Ghana. While multiple outlets were targeted, the Multimedia Group Limited’s Joy News brand suffered the highest volume of impersonation. Fabricators exploited the brand’s high trust rating to circulate fraudulent quotes, fictitious election results, and inflammatory statements attributed to key political figures like Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia and John Dramani Mahama.
A forensic examination of over 40 verified fake graphics circulated during this period reveals a consistent pattern of visual mimicry that fails under technical scrutiny. These “clones” rely on the cognitive speed of social media scrolling, where the presence of a red banner and a logo overrides the viewer’s attention to typographic irregularities.
Typographic Inconsistencies and Font Substitution
The most distinct forensic marker distinguishing official Joy News output from fabricated cards is the typeface. Official Joy News graphics strictly adhere to a proprietary style guide, using specific weights of Gotham or Helvetica Neue for headlines, ensuring uniform kerning (spacing between characters) and leading (spacing between lines).
In contrast, 85% of the debunked cards analyzed by GhanaFact and Dubawa displayed default system fonts common to free design software like Canva or cracked versions of Adobe Photoshop. The most frequent substitutes were:
- Arial / Arial Bold: Used in 60% of fakes due to its ubiquity on Windows systems. It absence the subtle geometric balance of the official font.
- Calibri: frequently found in lower-resolution fakes, likely created on mobile devices.
- Roboto: A default Google font common in Android-based photo editors.
also, the fabricators frequently failed to respect the brand’s text hierarchy. Official cards use a specific ratio of font size between the headline and the body text. The fakes frequently maximized the font size to fill the white space, resulting in cramped margins and “bleeding” text that touched the edges of the red borders, a design error professional newsrooms avoid.
Color Hex Codes and Compression Artifacts
The “Joy News Red” is a specific broadcast-safe color value. While the exact proprietary hex code is an internal asset, visual analysis shows it sits near #ED1C24 (a vibrant standard red). The counterfeits, yet, frequently missed this specific hue.
Forensic sampling of the red banners in viral fake cards revealed two common deviations:
- Oversaturation (#FF0000): A “digital pure red” frequently used by amateurs, which appears jarringly bright compared to the slightly deeper official tone.
- Dullness (#C00000): Resulting from repeated saving and re-compression of the template, darkening the red and introducing “jpeg artifacts”, blocky noise around the text and logos.
The logo placement also betrayed the forgeries. In official high-resolution templates, the Joy News logo has a transparent background with crisp edges. In the fakes, a “white halo” or pixelated fringe was frequently visible around the logo, indicating it had been hastily cropped from a Google Image search result using an automated background remover tool.
Case Study: The “Gazetted Results” Forgery (January 2025)
One of the most sophisticated yet technically flawed forgeries appeared in late January 2025, claiming the Electoral Commission had “gazetted” new results favoring the NDC. The card mimicked the Joy News “Breaking News” template.
| Feature | Official Joy News Standard | Fake “Gazetted Results” Card |
|---|---|---|
| Headline Font | Heavy weight, tight kerning. | Standard Arial Bold, wide tracking. |
| Date Format | DD Month YYYY (e. g., 08 January 2025). | Inconsistent (e. g., Jan 30th, 2025). |
| Watermark | “MyJoyOnline. com” centered or aligned right, 30% opacity. | Missing or placed awkwardly over the subject’s face. |
| Attribution | specific reporter or “Joy News Desk”. | No attribution or vague “Sources”. |
| Image Quality | High-definition, professional lighting. | Low-res, grainy crop from a 2020 archive photo. |
The “Bluetooth Kayayei” and “Excavator” Fakes
Two other high-profile incidents demonstrated the weaponization of these templates. In February 2024 (and resurfacing in late 2024), a card circulated claiming Vice President Bawumia stated head porters (Kayayei) were “using Bluetooth to transport goods.” The typography on this card was visibly misaligned, with the text justified to the left in a way that left jagged gaps, a trait inconsistent with the center-aligned or justified style of official quotes.
Similarly, in November 2024, a fake card attributed a quote to Dr. Matthew Opoku Prempeh (Napo) promising to return seized excavators to illegal miners. While the quote was based on a disputed video, the static graphic itself was a fabrication. The text was bolded arbitrarily on words like “Excavators” and “Peacefully,” a technique used in clickbait marketing never in neutral journalistic reporting.
The “Fake News” Stamp War
A secondary of visual manipulation emerged when politicians began co-opting the “Verified” or “Fake News” stamps used by fact-checkers., a fact-checker like Dubawa or GhanaFact overlays a semi-transparent “FAKE” stamp on a debunked image. In the 2024 pattern, partisan actors began applying counterfeit “FAKE” stamps onto genuine news cards that reported unfavorable statistics or quotes about their candidates.
This “muddying the waters” tactic made forensic analysis difficult for the average voter, as the visual language of verification, the red rubber stamp overlay, was itself counterfeited. GHOne TV and Joy News responded by introducing audio- cards (voice notes) on social media, forcing users to listen to the actual recording, a format harder to clone than a static JPEG.
“The safeguards that attempted to counter the bogus claims the last time are eroding… fabricated images, videos and audio clips known as deepfakes have started making their way into experimental presidential campaign ads.”
, MyJoyOnline, citing AI experts on election disinformation risks (Dec 2023).
Volume Metrics of False Attribution Targeting Mahamudu Bawumia via Fabricated Quote Cards
The Asymmetry of Attribution: Volume and Velocity
An analysis of the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition’s data covering the 2024 election pattern reveals a distinct asymmetry in how disinformation targeted the two primary presidential contenders. While the sheer volume of disinformation targeting National Democratic Congress (NDC) candidate John Dramani Mahama stood at 21. 1%, the attacks against Vice President Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia (5. 7%) relied less on volume and more on high-velocity, fabricated policy statements. The lower percentage for Bawumia does not indicate a safer information environment; rather, it suggests a strategic pivot by bad actors. Instead of generic smears, fabricators used “NewsCards” to attribute specific, technically impossible pledge to the Vice President, exploiting his reputation as a technocrat to paint him as out of touch with reality.
Between January 2024 and January 2025, fact-checkers at Dubawa Ghana and GhanaFact flagged over 40 distinct instances of fabricated quote cards attributed to Bawumia. Unlike the attacks on Mahama, which frequently focused on character assassination or past scandals, the Bawumia-focused disinformation vectors were almost exclusively policy-oriented. These fabrications were designed to mimic the visual language of trusted outlets like Joy News, Citi FM, and Graphic Online, laundering the lies through the stolen credibility of established newsrooms.
Vector 1: The “Digital Delusion” Narratives
The most viral category of fabricated quotes targeted Bawumia’s digitization agenda. Fabricators capitalized on the public’s absence of technical understanding regarding the Ghana Card and digital interoperability.
In June 2024, a widely circulated graphic bearing the logo of Media General (TV3) alleged that Bawumia promised: “I introduce free VISA to USA, CANADA, UK, and all the EUROPIAN countries for individuals with ghana card.” This fabrication traveled through closed WhatsApp networks before surfacing on Facebook. The card was designed to trigger ridicule, framing the Vice President’s legitimate digitization efforts as farcical. Dubawa Ghana debunked this on June 10, 2024, confirming that no such pledge was made and the graphic did not originate from Media General.
A similar vector appeared in August 2024, when a deepfake video, frequently accompanied by static summary cards, depicted Bawumia singing a Chinese song during a speech. While the video used AI audio generation, the accompanying “NewsCards” circulated on TikTok summarized the event as a “diplomatic embarrassment,” further entrenching the narrative of a leader disconnected from Ghanaian realities.
Vector 2: Economic Policy Fabrication
The second major category of false attribution focused on taxation and the economy. As the government faced criticism for the Electronic Transfer Levy (E-Levy), disinformation agents produced cards attempting to pin the specific authorship of the tax on Bawumia, even with his public attempts to distance himself from it.
