Rare Earth Rivalries: The Fight for Control Over Burundi’s Minerals

1. Introduction: The Gakara Deposit – An Awakening Giant in the Hills of Bujumbura Rural

The red earth roads winding through the verdant hills of Bujumbura Rural province conceal a treasure that has quietly become the center of a global industrial storm. Here lies the Gakara project, a mineral deposit so exceptionally rich that geologists often describe it as a freak of nature. While most rare earth elements across the world are locked in low concentrations within complex rock formations, Gakara offers something different. It features veins of bastnaesite and monazite that can be extracted by hand, boasting mineral grades that dwarf those found in the vast industrial mines of China. In a world desperate for the magnetic metals that power electric vehicles and wind turbines, this Burundian hillside represents more than just a mine. It is a strategic pawn in the intensifying struggle for technological supremacy between East and West.

For the United Kingdom based operator Rainbow Rare Earths, the Gakara deposit was supposed to be a company maker. From 2017 to 2021, the site produced a concentrate with a basket grade of approximately 54% Total Rare Earth Oxide. This figure is staggering when compared to global averages that often hover between 1% and 4%. The geology allows for simple gravity separation, eschewing the toxic and expensive chemical processing required elsewhere. By early 2021, Gakara was the only producing rare earth mine in Africa, positioning Burundi as a vital alternative supplier to the Chinese monopoly that controls nearly 90% of global processing capacity. The project promised to deliver neodymium and praseodymium, the twin metals essential for permanent magnets, directly to Western supply chains.

Yet the awakened giant soon found itself shackled by political chains. In June 2021, the administration of President Evariste Ndayishimiye issued a sudden directive suspending operations. The government in Gitega cited concerns over the fairness of mining conventions signed by previous administrations. Officials argued that the state, which held a 10% stake in the project, was not receiving its equitable share of the wealth being extracted from its soil. This move was part of a broader wave of resource nationalism sweeping through the Great Lakes region, but international observers noted the timing coincided with escalating geopolitical friction. As Washington and Brussels sought to secure critical minerals outside of Chinese jurisdiction, the abrupt closure of Africa’s only active rare earth producer sent shockwaves through the market.

The stalemate has persisted from 2021 through 2025, turning the mine into a silent monument to regulatory risk. Negotiations between Rainbow Rare Earths and the Burundian government have continued intermittently, but the machinery remains idle. In its 2024 financial reports, the company made the difficult decision to fully write down the value of the Gakara asset, shifting its primary focus to the Phalaborwa project in South Africa. This accounting move signaled a grim reality: despite the immense geological value buried in the hills of Mutambu, the political price of extraction had become too high to sustain on a balance sheet. The stoppage effectively removed a key non Chinese source of magnetic metals from the global board just as demand began to outstrip supply.

The situation in Burundi reflects a wider global contest where geology meets statecraft. While Western capital funded the initial development of Gakara, the suspension has left the door ajar for other actors. Rumors of interest from competitors have circulated in Bujumbura, though no new operator has officially taken the helm. The United States government, through the International Development Finance Corporation, has since thrown its weight behind Rainbow’s South African endeavors, aiming to forge a supply chain free from Beijing’s influence. However, the frozen assets in Burundi serve as a stark reminder of the fragility inherent in these supply lines.

As 2025 progresses, the veins of Gakara remain untouched, their immense potential locked away by a dispute that is as much about sovereignty as it is about profit. For the local communities in Bujumbura Rural, the pause has meant lost wages and stalled development. For the global market, it represents a lost opportunity to diversify away from a singular dominant supplier. The giant in the hills sleeps on, waiting for a resolution that can satisfy the demands of a government asserting its rights and an industry hungry for its unique resources.

The following investigative section examines the strategic importance of Burundi’s mineral wealth, specifically the Gakara project, utilizing data from 2020 through early 2025.

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Rare Earth Rivalries: The Strategic Imperative

2. The Strategic Imperative: Why the World Desperately Needs Burundi’s High Grade Rare Earth Oxides

To understand the ferocity of the quiet war being waged over Burundian soil, one must first understand the geology that lies beneath the red earth of the Gakara project. In the global mining industry, a deposit containing 5 percent Total Rare Earth Oxide (TREO) is often considered commercially viable. A deposit hitting 10 percent is exceptional. The veins running through Western Burundi, however, defy these standard metrics entirely. Data released by Rainbow Rare Earths between 2020 and 2024 confirms that the Gakara deposit boasts an in situ grade ranging from 47 percent to 67 percent TREO. This geological anomaly makes it arguably the richest rare earth deposit on the planet, offering a concentration of minerals so pure that the ore can be processed using simple gravity separation rather than complex chemical leaching.

For Western powers desperately seeking to decouple their supply chains from Chinese influence, Gakara is not merely a mine; it is a strategic lifeline. The specific composition of the ore is what drives this geopolitical urgency. Analysis reveals that Neodymium and Praseodymium (NdPr) constitute approximately 19 percent to 20 percent of the volume. While this might seem a modest fraction, the market reality is starkly different. Due to their critical role in the manufacture of permanent magnets for electric vehicles and offshore wind turbines, these two elements account for roughly 88 percent of the basket value of the mine. In a world racing toward net zero emissions, the Neodymium buried in Burundi is as valuable as gold.

Investigative Data Point (2021-2024):
While global demand for NdPr is forecast to jump fivefold by 2030, the supply deficit is widening. The Gakara project, prior to its suspension, was the only producing rare earth mine in Africa, yielding a concentrate grading 54 percent to 56 percent TREO. This stands in sharp contrast to Australian or Chinese projects that often require processing massive volumes of low grade ore to achieve similar yields.