In February 2024, a fabricated card circulated with the headline: “Bawumia was instrumental in drafting e-levy tax.” This graphic was so pervasive that the Ministry of Information was forced to problem a “FAKE” stamped rebuttal on February 8, 2024. The fabrication Citi TV as the source, the outlet had never published such a report. This specific piece of disinformation was timed to derail Bawumia’s “Ghana’s Chapter” lecture, where he explicitly stated he would abolish the tax if elected.
Post-Election Disinformation: The “Concession” Hoax
The disinformation campaign continued into the immediate post-election period. On January 4, 2025, following the declaration of results, a fake flyer bearing the TV3 logo circulated claiming Bawumia had said: “I am okay with the 38. 2%.”
This fabrication served two purposes: it demoralized New Patriotic Party (NPP) supporters by suggesting their candidate was indifferent to the loss, and it legitimized false vote percentages circulating on social media (official provisional results placed him at 41. 32%, not 38. 2%). The card forced Gideon Boako, the Vice President’s aide, to problem a public denial, diverting resources from the transition process to damage control.
Index of Verified Fabricated Quote Cards (2024-2025)
The following table categorizes the most significant verified fabricated quote cards targeting Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia during the election pattern.
| Date Circulated | Fabricated Quote / Claim | Impersonated Brand | Primary Disinformation Theme | Fact-Check Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| June 10, 2024 | “I introduce free VISA to USA, CANADA, UK… for individuals with Ghana card” | Media General (TV3) | Impossible pledge / Digital Delusion | False (Dubawa) |
| Feb 8, 2024 | “Bawumia was instrumental in drafting e-levy tax” | Citi News / Generic | Economic Liability | False (Ministry of Info/Citi) |
| Dec 11, 2023 | Fake screenshot of Bawumia insulting a Twitter user (@citizen_1) | X (Twitter) Interface | Arrogance / Character Attack | Fabricated (GhanaFact) |
| Jan 4, 2025 | “I am okay with the 38. 2%” (referring to vote share) | TV3 | Defeatism / False Data | False (Dubawa) |
| Aug 8, 2024 | Claims Bawumia sang a Chinese song during a speech (AI Audio) | TikTok / News Summaries | Foreign Influence / Ridicule | Deepfake (Dubawa) |
The “Liar” Trope vs. The “Incompetent” Trope
The data suggests a in the intent of the quote cards. While opposition candidate Mahama was targeted with “scare” narratives (e. g., he cancel Free SHS), Bawumia was targeted with “ridicule” narratives. The “Free Visa” and “Chinese Song” cards were not designed to generate fear, to generate laughter and dismissal. This aligns with the broader opposition strategy to brand the Vice President as a “liar” (Bawuliar) rather than incompetent. By flooding the zone with absurd pledge attributed to him via fake media brands, disinformation actors successfully blurred the line between his actual ambitious pledge (e. g., digital interoperability) and complete fabrications.
The 5. 7% volume figure by the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition is therefore deceptive if viewed in isolation. While the quantity was lower than the attacks on Mahama, the quality of the forgery, specifically the use of high-fidelity clones of trusted media templates, ensured that these specific lies achieved high penetration in non-partisan WhatsApp groups, where the nuance of a fact-check rarely reaches.
The John Mahama Distortion: Quantifying Negative Sentiment in Counterfeit Graphic Online Headlines
The John Mahama: Quantifying Negative Sentiment in Counterfeit Graphic Online Headlines
Forensic Fan-Out: 20 Key Questions on Anti-Mahama Disinformation
| 1. Primary Target? | John Dramani Mahama (NDC Flagbearer). |
| 2. Dominant Vector? | Counterfeit “NewsCards” mimicking Graphic Online. |
| 3. Peak Activity? | November 2024 , January 2025. |
| 4. Key Narrative 1? | Cancellation of Free SHS (Social Policy). |
| 5. Key Narrative 2? | Election rigging plots (Institutional Mistrust). |
| 6. Key Narrative 3? | Personal enrichment/Corruption ($900m wealth claim). |
| 7. Fake “Gazetted” Result? | Claimed 57. 7% win for Mahama (Dec 2024). |
| 8. Brand Mimicked? | Graphic Online (graphic. com. gh). |
| 9. Visual Error 1? | Incorrect Hex Code for “Graphic Red” (#E31B23). |
| 10. Visual Error 2? | Wrong typeface (Arial instead of custom serif). |
| 11. “Indian Spell” Claim? | False quote attributing superstition to Mahama. |
| 12. “Moscow Trip” Lie? | Alleged he sought Russian election interference. |
| 13. “English Removal” Hoax? | Claimed he would ban English in schools. |
| 14. Fact-Checkers? | Dubawa Ghana, GhanaFact, Fact-Check Ghana. |
| 15. Dissemination Hub? | WhatsApp groups and “Ghana Today” Facebook page. |
| 16. Sentiment Score? | 92% Negative (based on 40+ verified fakes). |
| 17. Appointee List? | Fake cabinet list circulated Dec 16, 2024. |
| 18. “iPhone Gift” Lie? | Claimed he promised iPhones to market women. |
| 19. Attribution? | frequently anonymous or “Daily Insights GH”. |
| 20. Strategic Goal? | Voter suppression and character assassination. |
The Metric of Malice: Analyzing the “Graphic” Clone
Between January 2024 and January 2025, the digital identity of Graphic Online, the internet arm of the state-owned Daily Graphic, was systematically hijacked to wage a disinformation war against John Dramani Mahama. Unlike the Joy News clones which focused on sensationalism, the counterfeit Graphic Online cards were engineered to project false authority. Data from the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition indicates that 21. 1% of all election-related disinformation claims specifically targeted Mahama, with a 65% of these utilizing fake graphic headlines to bypass serious reading filters.
The “John Mahama ” was not random; it was a calculated campaign of negative sentiment injection. An analysis of 42 verified fake Graphic Online cards reveals a sentiment distribution heavily skewed towards fear and outrage. Over 90% of these graphics attributed fabricated quotes to Mahama that were designed to alienate specific voter demographics: teachers, parents, and the religious conservative base. The fabricators relied on the Graphic brand’s reputation for sobriety to sell lies that would otherwise be dismissed as tabloid fodder.
Case Study: The “English Language” Hoax (November 2024)
In November 2024, a digitally altered flyer bearing the Graphic Online masthead circulated rapidly on X (formerly Twitter) and WhatsApp. The headline claimed: “Mahama to Abolish English as Medium of Instruction in Basic Schools.” This fabrication was timed to coincide with a debate on educational reform, weaponizing a sensitive policy problem.
Forensic Deconstruction of the Hoax:
- Font gap: The fabricators used a standard Arial Bold font for the headline. The authentic Graphic Online template uses a proprietary serif font family (frequently Georgia or a custom variant) for its primary headers.
- Color Mismatch: The red banner at the bottom of the fake card utilized the Hex code #FF0000 (standard generic red). The official Graphic Online brand red is a deeper shade, approximately #E31B23.
- Logo Artifacts: The Graphic Online logo on the fake card showed significant JPEG compression artifacts (pixelation) around the edges, indicating it had been lifted from a low-resolution screenshot rather than a source file.
even with these technical failures, the card achieved high velocity. GhanaFact debunked the claim on November 7, 2024, noting that the narrative had already been amplified by a Nigerian news website, Nairametrics, which reposted the fake flyer as legitimate news. This “laundering” of fake graphics through foreign portals became a hallmark of the anti-Mahama campaign.
The “Moscow” and “Rich List” Narratives
Two other significant spikes in counterfeit Graphic Online activity occurred in July 2024 and August 2023, establishing the “foreign interference” and “corruption” frames.
In July 2024, a fake headline alleged Mahama was in Moscow to “seek Russian assistance” for the 2024 election. This narrative attempted to link the NDC candidate to global geopolitical tensions. The card was debunked by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and Graphic Online itself, which issued a disclaimer stating, “We have not published any such story.” The fake card absence the timestamp and author byline standard on all genuine Graphic digital assets.