The suspension of operations in June 2021 by the Government of Burundi, under the administration of President Evariste Ndayishimiye, exposed the fragility of this supply chain. The official rationale was economic nationalism; the state argued it was not receiving its fair share of revenues under the existing convention. However, the timing suggests a deeper layer of complexity involving great power competition. The halt removed a critical non Chinese source of magnetic metals from the global market just as prices for Neodymium Oxide were beginning a steep ascent, peaking in early 2022. By 2024, despite ongoing negotiations reported by Rainbow Rare Earths, the asset remained paralyzed, leading the company to impair the book value of the project to nil in its 2023 accounts while shifting focus to the Phalaborwa project in South Africa.

This paralysis benefits specific actors. China currently controls over 90 percent of global rare earth processing capacity. A dormant Gakara ensures that the West remains dependent on Chinese exports for the magnetic materials required for its F-35 fighter jets and Tesla drivetrains. The involvement of TechMet, a fervent investor in critical minerals backed by the US International Development Finance Corporation, in Rainbow Rare Earths highlights Washington’s acute interest in reviving the project. Yet, as of early 2025, the stalemate continues. The Burundian government has effectively locked away one of the world’s most potent sources of clean energy minerals, using its sovereignty as leverage in a high stakes negotiation that involves Washington, Beijing, and London.

The strategic imperative is clear. For the industrial West, unlocking Gakara is not just about profit; it is about security. Every month the mine remains shuttered is a month where the global supply deficit grows, tightening the grip of dominant market players. The fight for Burundi’s minerals is no longer a local dispute over tax revenues. It has mutated into a proxy battle for the control of the twenty first century energy infrastructure.

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3. The Pioneer: Rainbow Rare Earths and the Early Days of Industrial Extraction

For a brief window near the start of the decade, the Gakara project in western Burundi stood as a singular success story for East African mining. Operated by Rainbow Rare Earths, a company listed in London, the site was the only producing mine for rare earth elements on the entire continent. Unlike the massive but low grade deposits found elsewhere, Gakara boasted veins of exceptional purity. The ore contained up to 54 percent total rare earth oxides, a concentration so rich that the rock could be sold as concentrate with minimal processing. As 2020 began, Rainbow moved from exploration into a phase of trial mining, shipping hundreds of tonnes of material to processing partners in China. The company targeted an annual output of 5,000 tonnes, envisioning a steady expansion that would cement Burundi as a key supplier in the global magnet supply chain.

The trajectory changed abruptly in mid 2021. On June 29, the Ministry of Hydraulics, Energy and Mines in Gitega issued a notification suspending operations at Gakara. This order was not an isolated administrative hurdle but part of a sweeping resource nationalist pivot under President Evariste Ndayishimiye. In a speech delivered shortly after the suspension, the President declared that foreign companies had arrived “only to plunder” the nation. His administration argued that the state, which held a 10 percent stake in the project, was not receiving a fair portion of the economic benefits. Officials demanded a renegotiation of the mining convention to ensure a more equitable division of revenue, reflecting a broader trend across the Great Lakes region where governments sought to rewrite colonial era or early post conflict concessions.

For the remainder of 2021 and throughout 2022, the Gakara mine sat in a state of care and maintenance. The heavy machinery fell silent, and the local workforce faced furloughs. Rainbow Rare Earths engaged in prolonged talks with Burundian authorities, maintaining that a restart was in the best interest of all parties. However, the political climate proved unyielding. The government introduced a new Mining Code in August 2023, which codified stricter state participation and compliance requirements. While Rainbow maintained its office in Bujumbura, the lack of export revenue from the site began to weigh heavily on its strategic outlook. The stalemate dragged on, leaving the high grade veins untouched underground while global prices for neodymium and praseodymium experienced volatility.

By 2024, the deadlock had forced a decisive strategic shift. With no clear path to resuming extraction at Gakara, Rainbow turned its primary attention and capital toward South Africa. The Phalaborwa project, which involves recovering rare earths from gypsum stacks left behind by historic phosphate mining, offered a more stable jurisdiction and a clearer route to production. In its financial reporting for the year ending June 2024, the company made a stark admission regarding its Burundian assets. Rainbow wrote down the value of the Gakara project to almost zero, impairing the asset from over 9 million dollars in prior years to a nominal residual value.

As of early 2025, the situation remains unresolved. The Gakara project stands as a frozen monument to the risks of operating in a jurisdiction where regulatory frameworks can shift overnight. While the deposit remains one of the highest grade resources known globally, its minerals stay locked in the earth. The dispute highlights the intense friction between international capital seeking returns and sovereign states demanding greater control over their natural inheritance. For now, Burundi sits on a treasure chest of critical minerals, but the keys remain lost in a diplomatic and commercial standoff.

4. Regime Change and Policy Shifts: The Transition from Nkurunziza to Ndayishimiye

The political landscape of Burundi underwent a seismic shift in June 2020 following the sudden death of President Pierre Nkurunziza. His successor, Évariste Ndayishimiye, ascended to power with promises of reform and economic revitalization. International observers initially hoped this transition would mark an end to the isolationism that characterized the previous administration. However, regarding the strategic mining sector, the new leadership did not liberalize the market. Instead, it doubled down on resource nationalism, initiating a period of volatility that has left foreign investors and Western supply chain strategists in a state of suspended animation.