Earlier, in August 2023, a persistent fake graphic claimed Mahama was the “4th Richest Person in Ghana” with a net worth of $900 million. This graphic was designed to his “man of the people” image. The fabricators pasted a low-quality headshot of Mahama over a stock background, a visual style inconsistent with Graphic Online‘s practice of using high-resolution, credited photography. Joyce Bawah Mogtari, Mahama’s special aide, was forced to problem a statement denouncing the “malicious false publications,” yet the graphic resurfaced in WhatsApp groups throughout the 2024 campaign.
Post-Election Chaos: The “Gazetted” Results (January 2025)
The most dangerous application of the Graphic Online clone occurred in the immediate aftermath of the December 2024 polls. On January 3, 2025, a fake graphic purporting to show “Gazetted Presidential Election Results” circulated, awarding Mahama 57. 7% of the vote against Dr. Bawumia’s 38. 2%. This card was shared by high-ranking party officials, lending it a veneer of credibility.
Visual Forensic Failures:
| Feature | Authentic Graphic Online Card | Fake “Gazetted” Card |
|---|---|---|
| Date Format | “Jan. 03, 2025” (Abbreviated Month) | “January 3rd 2025” (Full Month + Suffix) |
| Headline Alignment | Left-Aligned | Center-Aligned (Amateur formatting) |
| Watermark | Subtle, diagonal transparency | None or unclear, blocking text |
| Source Citation | “Source: Electoral Commission” | “Source: EC Gazette” (Non-standard term) |
The Electoral Commission, through Dr. Bossman Asare, clarified that they “do not gazette with figures or percentages,” exposing the procedural ignorance of the forgers. yet, the damage was done; the graphic had already been viewed over 200, 000 times on X, fueling conspiracy theories about a stolen verdict.
The “Indian Spell” and “iPhone” Bribes
Beyond high-level policy fakes, the campaign utilized “micro-disinformation” to attack Mahama’s character. A fake quote card, debunked by Dubawa in October 2024, attributed a bizarre statement to Mahama claiming the NPP had placed an “Indian spell” on Ghanaians. While this card mimicked the layout of FM rather than Graphic Online, it followed the same template of using a trusted media frame to deliver absurd content. Similarly, a July 2024 fake flyer claimed Mahama promised to gift every market woman an iPhone. These “ridicule tactics” were designed to make the candidate appear desperate and unserious.
The cumulative effect of these 40+ verified fake graphics was a of the information. By hijacking the visual authority of Graphic Online, disinformation actors succeeded in making false narratives compete on equal footing with verified news, forcing the electorate to navigate a minefield of “red banners” where the truth was frequently the casualty.
Delegitimizing the Referee: The Surge of Fake Electoral Commission Decrees on WhatsApp
Delegitimizing the Referee: The Surge of Fake Electoral Commission Decrees on WhatsApp
Between November 2024 and January 2025, a coordinated disinformation campaign targeted the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana, moving beyond simple partisan attacks to a more sophisticated strategy: the fabrication of administrative decrees. These forgeries were designed to mimic the visual authority of the EC’s official communications, using high-resolution logos, specific fonts, and the “NewsCard” format popular on WhatsApp. The objective was to public trust in the electoral referee by circulating conflicting directives regarding voting procedures, results, and personnel recruitment.
Case 1: The “Gazetted Results” Forgery (December 2024 , January 2025)
The most significant attempt to preempt official channels occurred in late December 2024, continuing into January 2025. A digitally fabricated document, purporting to be an official gazette from the EC, circulated widely on WhatsApp and X (formerly Twitter). This forgery claimed the EC had finalized results awarding John Dramani Mahama 57. 7% of the vote and Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia 38. 2%.
The document exploited a delay in the official gazetting process caused by outstanding results from the Ablekuma North constituency. By filling this information vacuum with a “confirmed” document, the fabricators sought to establish a false baseline of victory. On December 26, 2024, Dr. Bossman Asare, Deputy Chairperson of the EC, was forced to problem a categorical denial, clarifying that the Commission does not gazette results with specific percentages, rather declares the winner who crossed the 50% threshold. The fake document’s reliance on specific percentages was a forensic error that debunked it, yet it had already achieved viral status among partisan networks.
Case 2: The “Ballot Swap” Directive (November 2024)
Following the death of Ghana Freedom Party (GFP) flagbearer Akua Donkor in October 2024, disinformation agents seized on the uncertainty to circulate a fake “Notice of Poll.” This graphic, released in early November 2024, alleged that the EC had administratively re-ordered the presidential ballot positions, moving the NPP candidate, Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia, from the number one spot to number two.
The graphic was designed to look like a leaked internal memo, complete with the EC’s coat of arms. It capitalized on the legal complexity of Article 50(4) regarding the death of a candidate. The EC had to suspend the printing of presidential ballots to resolve the GFP’s nomination status, creating a window of silence that the fake decree exploited. GhanaFact and other verification bodies confirmed on November 6, 2024, that no such re-ordering had occurred, the graphic had already caused confusion among voters regarding how to identify their preferred candidate on the ballot.
Case 3: The “Special Voting” Sabotage (November , December 2024)
A series of fake announcements targeted the “Special Voting” exercise, which allows security personnel and media to vote early. In late November 2024, a viral video and accompanying text claimed the EC had disenfranchised security agencies by invalidating their ID card numbers. A subsequent fake notice alleged the date for Special Voting had been surreptitiously moved to December 5, 2024, instead of the scheduled December 2.
These fabrications were tactical attempts to suppress turnout among security forces and sow discord between the uniformed services and the election management body. The EC refuted these claims on November 24, 2024, urging the public to disregard the “security expert” in the video. The persistence of these rumors required the EC to publish the Special Voters Register online for the time in history to prove transparency.
Case 4: The “Recruitment” Phishing Trap (May 2023 , June 2024)
Long before the ballot was cast, the EC’s brand was weaponized for data harvesting. From May 2023 through June 2024, fake recruitment advertisements circulated on WhatsApp, promising “Ad Hoc Staff” positions for the 2024 election. These messages contained phishing links (e. g., ec. recruit. gov-funding. cf) that directed users to sites mimicking the EC’s old and new logos.
Unlike political disinformation, these scams were financially motivated, seeking to collect personal data from unemployed youth. yet, they contributed to the wider delegitimization campaign by associating the EC with fraud and incompetence. On June 19, 2024, investigations revealed that while links were technically “safe” from malware, they were fraudulent portals designed to farm user traffic and data under the guise of official EC employment.
| Type of Forgery | Key Fabrication Element | Disinformation Goal | Primary Distribution Channel |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gazetted Results | Fake percentages (57. 7% vs 38. 2%) | Preempt official declaration; incite unrest | WhatsApp, X (Twitter) |
| Ballot Re-ordering | Altered candidate numbering (#1 to #2) | Create voter confusion; invalidate ballots | WhatsApp Status |
| Special Voting Change | False dates (Dec 5) & disenfranchisement claims | Suppress security force turnout; sow distrust | TikTok (re-shared to WhatsApp) |
| Recruitment Ads | Phishing links with official logos | Data harvesting; brand | WhatsApp Groups |
Dubawa Ghana Data: The Latency Gap Between Viral Spread and Verification of Static Image Hoaxes
The Velocity Mismatch: Viral Speed vs. Verification Sluggishness
The central failure of the information ecosystem during Ghana’s 2024 election pattern was not an absence of fact-checking, a catastrophic latency gap. Data released by the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition (GFC), a strategic alliance between Dubawa Ghana, GhanaFact, and the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), reveals a clear “velocity mismatch.” While fraudulent NewsCards frequently achieved viral saturation within 45 minutes of release on WhatsApp and X (formerly Twitter), the average verification process required between four to twelve hours. This window, frequently referred to as the “Zone of Impunity,” allowed fabricated narratives to solidify in the public consciousness long before corrective data could be published. Between December 4 and December 11, 2024, the GFC’s Media Situation Rooms in Accra and Tamale analyzed 142 distinct claims. Of these, approximately 80% originated on social media, with static graphic cards being the primary vector. The latency problem was exacerbated by the specific nature of these graphics. Unlike text-based rumors which can be quickly searched and cross-referenced, fake NewsCards require visual forensics and direct confirmation from the impersonated media house or the Electoral Commission (EC). This manual verification load created a structural delay that disinformation agents exploited with precision.
Data Analysis: The 12-Hour Danger Zone
The most damaging disinformation campaigns occurred during the “counting silence”, the period between the close of polls on December 7 and the official declaration of results. During this window, fabricators released high-quality clones of Joy News and Citi FM graphics alleging specific constituency victories. Dubawa Ghana’s operational data from this period highlights the chronological. For instance, a fake graphic attributed to Channel8Ghana claiming John Mahama had polled 5, 271, 758 votes against Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia’s 3, 848, 948 votes began circulating early on December 8. While the GFC issued a debunk later that same day, the graphic had already been shared across hundreds of WhatsApp groups, anchoring a false “victory” narrative before the EC had collated even 50% of the results. The following table reconstructs the timeline of three major static image hoaxes tracked during the election week, demonstrating the serious lag time.
| Fake NewsCard Subject | Impersonated Brand | Viral Onset (Est.) | Verification Timestamp | Latency Gap | Impact Metric |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| “Mahama Wins 5. 2M Votes” | Channel8Ghana | Dec 8, 09: 30 AM | Dec 8, 04: 15 PM | ~6. 5 Hours | High (Triggered premature celebrations) |
| “Trump Endorses Mahama” | International/CNN Clone | Dec 7, 08: 00 AM | Dec 7, 02: 30 PM | ~6. 5 Hours | Medium (Widely shared on X) |
| “NPP HQ Crowd Gathering” | GhanaWeb | Dec 7, 01: 00 PM | Dec 7, 05: 45 PM | ~4. 5 Hours | High (Incited tension/fear of clashes) |
| “Gazetted Presidential Result” | Electoral Commission | Jan 2025 (Post-Election) | Jan 29, 2025 | ~24+ Hours | Severe (Undermined official declaration) |
The WhatsApp “Incubation Chamber”
A significant factor driving this latency was the “dark social” architecture of WhatsApp. Unlike X or Facebook, where viral trends are immediately visible to fact-checkers using monitoring tools like CrowdTangle or TweetDeck, WhatsApp operates as a closed network. Disinformation flows through private family and political groups for hours, or even days, before surfacing on a public platform where fact-checkers can detect it. In the 2024 pattern, this “incubation chamber” effect meant that by the time Dubawa or GhanaFact saw a fake NewsCard on X, it was already “old news” to thousands of WhatsApp users. The GFC report noted that while X was the most visible platform for disinformation campaigns (accounting for 85% of public social media flags), the origin frequently traced back to coordinated WhatsApp broadcasts. This invisibility cloak doubled the reaction time for verification teams, as they were reacting to the exit of the disinformation from the private sphere, not its inception.
Institutional Friction and Verification Bottlenecks
The delay was not solely technical; it was also bureaucratic. The GFC’s post-election report, released in January 2025, “difficulty in getting timely information from major officials” as a primary cause for the lag. When a fake NewsCard appeared claiming a specific ballot box theft in the Ashanti Region, fact-checkers could not simply dismiss it as false without evidence. They required confirmation from the National Election Security Taskforce or the EC. During the serious hours of December 7-9, these official channels were frequently overwhelmed or unresponsive. This institutional friction meant that fact-checkers frequently had to hold back their “False” verdict until they could secure an on-the-record denial, leaving the fake graphic to circulate unchallenged during the period of highest public anxiety. The fabricators, unbound by the need for verification, operated with a speed advantage that truth-tellers could not match without sacrificing accuracy.
Post-Election Persistence: The January 2025 Spike
The latency problem well into the post-election transition. In January 2025, a sophisticated fake document purporting to be the “Gazetted Presidential Result” began circulating, challenging the legitimacy of the declared winner. This document, designed to look like an official EC release (a bureaucratic variant of the NewsCard), exploited the complex legal language of gazetting processes. Because verifying a legal instrument requires expert constitutional interpretation and cross-referencing with the government printer (Assembly Press), the verification process took over 24 hours. During this gap, the document was weaponized by partisan actors to claim that the election results were being secretly altered. This incident demonstrated that as the complexity of the fake increases, the latency gap widens, offering disinformation agents a longer runway to entrench their narratives.
The Digital Foot Soldier Network: Tracing the Origins of Partisan Graphic Fabrication
The Hierarchy of Fabrication
The production of fake media branding is not accidental; it is industrial. Political parties in Ghana have formalized their social media wings, mirroring the command structures of military units. The 2024 election pattern saw the consolidation of these “cyber wings” into three distinct tiers: 1. The War Rooms (Strategy): Located in Accra, these small, high-level teams design the day’s narrative. They monitor trending topics and problem “deployment orders” to counter opposition claims. It is here that the high-quality templates for fake Joy News, Citi FM, and Graphiconline cards are frequently designed using professional software like Adobe Photoshop. 2. The Hubs (Distribution): Mid-level influencers and “communicators” receive the raw graphics. Their role is to seed the content into high-traffic spaces. A network analysis by FactSpace West Africa in December 2024 identified a user handle “Kwaku Brown” as a central node in a pro-NPP disinformation network. This account acted as a “hub,” with secondary accounts like “Angela Addai” and “Mr Emmanuel Ntow” serving as immediate amplifiers, creating an illusion of organic engagement. 3. The Foot Soldiers (Amplification): The lowest tier consists of thousands of party loyalists organized in WhatsApp and Telegram broadcast lists. Their primary instruction is to forward specific graphics into non-political groups, church chats, old school associations, and family threads, without adding commentary, allowing the fake media branding to speak for itself.
Case Study: The ‘Twitta Patriots’ and ’18Plus4NDC’
The 2024 election saw the rise of named digital battalions. The NPP’s “Twitta Patriots” (@TheTPatriots) and the NDC’s “18Plus4NDC” (@18plus4NDC) operated as recognized entities on X (formerly Twitter). While these groups publicly engaged in hashtag activism, forensic analysis suggests their networks were frequently the “Patient Zero” for coordinated graphic drops. In October 2024, a fake graphic attributing a quote about “legalizing LGBTQ+ rights” to John Mahama appeared almost simultaneously across forty different X accounts associated with pro-NPP networks. The graphic utilized the exact color code (#ED1C24) and typography of a Joy News breaking news alert. The synchronization of the timestamps, all posting within a 12-minute window, indicates a coordinated “blast” rather than organic sharing.
The Economics of Falsehood: Data, Momo, and Jobs
The motivation for these foot soldiers is rarely direct salary. Instead, the political economy of Ghanaian disinformation relies on a patron-client system. Interviews and reports from the Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) indicate that payment is frequently informal and sporadic.
| Role | Primary Responsibility | Typical Compensation/Incentive |
|---|---|---|
| Strategist / War Room Lead | Narrative creation, high-end graphic design (Photoshop). | Formal salary (GHS 5, 000, GHS 15, 000/month), official party appointment. |
| Influencer / Hub | Seeding content, managing “attack” hashtags. | Project-based fees (GHS 500, GHS 2, 000 per campaign), direct access to MPs. |
| Constituency Communicator | Localizing graphics, managing WhatsApp lists. | Weekly “Data Money” (GHS 50, GHS 200), smartphones, pledge of local gov employment. |
| Foot Soldier | Mass sharing, commenting, trolling. | Irregular Mobile Money (Momo) transfers, T-shirts, hope of future enlistment in security services. |
This precarious economic model drives the volume of fake NewsCards. Foot soldiers are under pressure to demonstrate “work done” to their patrons. Creating and sharing a viral fake graphic is a tangible metric of loyalty. The more inflammatory the card, and the more it mimics a trusted brand like Daily Graphic, the higher the perceived value of the operative to the party hierarchy.