President Ndayishimiye moved quickly to assert control over the mineral wealth of the nation. In a definitive speech on July 1, 2021, marking Independence Day, he declared that foreign mining companies were reaping excessive profits while leaving the state with meager returns. Using rhetoric centered on “fairness” and “mutual benefit,” he ordered an immediate suspension of all foreign mining activities. This decree brought operations to a halt for companies from the United Kingdom, Russia, and China alike, but the impact was most severely felt by Rainbow Rare Earths, the operator of the Gakara mine.

The Gakara Standoff

The Gakara project, located in Western Burundi, is unique globally due to its incredibly high grade ore, which is rich in neodymium and praseodymium. These elements are critical for the permanent magnets used in electric vehicles and wind turbines. Before the 2021 suspension, Rainbow Rare Earths was the only formal producer of rare earth concentrates on the African continent, positioning Burundi as a vital alternative to Chinese dominance in the sector.

Following the presidential order, the Gakara mine was placed on “care and maintenance,” a status it retained through 2024 and into 2025. The disruption was not merely a pause but a complete blockade of exports. For nearly five years, zero commercial shipment of rare earth concentrate left the Gakara site. The company was forced to write down the value of the asset in its financial reports, shifting its primary focus to the Phalaborwa project in South Africa, which extracts rare earths from gypsum stacks and enjoys financial backing from the United States government.

Legislative Overhaul: The 2023 Mining Code

The suspension was the prelude to a legislative overhaul. On August 4, 2023, the government enacted a new Mining Code (Law No. 1/19). This legislation formalized the state demands for greater equity. Key provisions included:

Increased State Equity: The mandatory free carry stake for the state in mining projects was raised from 10 percent to 15 percent.
Production Sharing: New mechanisms were introduced to ensure the government captured a larger share of revenue before operational costs were deducted.
Local Processing Requirements: The law emphasized value addition within Burundi, discouraging the export of raw ore.

While the new code provided a legal framework for resumption, bureaucratic hurdles remained immense. Negotiations between Rainbow Rare Earths and the Ministry of Hydraulics, Energy and Mines dragged on without resolution. By late 2025, while other sectors saw minor movement, the Gakara project remained paralyzed. The government demanded renegotiated conventions that applied the 2023 terms retroactively, a point of contention that stalled progress.

Geopolitical Implications

The transition from Nkurunziza to Ndayishimiye has inadvertently complicated Western efforts to secure critical minerals. While the United States and the European Union seek to diversify supply chains, the regulatory unpredictability in Gitega has frozen a key asset. Ironically, the suspension has served to maintain the status quo of market scarcity, which benefits dominant global players like China. As of January 2026, the Gakara mine stands as a silent monument to the clash between sovereign resource ambition and the complex realities of international investment.

Section 5. The 2021 Freeze: Analyzing the Government’s Sudden Suspension of Operations

The trajectory of the rare earth sector in Burundi shifted dramatically in the middle of 2021. For years, the Gakara project had been touted as a beacon of diversification in a global market dominated by Chinese supply. Operated by Rainbow Rare Earths, a company listed in London, Gakara was the only producing rare earth mine in Africa at the time. However, on June 29, 2021, the narrative of steady growth collided with a harsh new reality. President Evariste Ndayishimiye, having taken office a year prior with a platform focused on economic reform and sovereignty, ordered the immediate suspension of almost all foreign mining contracts. This decree brought operations at Gakara to a sudden halt, freezing a critical supply chain and sending shockwaves through the investor community.

The Rhetoric of Resource Nationalism

The suspension was not an isolated administrative error but a calculated move rooted in resource nationalism. The government in Gitega argued that the country was not receiving a fair share of the wealth generated from its own soil. President Ndayishimiye publicly criticized existing agreements, claiming they were skewed in favor of international corporations. Specifically, the administration disputed the technical valuation of the minerals being exported. While Rainbow Rare Earths reported a Total Rare Earth Oxide (TREO) concentrate grade of roughly 54 percent to 56 percent—a figure verified by independent laboratories—government officials claimed the ore contained closer to 80 percent TREO. This discrepancy was not merely academic; it implied that the state was losing millions in unpaid royalties and undervalued taxes.

Furthermore, the government challenged the pricing mechanisms used for these exports. In a global market where prices for Neodymium and Praseodymium (NdPr) were rising due to demand for electric vehicles and wind turbines, Burundi sought to maximize its intake. The administration halted exports in April 2021, months before the full operational freeze, demanding a complete renegotiation of the mining convention that had granted Rainbow a 90 percent interest in the project, leaving only 10 percent for the state.

Financial Fallout and Asset Write Downs

The standoff proved devastating for the project. For the remainder of 2021 and throughout 2022, Rainbow Rare Earths attempted to engage in “constructive dialogue” with the Ministry of Hydraulics, Energy and Mines. However, as months turned into years without a resolution, the financial reality set in. The mine was placed on “care and maintenance,” a status that incurs costs for security and upkeep without generating a single dollar of revenue.

By late 2023 and continuing into 2024, the prolonged suspension forced Rainbow to take drastic accounting measures. In its financial reports for the year ending June 30, 2024, the company wrote down the value of the Gakara asset to nil. This impairment charge wiped millions from the company balance sheet, reflecting the grim assessment that a restart was no longer guaranteed or even likely in the near future. The stock market reacted accordingly; by October 2024, shares in Rainbow were trading around 11 pence, a fraction of their potential value had the mine been operational during the commodity price spikes of previous years.