The “Gazetted Results” Operation (January 2025)
The danger of this network beyond the December 7 vote. In January 2025, during the transition period, a sophisticated disinformation campaign circulated a fake “Gazetted Presidential Result.” The graphic, designed to look like an official Electoral Commission (EC) release, claimed the EC had recorded different figures (38. 2% for NPP, 57. 7% for NDC) than those publicly declared. GhanaFact traced the genesis of this graphic to a Facebook post by an NDC activist, Koku Mawuli Nanegbe, on December 19, 2024. The graphic was subsequently picked up by the foot soldier network and amplified until it was shared by high-ranking party officials, including former President John Mahama, on January 3, 2025. This incident demonstrates the “bottom-up” pollution of the information ecosystem: a graphic fabricated by a foot soldier can be laundered through the network until it is endorsed by leadership, granting it retroactive legitimacy.
Technological Toolkits
While the “War Rooms” use Adobe Creative Cloud, the average foot soldier relies on mobile- tools. The proliferation of “NewsCard Maker” apps and the use of Canva templates allow operatives to generate a fake Citi FM card in under three minutes. * Canva: Pre-loaded templates mimicking the Joy News red banner. * WhatsApp: The primary command-and-control center. Groups are frequently segmented by task: “Defense Team,” “Attack Team,” and “Graphic Distribution.” * Telegram: Used for hosting high-resolution archives of fake graphics to bypass WhatsApp’s image compression, ensuring the fakes look crisp and professional when shared. The digital foot soldier is not a rogue element; they are a budgeted line item in the modern Ghanaian political campaign. By impersonating trusted media brands, they convert the credibility of the Fourth Estate into partisan ammunition, leaving the actual news organizations to clean up the debris.
Hybrid Warfare: Correlating Fabricated NewsCards with AI-Generated Audio Clips
The Audio-Visual Feedback Loop: Validating Forgeries
By December 2024, the disinformation in Ghana had evolved beyond static images. The most campaigns employed a “hybrid” verification loop, pairing AI-generated audio clips (deepfakes) with high-fidelity fabricated NewsCards. This dual-vector attack exploited a specific psychological vulnerability: voters skeptical of a grainy WhatsApp voice note were disarmed when they saw a simultaneous “Breaking News” graphic from a trusted brand like Joy News or Citi FM transcribing the audio. The graphic validated the sound, and the sound “proved” the graphic.
Forensic analysis by GhanaFact and Dubawa during the serious November-December 2024 window identified a synchronized release pattern. In multiple instances, a fabricated audio file was seeded into closed WhatsApp groups 15 to 30 minutes before a corresponding fake NewsCard appeared on X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook. This sequencing created an artificial “news pattern,” where the graphic appeared to be the mainstream media reporting on the “leaked” audio.
Case Study: The “Weak-Minded” vs. “Short Memory” Symmetry
The most prominent deployment of this tactic occurred in the final week of campaigning, targeting both major presidential candidates with symmetrical narratives.
On December 6, 2024, a 27-second audio clip circulated on TikTok and WhatsApp purporting to feature National Democratic Congress (NDC) flagbearer John Dramani Mahama. The voice, cloned with high spectral accuracy, allegedly stated: “Like I always say, Ghanaians have short memory… Let us keep lying to them and get all the votes.”
Almost simultaneously, a fabricated NewsCard bearing the Joy News logo and the signature red-and-white typography began trending. The card featured a verbatim transcript of the deepfake, lending the audio the weight of an editorial confirmation. GhanaFact’s analysis, using tools like Deepware and Hiya, flagged the audio as “likely manipulated,” noting unnatural amplitude shifts and background noise insertion. Yet, the NewsCard had already achieved viral velocity, cementing the quote in the minds of voters who never verified the source.
In a direct counter-operation, a similar hybrid package targeted New Patriotic Party (NPP) candidate Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia. An AI-generated voice clip surfaced in which a voice resembling Bawumia’s described Ghanaians as “weak-minded” and promised to “deceive them into winning.” This was paired with a counterfeit graphic mimicking the Graphic Online brand. The symmetry of these attacks suggests a coordinated effort by actors possessing both voice-cloning software and professional graphic design capabilities, likely operating as “mercenary” units rather than direct party organs.
The “Agyapadie” Document: Text-to-Image Legitimacy
While the “Agyapadie” document, a fabricated blueprint alleging a state capture plot by the Akyem ethnic group, was primarily text-based, its dissemination relied heavily on the NewsCard format. Propagandists realized that few voters would read a multi-page PDF. Consequently, they extracted inflammatory “excerpts” and plastered them onto branded templates resembling The Fourth Estate and Joy News.
These cards did not just summarize; they fabricated quotes that did not exist even in the forged document itself, attributing them to senior government officials like Yaw Osafo-Maafo. When audio clips allegedly featuring Osafo-Maafo surfaced (later debunked as manipulated or taken out of context from years prior), the pre-existing circulation of these NewsCards primed the public to accept the audio as authentic. The visual disinformation prepared the ground for the auditory disinformation.
The Liar’s Dividend: Weaponizing Skepticism
The prevalence of these hybrid fakes birthed a secondary phenomenon known as the “Liar’s Dividend,” where political actors dismissed authentic incriminating footage as AI-generated.
A notable instance involved Dr. Matthew Opoku Prempeh (NAPO), the NPP vice-presidential candidate. When a video surfaced of him making controversial remarks, his campaign team and supporters immediately labeled it a “deepfake,” citing the rampant circulation of AI content. yet, forensic analysis by the WITNESS Deepfakes Rapid Response Force and Dubawa found zero evidence of AI manipulation. The teams noted that current AI technology could not generate full-body movement with perfect lip synchronization from the angles shown.
The fake NewsCards circulating in previous months had successfully poisoned the information well to such a degree that reality itself became a matter of partisan debate.
Technical Correlation Data
The following table correlates specific high-velocity fake audio clips with their accompanying fabricated visual carriers during the Q4 2024 election period.
| Target Subject | Audio Claim (Summary) | Visual Carrier (Fake Brand) | Forensic Verdict (Audio) | Primary Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| John Dramani Mahama | “Ghanaians have short memory… keep lying to them” | Joy News (Quote Card) | High Probability AI (Deepware Score: 92%) | TikTok / WhatsApp |
| Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia | “Ghanaians are weak-minded… deceive them” | Graphic Online / UTV | High Probability AI (Spectral irregularities) | WhatsApp Broadcasts |
| Yaw Osafo-Maafo | Alleged ethnic supremacy strategy (Agyapadie) | The Fourth Estate (Investigative Summary) | Manipulated/Decontextualized (2019 audio recycled) | Facebook Groups |
| Dr. Matthew Opoku Prempeh | Controversial campaign remarks | N/A (Video labeled as fake by campaign) | Authentic (No AI traces found) | X (Twitter) |
| Benjamin Akakpo (Journalist) | Promotion of fraudulent investment app | Joy News (AM Show Clip) | AI Voiceover (Lip-sync failure) | Facebook Ads |
The Role of “Cheapfakes” in Hybrid Attacks
Not all audio-visual attacks required sophisticated AI. of the hybrid warfare relied on “cheapfakes”, content manipulated using basic editing software. In one viral instance, a NewsCard attributed a statement about “head porters using Bluetooth to transport goods” to Dr. Bawumia. This was a complete fabrication, yet it was circulated alongside a slowed-down, low-quality audio recording of a different speech to make the candidate sound incoherent.
The NewsCard in this scenario served a serious function: it provided the interpretation of the garbled audio. Without the graphic, the audio was unclear noise; with the graphic, it became evidence of incompetence. This technique, known as “priming,” forced the listener’s brain to hear words that were not actually spoken, guided by the text on the fake news graphic.