A Shift in Geopolitical Strategy

The freeze in Burundi inadvertently reshaped the strategy of Western rare earth developers. With Gakara offline, Rainbow Rare Earths pivoted its primary focus to the Phalaborwa project in South Africa. This shift was underscored by significant financial backing from the United States. In early 2024, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) committed 50 million dollars to the Phalaborwa initiative. This move highlighted a stark contrast: while Burundi alienated foreign capital through unpredictable regulatory changes, other nations were attracting Western investment designed to secure critical mineral supply chains outside of China.

As of early 2025, the Gakara mine remains a dormant asset. The machinery sits idle, and the local workforce has largely been let go. The dispute serves as a cautionary tale for the industry. It demonstrates that high grade ore and technical feasibility are insufficient for success without political stability. For Burundi, the suspension has resulted in years of lost revenue and a tarnished reputation among global investors, proving that the fight for control over minerals can sometimes result in no winner at all.

The following investigative section explores the intense resource nationalism reshaping Burundi’s mining sector between 2020 and 2025.

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Rare Earth Rivalries: Resource Nationalism in Burundi

6. Resource Nationalism: The Demand for 50-50 Profit Sharing and Local Processing

In a move that sent shockwaves through the global mining community, Burundi transformed from a promising frontier for rare earth elements into a central battleground for resource nationalism. Between 2021 and 2025, the government of President Évariste Ndayishimiye executed a radical pivot, freezing foreign operations to demand an unprecedented “fair share” of mineral wealth.

The 2021 Suspension: A Declaration of Intent

The turning point came in July 2021, when the Burundian government suspended the operations of several international mining companies, most notably the London listed Rainbow Rare Earths. The administration explicitly cited “unbalanced” contracts that favored foreign shareholders over the national treasury. For decades, the state held a meager 10% free carry interest in mining projects, a standard often criticized by local civil society as neo colonial extraction.

President Ndayishimiye’s administration argued that the country was being “plundered” and issued a de facto ultimatum: renegotiate on “win win” terms or leave. This rhetoric crystallized into a demand for equitable revenue distribution, with negotiators pushing for a profit sharing model closer to a 50-50 split between the state and investors, a stark departure from the traditional royalty based systems.

Data Focus (2021–2025):

Gakara Project Status: Placed on “care and maintenance” since June 2021.
Fiscal Impact: Rainbow Rare Earths fully wrote down the value of the Gakara asset in its 2023/2024 accounts.
State Equity Shift: The 2023 Mining Code raised the minimum state participation from 10% to 16%, with provisions for further increases upon renewal.

The 2023 Mining Code: Codifying Control

After two years of legislative limbo, Burundi enacted a new Mining Code in August 2023 (Law No. 1/19). While the finalized law officially set the state’s free equity stake at a minimum of 16%, the surrounding regulatory framework and production sharing contract (PSC) negotiations maintained the pressure for a near equal division of economic benefits. The code introduced a mechanism for the state to acquire additional shares and emphasized “production sharing,” a model typically seen in the oil sector, to capture a larger slice of the windfall.

The legislative overhaul also targeted the artisanal sector. By late 2022, the government had forced mining cooperatives into a new profit sharing arrangement, requiring them to retrocede 30% of their production directly to the Central Bank. This aggressive capture of rent signaled that the 50-50 rhetoric was not merely a bargaining chip for foreign majors but a guiding philosophy for the entire sector.

The Local Processing Mandate

Parallel to the fiscal demands was an uncompromising stance on local value addition. In 2024, the Ministry of Hydraulics, Energy and Mines reiterated that the era of exporting raw concentrate was over. The government demanded that companies invest in downstream processing infrastructure—refineries and separation plants—within Burundi’s borders.

For Rainbow Rare Earths, whose Gakara mine produces one of the world’s highest grade rare earth concentrates (up to 54% Total Rare Earth Oxides), this requirement posed significant logistical and financial hurdles given the country’s infrastructure deficits. The impasse led the company to pivot its strategic focus toward South Africa’s Phalaborwa project, leaving the Gakara mine dormant throughout 2024 and early 2025.

The Stalemate and Economic Reality

By 2025, the strategy of extreme resource nationalism yielded mixed results. While it successfully asserted sovereign control, it froze significant foreign direct investment. The Gakara mine, once heralded as the only producing rare earth mine in Africa outside of China, remained inactive, depriving the state of tax revenue and royalties. The “win win” negotiations had, in the short term, resulted in a “lose lose” stagnation, with the government controlling 100% of a non operating asset rather than 16% of a thriving one.

President Ndayishimiye remained defiant, viewing the pause as a necessary correction to centuries of exploitation. His administration bet that the desperate global hunger for critical minerals—driven by the green energy transition—would eventually force investors to return on Burundi’s terms.

“`An investigative look into how Beijing cultivates influence in Burundi through high profile infrastructure and diplomatic gestures, creating a strategic foothold near critical mineral deposits.

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7. The Chinese Shadow: Beijing’s Soft Power and Infrastructure Leverage in Gitega

In the verdant hills of Gitega, the political capital of Burundi, a new skyline is emerging, one that speaks the architectural language of Beijing. While Western mining firms navigate suspended contracts and regulatory freezes, China has been busy cementing a physical and diplomatic presence that serves as a powerful lever in the scramble for resources. The relationship, elevated to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” during the September 2024 Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit, illustrates a calculated long term strategy: build the halls of power today to secure the minerals of tomorrow.

The Concrete Diplomacy

The most visible manifestation of this influence is the agreement signed in September 2024 for the construction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation headquarters in Gitega. This massive 11 story structure, fully funded and equipped by the Chinese government, is set for completion in 2028. It follows the precedent of the Ntare House in Bujumbura, the imposing presidential palace famously gifted by China. These buildings are not mere donations; they are listening posts and daily reminders of patronage. By housing the very officials who decide mining policy, Beijing ensures its interests are literally built into the walls of the Burundian administration.

Beyond government seats, Chinese state owned enterprises are embedding themselves into the logistical arteries of the nation. The modernization of the Melchior Ndadaye International Airport and the Ruzibazi hydropower dam serve dual purposes. They act as critical development aid for a cash strapped nation while establishing dependency on Chinese engineering and maintenance. However, this engagement is not without friction. Reports from May 2025 indicate that the rehabilitation of the Rumonge Nyanza Lac road, a vital corridor linking Tanzania to the Democratic Republic of Congo, faced significant delays. The project, led by the China Henan International Cooperation Group, managed only 20 percent completion three years into the contract, sparking rare tension between Gitega and Beijing.

Soft Power and “No Strings” Support

China distinguishes itself from Western partners through its rhetoric of “non interference.” While European and American investment often comes tethered to human rights benchmarks or transparency requirements, Beijing offers a transaction based alternative. This approach was vividly displayed when President Evariste Ndayishimiye visited China in mid 2023 and again for the FOCAC summit in 2024. The resulting deals included zero tariff treatment for Burundian products, such as coffee, allowing Gitega to bypass traditional Western markets. By late 2025, trade data showed China exporting over 11 million USD monthly to Burundi, vastly outpacing imports, yet the political value of accepting Burundian agricultural goods outweighs the economic imbalance.

The Mineral Endgame: Waiting in the Wings

The true strategic prize remains the mineral wealth beneath the soil, particularly the rare earth deposits at Gakara. The mine, one of the highest grade rare earth projects globally, was operated by the British firm Rainbow Rare Earths until the Burundian government suspended operations in June 2021. President Ndayishimiye cited “excessive profits” by foreign companies as the justification. In the years since, the mine has remained largely dormant under Western management, creating a vacuum.

Beijing has not overtly seized the Gakara asset, preferring a shadow strategy. By dominating the processing supply chain and maintaining close ties with the Ministry of Mines, Chinese entities are positioned as the inevitable partners for revitalization. Customs data from late 2025 reveals that China remains the primary destination for the limited artisanal minerals that do leave the country, including tin and tungsten ores. The presence of Chinese geologists and small scale operators in the provinces suggests a granular mapping of resources that Western satellites miss.

As 2025 closes, a complex rivalry unfolds. While Gitega signaled a potential pivot by opening negotiations with the United States regarding coffee exports and security cooperation in early 2025, the foundational infrastructure of the state remains effectively under Chinese sponsorship. For Western observers, the lesson is stark: while they litigate contracts in courtrooms, Beijing is busy pouring the concrete for the offices where the final verdicts will be delivered.

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8. Western Anxiety: U.S. and EU Efforts to Secure Non-Chinese Supply Chains

In the mist shrouded hills of western Burundi, the Gakara mine stands as a silent monument to the fragility of Western mineral strategy. Once heralded as the only producing rare earth mine in Africa operated by a Western company, its operations were abruptly suspended in June 2021 due to a dispute with the Burundian government. As of late 2025, the project remains on “care and maintenance,” a technical euphemism for a geopolitical stalemate that keeps high grade veins of bastnäsite and monazite locked underground. For policymakers in Washington and Brussels, Gakara is not just a stalled mine; it is a flashing warning light on the dashboard of the global energy transition.

The Gakara Deadlock: A Case Study in Fragility

The Gakara project was meant to be the vanguard of a non Chinese supply chain. Operated by London listed Rainbow Rare Earths, it promised a direct line of neodymium and praseodymium to Western markets, bypassing Beijing’s processing monopoly. However, the suspension of operations in 2021 exposed the vulnerability of Western reliance on junior miners navigating complex local politics without heavy state backing. While Rainbow Rare Earths pivoted its focus to the Phalaborwa project in South Africa—securing investment from the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) via TechMet—its Burundian asset became a stranded pawn. By October 2025, the company reported continuing “care and maintenance” costs for Gakara, symbolizing the West’s inability to swiftly resolve diplomatic bottlenecks in frontier markets.

Infrastructure as a Geopolitical Weapon

Recognizing that individual corporate contracts are insufficient, the U.S. and EU have shifted tactics toward massive infrastructure diplomacy. The centerpiece of this strategy is the Lobito Corridor, a railway project connecting the mineral rich Copperbelt in the DRC and Zambia to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola. In a significant move to counter Chinese logistical dominance, the U.S. pledged over $5 billion by mid 2025 to expand and modernize this network.

Although Burundi is not on the direct rail line, the corridor has become a focal point for Bujumbura’s economic planning. Burundian officials have actively lobbied to connect their supply chains to this Western backed artery via Lake Tanganyika. For the West, integrating Burundi into the Lobito network is a strategic imperative. It offers a way to siphon Burundi’s rare earths westward, preventing them from flowing east toward the Indian Ocean ports of Dar es Salaam or Mombasa, where Chinese shipping logistics are deeply entrenched.

Legislative Shields and Alliances

To institutionalize these efforts, the European Union engaged its Critical Raw Materials Act, which entered into force in May 2024. The Act mandates that by 2030, no more than 65% of the Union’s annual consumption of each strategic raw material should come from a single third country. With China controlling nearly 90% of rare earth processing, this legislation effectively mandates a “China Plus One” strategy, forcing EU diplomats to court resource rich nations like Burundi with offers of value added processing rather than mere extraction.