“The danger is not just that people believe the fake audio. It is that the fake NewsCard gives the audio a citation. It tells the voter: ‘This isn’t just a WhatsApp rumor; Joy News has reported it.’ That visual stamp of authority is the force multiplier.” , Internal Analysis, Ekalavya Hansaj Investigative Unit
Distribution Mechanics
The distribution of these hybrid assets followed a strict hierarchy. The audio files were almost exclusively seeded on WhatsApp, taking advantage of the platform’s end-to-end encryption which shields content from public moderation tools. Once the audio achieved a serious mass of forwards (measured in the thousands), the fake NewsCard was released on open platforms like Facebook and X.
This cross-platform strategy prevented fact-checkers from debunking the package. By the time the NewsCard on Facebook was flagged as “False Information,” the audio on WhatsApp had already been consumed by tens of thousands of users who never saw the correction. The NewsCard acted as the public face of a private smear campaign, maintaining a veneer of journalistic integrity while the audio did the visceral damage in the private chats of the electorate.
State Media Under Siege: The Systematic Exploitation of the Daily Graphic's Visual Authority
The emergency of Authority: Weaponizing the “Paper of Record”
While private broadcasters like Joy News faced a barrage of partisan impersonation, the assault on the Daily Graphic, Ghana’s state-owned newspaper of record, represented a more insidious breach of information security. As the flagship publication of the Graphic Communications Group Limited (GCGL), the Daily Graphic carries an implicit seal of state verification. Disinformation actors exploited this unique status, calculating that a fake NewsCard bearing the Graphic Online logo would be perceived not just as news, as official government confirmation. Between June 2024 and January 2025, the Daily Graphic‘s digital brand identity was systematically hijacked to circulate fabricated electoral data and fictitious quotes. Unlike the sensationalist fakes targeting private media, these forgeries were designed to mimic bureaucratic authority. The most damaging instance occurred in the volatile post-election period of January 2025, when a sophisticated forgery circulated claiming the Electoral Commission (EC) had “gazetted” the presidential results.
Case Study: The “Gazetted Results” Forgery (January 2025)
On January 3, 2025, a digitally manipulated graphic began trending on X (formerly Twitter) and WhatsApp. The card, designed to perfectly replicate the Graphic Online breaking news template, bore the headline: “2024 Presidential Election Results Gazetted by EC!!!” It listed specific percentages, 38. 2% for Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia and 57. 7% for John Dramani Mahama, citing the EC as the source. This forgery was dangerous because it bypassed the standard media pattern and struck directly at the legal finality of the election. By attributing these figures to a “Gazette” notification via a Daily Graphic branded card, the creators sought to preempt legal challenges and cement a narrative of an unassailable landslide. Forensic Analysis of the Forgery: * Font gap: The fabricators used Arial Bold for the percentages, whereas genuine Graphic Online cards use a proprietary serif typeface for data points. * Color Hex Codes: The red banner at the bottom of the fake card used the hex code #FF0000 (standard red), while the official Graphic branding uses a slightly darker shade (#D21F1F). * Timestamp Absence: Genuine Graphic cards include a timestamp in the lower-right corner; the forgery omitted this, a common error in templates designed for evergreen circulation. The impact was immediate. The fake card was shared by high-ranking political functionaries, forcing the EC’s Deputy Chairperson, Dr. Bossman Asare, to problem a denial to fact-checkers, clarifying that the EC does not gazette results with percentages, only declares the winner.
The “Stamp War”: Counterfeit Verification
The Daily Graphic attempted to the of fakes by aggressively deploying a “FAKE NEWS” stamp, a bold red rubber-stamp graphic overlaid on debunked images. yet, this verification method was itself reverse-engineered. In a tactic observed heavily in November 2024, political operatives began creating their own “FAKE NEWS” stamps to delegitimize genuine reporting. When Graphic Online published a verified story unfavorable to a specific candidate, partisan digital teams would overlay a counterfeit “FAKE NEWS” stamp and recirculate the image within minutes.
| Feature | Official Graphic Disclaimer | Partisan Counterfeit |
|---|---|---|
| Opacity | 70% transparency (underlying text visible) | 100% opacity (blocks text completely) |
| Angle | Fixed 15-degree tilt | Variable tilt (frequently random) |
| Resolution | High-res vector overlay | Pixelated raster image (artifacting visible) |
| Source URL | Always links to a debunking article | No link, or links to unrelated party sites |
This “stamp war” created a phenomenon of verification nihilism, where audiences could no longer distinguish between a media house’s official retraction and a partisan attempt to suppress the truth.
Targeting the Incumbent: The Bawumia Concession Hoax
While opposition figures were targeted, the Daily Graphic brand was also used to demoralize the ruling party’s base. In early January 2025, a fake NewsCard attributed a defeatist quote to Vice President Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia. The text read: “I am okay with the 38. 2%,” implying a premature acceptance of a specific defeat margin before the official collation was complete. The quote was entirely fabricated. Gideon Boako, an aide to the Vice President, was forced to problem a statement on Facebook urging the public to ignore the flyer. The choice of the Daily Graphic for this specific fake was strategic; as a state-owned paper, a concession quote carried on its platform would be interpreted as an irreversible signal from the government apparatus itself.
The Ballot Position Manipulation (November 2024)
The death of Ghana Freedom Party (GFP) flagbearer Akua Donkor in October 2024 created a vacuum that disinformation agents rushed to fill. On November 4, 2024, a fake Daily Graphic infographic circulated claiming the EC had rearranged the ballot positions, shifting the numbers of key candidates. This disinformation capitalized on the confusion surrounding the electoral laws on candidate replacement. The fake graphic mimicked the Daily Graphic‘s “Notice of Poll” visual style, using the correct EC logos and font weights. It was designed to cause voter confusion regarding the specific ballot number of the two main contenders, a serious element in a country where “vote for number X” is a primary campaign slogan.
Institutional Response and Limitations
The Graphic Communications Group Limited (GCGL) struggled to contain the volume of impersonation. Unlike private entities that could pivot quickly to video disclaimers, the Daily Graphic‘s response was frequently bureaucratic and text-heavy. Their primary defense, posting the fake image with a disclaimer on their official Facebook page, was frequently outpaced by the viral spread of the falsehoods on WhatsApp, where no algorithmic moderation exists to flag the content. Data from the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition indicates that between October and December 2024, the Daily Graphic was the subject of 18 verified fake NewsCards, making it the second most impersonated print/digital brand after the Ghanaian Times. yet, the Graphic fakes had a higher “belief score” in focus groups, attributed to the brand’s 74-year history as the voice of the Ghanaian state.
Freedom on the Net 2025: Measuring the Erosion of Public Trust Caused by Visual Mimicry
The Trust Deficit: Freedom on the Net 2025 Findings
The Freedom on the Net 2025 report, released by Freedom House, explicitly identifies “visual mimicry” as a primary driver for the stagnation of Ghana’s internet freedom score, which held at 64/100 (Partly Free). While the state refrained from broad technical censorship during the 2024 election pattern, the information space was aggressively polluted by non-state and semi-state actors using “NewsCards”, static, branded graphics designed to bypass serious analysis.
The report highlights a structural shift in disinformation tactics. Unlike long-form text hoaxes, which require reading time, these cards exploited the cognitive shortcuts of social media users. By cloning the typography, color palettes, and watermarks of trusted entities like Joy News, Citi FM, and Graphic Online, fabricators successfully laundered fraudulent narratives into the public discourse. The 2025 assessment notes that this tactic did not spread falsehoods; it actively dismantled the credibility of legitimate journalism, creating a “fog of war” where verified reports were frequently dismissed as fabrications.
Quantifying the: Afrobarometer Data
The impact of this visual mimicry is measurable in the collapse of public confidence. Data from Afrobarometer Round 10 (2024-2025) reveals a sharp decline in trust metrics compared to the 2022 baseline. The relentless barrage of counterfeit graphics caused voters to retreat from digital news sources, viewing them as inherently compromised.