Simultaneously, the U.S. led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) has ramped up its engagement. While Burundi is not a direct member, the MSP’s influence looms large over the region. The partnership’s “finance network,” launched in late 2024, aims to de risk mining projects that adhere to high ESG standards. The implicit offer to Burundi is clear: resolve the Gakara dispute and align with Western transparency standards, and the capital floodgates will open. However, the slow pace of these bureaucratic mechanisms often lags behind the swift, state backed deal making of Chinese competitors.

The Anxiety of the Void

The core of Western anxiety lies in the vacuum created by the Gakara suspension. Intelligence reports and industry analysis from 2024 and 2025 highlight a growing fear that if Western firms cannot restart the mine, Chinese entities—less burdened by ESG mandates and supported by state financing—will step in to fill the void. China’s export restrictions on gallium, germanium, and rare earth processing technologies in 2023 and 2024 demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to weaponize its supply chain dominance. A Chinese takeover of Burundi’s reserves would not just be a commercial loss for the West; it would seal off one of the few remaining high grade deposits outside of Chinese control, tightening the very noose the U.S. and EU are desperately trying to loosen.

Investigative Data Points (2020–2025)

June 2021: Operations at Gakara suspended; the site remains Africa’s only formalized rare earth mine project of significance stalled by political dispute.
May 2024: EU Critical Raw Materials Act enters into force, setting a hard deadline for supply chain diversification.
June 2025: U.S. commits to a $5 billion investment package for the Lobito Corridor expansion, signaling a direct infrastructure challenge to China in Central Africa.
October 2025: Rainbow Rare Earths confirms Gakara asset remains fully written down in financial accounts while retaining the mining license, illustrating the commercial paralysis.

9. The Invisible Workforce: Artisanal Miners and the Conflict with Industrial Concessions

The rusty silence surrounding the heavy machinery at the Gakara mine stands in sharp contrast to the frantic activity in the surrounding hills. Since June 2021, when the Burundian government suspended the operations of Rainbow Rare Earths, the only industrial producer of rare earth elements in Africa has been officially dormant. Yet for the local population in Bujumbura Rural province, the need to eat does not pause for contract renegotiations. While lawyers in London and officials in Gitega argue over “fair share” revenue terms, a shadow workforce has effectively reclaimed the sector, operating in dangerous conditions that define the gritty reality of mineral extraction in the Great Lakes region.

The Vacuum Left by Corporate Suspension

The Gakara project was hailed as a model of modern mining in Burundi, producing high quality concentrate for export to China and Germany. However, the suspension order in 2021, driven by President Évariste Ndayishimiye’s administration, halted these industrial activities. The government claimed the state was not receiving equitable returns from its mineral wealth. While Rainbow Rare Earths placed the site on “care and maintenance,” the local economy collapsed. Hundreds of formal jobs evaporated overnight. For these displaced workers, the only option was to return to artisanal methods, digging into the treacherous earth with pickaxes and shovels rather than operating excavators.

Data from 2020 to 2025 indicates that the artisanal mining sector in Burundi absorbs a vast number of these displaced laborers. Estimates suggest that over 35,000 people across the country depend directly on such informal extraction for their livelihood. In the absence of industrial wages, which offered a degree of stability, these miners now rely on illicit networks to sell their finds. The suspension of Gakara did not stop the demand for rare earths; it merely pushed the supply chain into the gray market, where oversight is nonexistent and safety is a luxury no one can afford.

The Human Cost of “Fair Share” Nationalism

The dangers facing this invisible workforce are lethal. Without the structural supports and safety protocols mandated by industrial firms, artisanal shafts are prone to collapse. In April 2023, a tragedy in the nearby Cibitoke province illuminated the risks; a mine collapse in Mabayi killed at least 15 people. While that disaster occurred at a gold site, the conditions mirror those found in the rare earth workings around Gakara. Miners descend into unventilated pits, risking suffocation and landslides for a weekly income that rarely exceeds 150,000 Burundian Francs (roughly 50 USD). For many, the earnings are far lower, often hovering around 15,000 BIF per week.

This precarious existence is exacerbated by the legal limbo. The government views these unauthorized miners as criminals plundering state assets, yet it fails to provide alternative employment. The administration argues that the 2021 suspension was necessary to secure a better deal for the nation, citing that the state held only a 10 percent stake in the Gakara project. However, the delay in resolving these contracts means that for four years, the “people” in whose name the government claims to act have been left to scavenge in the dirt.

Policy Reform and the Cooperative Facade

In August 2023, Burundi enacted a new mining code designed to formalize this chaotic sector. The law requires artisanal miners to organize into cooperatives and mandates that all such permits be held by entities with 100 percent Burundian ownership. On paper, this empowers locals. In practice, it has created a new layer of elite capture. Investigations reveal that many of these cooperatives are controlled by political figures or powerful traders who dictate prices to the miners. The “cooperative” model often functions as a system of labor control rather than collective empowerment, stripping the individual miner of bargaining power while shielding the state from liability for workplace accidents.

As of 2025, the stalemate at Gakara continues. Rainbow Rare Earths remains entangled in negotiations, while the valuable veins of bastnaesite and monazite sit beneath the soil. Above ground, the invisible workforce continues to dig, caught between a government demanding sovereignty and a global market demanding resources, bearing the full weight of the rivalry on their backs.

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Burundi Mining Impact

10. Environmental Impact: Water Contamination and Land Rights in a Densely Populated Nation

The pursuit of rare earth elements in Burundi presents a distinct ecological paradox. While the global transition to green energy demands these minerals for electric vehicles and wind turbines, the local extraction process threatens the immediate survival of communities living atop the deposits. Between 2020 and 2025, the Gakara project became a focal point for this tension, illustrating how industrial ambitions clash with agrarian necessity in a nation with vanishingly little space.

Burundi is not merely small; it is crowded. By 2024, data indicated a population density exceeding 485 inhabitants per square kilometer, making it one of the most densely populated nations on the African continent. This demographic reality transforms every hectare of land concession into a potential flashpoint. In the Bujumbura Rural province, where Rainbow Rare Earths centered its operations before the 2021 government mandated suspension, mining claims overlap directly with subsistence farms. For the local population, over 90 percent of whom rely on agriculture, the loss of arable soil to mining trenches is not an economic statistic but an existential threat.

The Water Crisis at Lake Tanganyika

Water remains the most volatile variable in this equation. The processing of rare earth ores, particularly the bastnaesite found at Gakara, carries inherent risks of chemical runoff. The Kabezi processing plant sits roughly 20 kilometers from the extraction sites and dangerously close to Lake Tanganyika. This body of water is a lifeline for millions, yet it faces compounding pressures. From 2023 to 2025, rising water levels linked to climate change flooded parts of the economic capital, Bujumbura, displacing over 200,000 people. Introducing industrial mining waste into this fragile hydrological system invites disaster.

Independent environmental assessments conducted in 2024 warned that heavy metal contamination from expanded processing facilities could compromise the water table. The specific concern involves the radioactive elements thorium and uranium, which often accompany rare earth deposits. While the Gakara veins are high grade and allow for manual extraction, minimizing heavy machinery, the chemical separation processes required downstream pose a lasting danger to the watershed feeding the lake.

            “The state, which owns the soil and minerals, is not making a profit as it should,” declared Mines Minister Ibrahim Uwizeye in 2024, signaling that environmental sovereignty is now coupled with financial nationalism.
        

Land Rights and Displacement

The legal landscape is as treacherous as the physical one. In Burundi, land disputes account for approximately 80 percent of all court cases. The suspension of Rainbow Rare Earths in July 2021 was ostensibly about financial renegotiation, but it also paused a growing crisis regarding land compensation. When the government passed the new Mining Code in August 2023, it demanded a minimum of 16 percent free carried interest for the state. However, the code remained vague on specific protections for communities displaced by future industrial expansion.

Local farmers face a precarious future. The 2024 general census revealed that the population continues to surge, shrinking the average family plot size. When a mining company fences off a hill for excavation, the displaced families have nowhere to go. There is no empty frontier in Burundi. The resulting internal migration often pushes people into protected nature reserves or urban slums, exacerbating the cycle of poverty and environmental degradation.

As negotiations for the restart of Gakara dragged into 2025, the government faced a dilemma. It needs the revenue to fund development and manage its debt, yet it cannot afford to poison the land that feeds its people. The fight for Gakara is no longer just about strategic minerals for the West or China; it is a domestic battle over water, soil, and the right to remain on one’s ancestral land.

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11. Follow the Money: Transparency Issues and the Management of Mineral Revenues

The promise of mineral wealth in Burundi has long collided with a murky reality of missing funds and opaque contracts. As the global race for rare earth elements accelerated between 2020 and 2025, the government in Gitega sought to tighten its grip on the mining sector. Yet, a forensic look at revenue flows reveals a stark disconnect between the value of minerals leaving the country and the funds entering the national treasury. This financial dissonance highlights the central struggle in the fight for control over the Gakara resources and beyond.

Data from trade partners exposes the scale of this capital flight. An analysis of export records from 2013 to 2023 shows that the United Arab Emirates imported minerals worth 1.3 billion dollars from Burundi. In contrast, the Burundian Central Bank recorded only 430 million dollars in receipts for the same period. This statistical chasm, amounting to nearly 900 million dollars, suggests that vast quantities of gold, coltan, and rare earths vanish into a parallel economy before they can benefit the state. For a nation grappling with severe foreign exchange shortages, this leakage is not merely a bureaucratic failure but a macroeconomic crisis.

The administration of President Evariste Ndayishimiye attempted to stem these losses through aggressive legislative reform. The suspension of all multinational mining operations in July 2021 marked the beginning of this pivot. The government argued that previous agreements favored foreign entities at the expense of the populace. This standoff culminated in the enactment of a new mining code in August 2023. The 2023 law mandates that the state must hold at least a 15 percent stake in any mining project, an increase from the previous 10 percent requirement. It also emphasizes local processing to capture value within domestic borders.

Rainbow Rare Earths, the operator of the Gakara project, found itself at the center of this nationalist shift. Once touted as the only producing rare earth mine in Africa, Gakara remained under “care and maintenance” status through 2024 and into 2025. While the company sought a resolution that would allow operations to resume, the government demanded a complete renegotiation of fiscal terms. The stalemate reflected a broader skepticism in Gitega regarding foreign operators. Unlike other firms that launched arbitration claims in January 2026, Rainbow continued dialogue, hoping to align with the new “mutually beneficial” rhetoric espoused by the state.