Table: of Media Trust in Ghana (2022, 2025)
| Metric | 2022 Baseline | 2025 Post-Election | Net Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trust in Social Media News | 38% | 26% | -12% |
| Trust in Private Media | 48% | 41% | -7% |
| Trust in State Media | 44% | 41% | -3% |
| Perception of Media Freedom | 81% (Free) | 67% (Free) | -14% |
The 12-point drop in social media trust is particularly damning. It suggests that the “NewsCard” epidemic successfully poisoned the well of digital information. When voters cannot distinguish between a genuine quote card from MyJoyOnline and a forensic clone created by a partisan troll farm, they cease trusting the medium entirely.
The “Liar’s Dividend” and the Stamp War
A serious finding in the post-election analysis is the emergence of the “Liar’s Dividend.” This phenomenon occurs when the prevalence of deepfakes and clones allows political actors to dismiss authentic incriminating evidence as fake. During the serious weeks of November and December 2024, the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition (GFC) observed a coordinated counter-tactic: when legitimate outlets published unfavorable stories, partisan communication teams immediately circulated “FAKE NEWS” stamps overlaid on the real graphics.
This created a recursive loop of confusion. In one documented instance involving a quote attributed to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) flagbearer, three versions of the same graphic circulated simultaneously: the original (authentic), a doctored version (fake), and the original stamped “FAKE” by party affiliates. The result was total information paralysis. The Freedom on the Net 2025 report cites this specific as a key reason for the of the “availability of reliable information” sub-score.
“The danger is no longer just that people believe lies. The greater danger is that they no longer believe the truth. The ‘NewsCard’ war neutralized the corrective power of fact-checking for of the electorate.”
, Excerpt from the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition 2024 Election Report
Institutional Metrics: The GFC Situation Room
The Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition, comprising Dubawa, GhanaFact, and the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), operated a dedicated situation room during the election. Their final data set provides a granular look at the of the attack.
- Total Flagged Claims: Over 142 unique viral claims were investigated between December 4 and December 11, 2024.
- Platform Vector: 85. 3% of these false narratives originated or were primarily amplified on X (formerly Twitter) and WhatsApp.
- Format Dominance: 62% of the debunked content involved visual manipulation (NewsCards, doctored videos, or miscontextualized photos), confirming that visual mimicry was the preferred weapon of choice over text-based rumors.
The coalition’s findings align with the Freedom on the Net assessment: the barrier to entry for creating high-quality disinformation has lowered significantly. Simple design tools like Canva, combined with the absence of cryptographic signatures on genuine news media, allowed decentralized actors to flood the zone with high-fidelity fakes that overwhelmed the capacity of verification teams.
Algorithmic Complicity: How Social Platforms Prioritized Engagement Over OCR-Based Verification
The OCR Blindspot: How Static Images Evaded Text-Based Moderation
The proliferation of fraudulent NewsCards during Ghana’s 2024 election pattern was not a content moderation failure; it was a structural byproduct of algorithmic architecture that prioritizes engagement over pixel-level analysis. While Meta (Facebook/Instagram), X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok maintain sophisticated Natural Language Processing (NLP) filters to detect hate speech and falsehoods in captions or status updates, their systems demonstrated a catastrophic inability to police text within images. This technical gap, known as the “OCR Blindspot,” allowed fabricators to bypass automated filters. A text post stating “Dr. Bawumia has withdrawn from the race” would likely trigger immediate flagging method based on keyword matching. Yet, the same sentence, when rendered in Impact font on a red background mimicking a Joy News graphic, was treated by the algorithm as a high-engagement image rather than a falsifiable claim.
The Engagement Loop: Red Banners and Algorithmic Boosts
Social media algorithms are designed to maximize “Meaningful Social Interactions” (MSI), a metric that rewards content generating pauses, clicks, shares, and comments. The visual design of the fake NewsCard is engineered to hack this metric. * Visual Salience: The high-contrast red and white color schemes used by imposters (mimicking Joy News or Citi FM) arrest the user’s scroll. * Reactionary Metrics: These cards frequently featured inflammatory quotes. Users reacting with “Angry” or “Wow” emojis signaled to the algorithm that the content was “engaging,” prompting the system to push the image to wider audiences. * The Speed Gap: In the serious 48-hour window before the December 7 polls, fake results sheets circulated on WhatsApp and Facebook. While fact-checkers at the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition (GFC) required an average of 45 to 90 minutes to verify and debunk a graphic, the algorithmic distribution systems broadcast the fake cards to thousands of feeds within seconds.
| Metric | Text-Based Disinformation | Image-Based NewsCards | Impact Factor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Automated Detection Time | < 1 minute (Keyword Flagging) | No immediate detection (OCR Lag) | Images bypass initial filters. |
| Viral Velocity (1k Shares) | ~2-4 Hours | ~20-40 Minutes | Visuals are processed 60, 000x faster by the human brain. |
| Moderation Action | Auto-labeling / Downranking | User Reporting Required | Reactive rather than proactive policing. |
Platform-Specific Failures
Meta: The “Community Standards” Gap
even with Meta’s claims of using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to review text in images, the volume of fake cards targeting the NPP and NDC in 2024 exposed the system’s limitations in the Ghanaian context. The OCR tools struggled to distinguish between legitimate media branding and “cheapfakes”, low-tech edits where a logo is pasted onto a template. also, the reduction of human review teams for Sub-Saharan Africa in early 2024 left the algorithmic dragnet unsupervised. A report by the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) noted that 85. 3% of false narratives tracked during the election period circulated on social media, with Facebook serving as a primary archive for these static images.
X (Twitter): The Blue Check Illusion
Under the ownership of Elon Musk, the removal of legacy verification and the introduction of paid “X Premium” verification created a verification vacuum. Imposter accounts bearing blue checks posted fake NewsCards that the algorithm treated as authoritative. The “Community Notes” feature, touted as the solution to misinformation, failed to function in real-time. Data from the Center for Countering Digital Hate indicates that even in the US election, 74% of accurate Community Notes were never shown to users due to voting thresholds. In Ghana, this latency meant that by the time a “Note” appeared on a fake Daily Graphic cover, the image had already been screenshotted and migrated to WhatsApp, where no such notes exist.
TikTok: The “Ken Burns” Evasion
TikTok’s algorithm promotes video content. Disinformation agents adapted by converting static fake NewsCards into 5-second video clips with a slow zoom (Ken Burns effect) and trending audio overlays. This format prevented static image classifiers from indexing the content. The platform claimed to remove 99. 2% of election misinformation before reporting, yet this statistic relies on what the platform successfully identified, not the volume of “grey zone” content, such as decontextualized quote cards, that remained live and viral.
“The algorithm does not see a lie. It sees a red pixel, a white pixel, and a user pausing for three seconds. That is a success signal. The truth of the text inside the pixels is irrelevant to the code.”
, Internal Audit Note, Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition (January 2025)
The WhatsApp “Dark Social” Vector
While not an algorithmic feed in the traditional sense, WhatsApp’s “forwarded” mechanics played a distinct role. The encryption that protects user privacy also protects NewsCards from moderation. Once a fake card was downloaded from Facebook or X, it entered the “dark social” of WhatsApp family groups. Here, the “Forwarded Times” label was the only algorithmic intervention, a passive signal that failed to deter the spread of graphics confirming the recipient’s political biases. The platform’s inability to trace the origin of an image file meant that a single debunked card could be reintroduced into the ecosystem endlessly without a digital fingerprint stopping it.
Regional Disparities: The Spread of Translated Fake NewsCards in Twi and Hausa Networks
The “Card + Voice Note” Vector
The most potent dissemination method observed between late 2024 and early 2025 was the “Card + Voice Note” bundle on WhatsApp. In this model, a fake NewsCard serves as the “evidence,” while an accompanying audio file provides the “context” in a local dialect. Forensic analysis of WhatsApp forward chains in the Ashanti and Northern regions revealed a distinct pattern: * The Visual Anchor: A forged NewsCard featuring a sensational headline in English (e. g., “Bawumia Admits Economy Has Failed”). * The Vernacular Payload: A 30-to-90-second voice note in Twi or Hausa. The speaker, frequently feigning the tone of an “insider” or “concerned citizen,” the headline loosely, adding inflammatory details not present in the text. This method weaponized the trust gap. Recipients unable to serious parse the English text relied entirely on the vernacular interpretation. In one documented case from November 2024, a fake Graphic Online card quoting the Electoral Commission Chairperson was circulated in the Ashanti Region. The English text was relatively benign, the accompanying Twi voice note claimed the Commission had admitted to printing excess ballots for the ruling party.
The Northern Front: The Tamale Hub Findings
The establishment of a dedicated Media Situation Room in Tamale by the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition (GFC) highlighted the severity of the north-south disinformation divide. While Accra-based disinformation focused on economic metrics and corruption scandals, narratives circulating in the Northern, Savannah, and North East regions were heavily securitized and ethnicized. Monitors in the Tamale hub intercepted a high volume of fake cards translated or interpreted into Hausa and Dagbani. These graphics frequently alleged: * Cross-Border Infiltration: False reports that “machomen” (thugs) were being recruited from Burkina Faso to disrupt polling stations in opposition strongholds. * Religious Identity: Manipulated quotes attributed to Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia and John Dramani Mahama, designed to inflame religious tensions within Zongo communities. One widely shared fake card purported to show a Daily Guide headline claiming a candidate would “ban the call to prayer” if elected, a fabrication debunked by Dubawa widely believed in closed WhatsApp groups. The GFC reported that while 85. 3% of false narratives were spread on social media, the amplification in the north relied heavily on community radio stations reading these fake cards on air as legitimate news, granting them undeserved credibility.
The Ashanti Network: TikTok as the New Radio
In the Ashanti Region, the disinformation ecosystem migrated from WhatsApp to TikTok. “News readers”, influencers broadcasting in Twi, used green-screen effects to display fake NewsCards behind them while delivering impassioned, partisan monologues. Unlike the closed loops of WhatsApp, these TikTok streams were algorithmic, pushing fake content to millions of “For You” feeds. A specific cluster of accounts, identified by the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) as repeat offenders, specialized in “interpreting” forged Joy News graphics. These videos frequently garnered ten times the engagement of the original fact-checks.
Comparative Analysis of Regional Disinformation Narratives
| Region/Network | Primary Language | Dominant Narrative Themes | Primary Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greater Accra (Urban) | English | Economic indicators, IMF deals, corruption scandals, “State Capture” reports. | X (Twitter), Facebook, Instagram |
| Ashanti / Eastern | Twi (Akan) | Chieftaincy disputes, infrastructure neglect, insults against candidate heritage. | TikTok Live, WhatsApp Voice Notes |
| Northern / Zongo | Hausa, Dagbani | Religious identity, border security (Burkina Faso mercenaries), disenfranchisement. | WhatsApp Groups, Community Radio |
| Volta / Oti | Ewe | Voter suppression, Togolese registry claims, military intimidation. | Facebook Groups, WhatsApp Broadcast Lists |
The Zongo Strategy
A distinct subset of fake media branding targeted Ghana’s Zongo communities (urban settlements with high Muslim populations). Here, the disinformation was tailored to exploit feelings of marginalization. Fake cards imitating Zongo News or Al-Jazeera (a trusted international brand in these communities) were fabricated to suggest international condemnation of specific candidates. One particularly damaging campaign involved a forged Al-Jazeera graphic circulating in Nima and Maamobi, claiming the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued a warning to a specific political party leader. The card was fake, the font and layout were inconsistent with Al-Jazeera’s style guide, the Hausa voice notes accompanying it framed the election as a “holy duty” to reject the “criminal” candidate.
Verification Asymmetry
The regional created a verification lag. Fact-checking organizations, primarily staffed by English speakers in Accra, frequently detected these vernacular campaigns only after they had achieved viral saturation. By the time a Twi or Hausa voice note was translated, verified, and debunked, the narrative had already solidified in the target demographic. To counter this, the GFC broadcasted fact-checks in 45 Ghanaian languages, utilizing a network of 100+ partner radio stations. yet, the speed of the “Card + Voice Note” spread consistently outpaced the institutional response, proving that in 2024, the most disinformation was not just visual, vocal and vernacular.
Post-Election Instability: The Persistence of Fake Transition Protocols and Security Alerts
The “Gazetted Results” Fabrication
Between December 19, 2024, and January 3, 2025, a coordinated campaign circulated a fraudulent graphic claiming to show the “official” results gazetted by the Electoral Commission (EC). The graphic, designed to mimic the typography and layout of a government notice, alleged that the EC had legally certified John Dramani Mahama as the winner with 57. 7% of the vote, contrasting with the official declaration that had sparked contention.
This disinformation was dangerous because it exploited a procedural technicality that few citizens understood. The fabricators relied on the public’s ignorance of the Gazette process to sow confusion. On January 3, 2025, the narrative received a serious boost when former President John Dramani Mahama shared a flyer containing these fabricated figures on his official social media channels. The EC was forced to problem a technical rebuttal, clarifying that while the Gazette confirms the winner, it strictly does not publish vote percentages or breakdowns, a forensic detail the forgers had overlooked.
Weaponizing Regional Instability
Parallel to the constitutional gaslighting, fabricators exploited Ghana’s proximity to the Sahelian security emergency to generate panic. A series of fake security alerts, branded with the logos of the Ghana Police Service and the National Security Ministry, circulated on WhatsApp in late December 2024. These cards claimed that “machomen” and mercenaries from Burkina Faso had been imported to disrupt the inauguration.
Unlike the political NewsCards, these security fabrications were designed to trigger a visceral survival response. They used “Urgent” red banners and official police letterheads to warn of non-existent curfews and military deployments. Fact-checkers at Dubawa and GhanaFact traced the “Burkina Faso mercenaries” narrative to a network of partisan accounts that had previously trafficked in anti-refugee rhetoric, repurposing old videos of border crossings to substantiate their claims of an invasion.
Table 12. 1: Verified Post-Election Disinformation Vectors (Dec 2024 , Jan 2025)
| Date Circulated | Claim | Impersonated Entity | Forensic Flaw | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 19, 2024 | EC has “Gazetted” NDC win at 57. 7% | Electoral Commission | Included percentages (Gazettes only list names) | Forced EC to problem technical denial; eroded trust in official results. |
| Dec 28, 2024 | Mercenaries from Burkina Faso entering Accra | National Security | Recycled video from 2022 border crossing | Incited panic in border communities; heightened inauguration tension. |
| Jan 03, 2025 | Inauguration postponed due to security threat | Joy News | Wrong font on “Breaking News” banner | Attempted to delegitimize the handover ceremony. |
| Jan 12, 2025 | Secret military recruitment for party loyalists | Ghana Armed Forces | Fake “Protocol” email address (gmail. com) | Exploited youth unemployment to stoke anger against new admin. |
The Persistence of the “Clone”
The survival of these tactics into the post-election period indicates that the “NewsCard” is no longer just a campaign tool; it has become a permanent feature of Ghana’s information. The infrastructure used to clone Joy News and Citi FM brands remains active, ready to be deployed for any emergency, be it a budget reading, a strike, or a security alert.
By January 2025, the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) was fighting a two-front war: one against genuine security threats and another against digital imposters. Fraudulent recruitment notices, perfectly mimicking GAF’s visual identity, flooded social media, promising “protocol” slots for a fee. While ostensibly financial scams, these cards reinforced the narrative of institutional corruption and exclusion that had been seeded during the election. The direct transition from political disinformation to criminal fraud demonstrates the versatility of the NewsCard: once trust in the brand is hijacked, the payload can be anything.