In October 2025, the government orchestrated a public display of its new strict export policy. President Ndayishimiye flagged off a convoy of ten containers bound for China, carrying minerals valued at approximately 6 million dollars. This event was designed to signal a new era of transparency where revenues would flow directly through the Central Bank to alleviate the currency crisis. Officials touted this shipment as proof that the 2023 reforms were working. However, civil society observers noted that without independent oversight, such ceremonial exports could not guarantee systemic integrity.

Institutional voids compound these transparency deficits. Burundi remains outside the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), having stalled its application process in late 2023. The Office Burundais des Mines et Carrières (OBM) lacks the resources to police the thousands of artisanal miners who feed into the supply chains of larger exporters. Consequently, rare earth concentrates are often mixed with other ores or smuggled across porous borders to be sold in regional hubs like Kigali or Kampala, effectively scrubbing their origin. Until Gitega can close the 900 million dollar gap and enforce rigorous tracing from pit to port, the true value of its mineral inheritance will remain elusive.

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The Logistics Challenge: Exporting Minerals from a Landlocked Conflict Zone

12. The Logistics Challenge: Exporting Minerals from a Landlocked Conflict Zone

The red earth of Mutambu commune, specifically the Gakara mine, holds a geological anomaly. The veins here contain rare earth concentrate with grades hitting 54 percent, a purity so high it renders most global competitors envious. Yet, for the last four years, this mineral wealth has remained largely trapped in the ground, held hostage not by geology, but by the brutal arithmetic of logistics and a volatile political standoff. For a landlocked nation like Burundi, the distance to the sea is measured in dollars as much as kilometers, and between 2020 and 2025, that cost became a stranglehold.

The Trucking Bottleneck

Until a rail solution materializes, the only way out for Burundi’s ore is the road. The Central Corridor, a 1,600 kilometer asphalt ribbon stretching from Bujumbura to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, represents a logistical nightmare for bulk mining. Data from the Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency reveals that in 2021, moving a single container along this route cost between 3,800 USD and 4,800 USD. For high volume, low margin commodities, this price tag is prohibitive. Even for high value rare earths, these transport costs devour operating margins, leaving miners vulnerable to even minor dips in global pricing.

The physical journey is arduous. Trucks face a transit time of three to four days under ideal conditions, but border delays, weighbridge queues, and road maintenance often stretch this to a week. The reliance on diesel trucks also introduces a vulnerability to fuel price shocks, which rocked East African markets throughout 2022 and 2023. This fragility was exposed when the Burundian government suspended operations at Gakara in June 2021. While officially a regulatory review, insiders pointed to a government realization: the state was assuming the environmental risk while the logistical value chain—trucking, port fees, shipping—captured the bulk of the economic activity outside Burundi borders.

The 2021 Suspension and Regulatory shift

The suspension of Rainbow Rare Earths in mid 2021 was a pivotal moment. It highlighted the friction between foreign extraction and sovereign benefit. President Evariste Ndayishimiye publicly criticized previous mining contracts, suggesting they offered “peanuts” to the state. This rhetoric culminated in the Mining Code of August 2023 (Law No 1/19), which raised the free carried interest of the state from 10 percent to 16 percent. The government effectively used the logistical bottleneck as leverage, halting exports to force a renegotiation of the fiscal terms. As of early 2026, the Gakara project remains on care and maintenance, a sleeping giant waiting for a regulatory and logistical unlock.

The Iron Solution: The SGR Project

The game changer arrived with the formal launch of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) construction in August 2025. This 2.15 billion USD project, financed with support from the African Development Bank, aims to link Uvinza in Tanzania to Musongati in Burundi. The economics of this line are transformative. Feasibility studies project that rail transport will slash the transit time from four days to under 24 hours. More importantly, it is expected to cut the cost per tonne by nearly 40 percent, dropping the price of moving a container to approximately 2,000 USD.

The Musongati terminal is not just a passenger station; it is designed as a bulk freight hub specifically for the nickel and rare earth deposits found nearby. The agreement signed between the two nations involves Chinese contractors CREGC and CREDC, signaling a shift from Western corporate extraction to Eastern infrastructure development. For the mining sector, this railway is the difference between viability and dormancy. The SGR promises to turn the “tyranny of distance” into a manageable operational cost, potentially allowing Burundi to export not just concentrate, but processed intermediate products.

Conclusion

For now, the sector remains in a holding pattern. The red ore of Gakara sits waiting. The trucks are too expensive, and the trains have yet to arrive. The fight for control over Burundi’s minerals is no longer just about who owns the mining license; it is about who controls the tracks that lead to the ocean. Until the first locomotive pulls out of Musongati, the logistics challenge will remain the primary barrier keeping Burundi from its potential status as a global rare earth player.

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13. Smuggling Networks: Illicit Flows Across the Tanzanian and Rwandan Borders

The suspension of industrial mining operations in Burundi during 2021 created a chaotic vacuum that illicit networks were quick to fill. When the government halted activities at major sites, including the Gakara rare earth mine operated by Rainbow Rare Earths, the intention was to renegotiate contracts for better national benefit. However, the immediate result was a surge in unregulated artisanal extraction. Without the oversight of formal corporate entities, valuable ores began bleeding out of the country through porous frontiers, feeding a shadow economy that enriches foreign brokers and armed groups rather than the Burundian state.

This illicit trade is driven by a stark economic disparity between Burundi and its neighbors. Data from the World Bank and industry reports from 2020 to 2025 highlight that Burundi loses millions in tax revenue annually due to these leakages. The primary commodities trafficked are gold and the “3T” minerals (tin, tungsten, and tantalum), though high quality rare earth concentrates have also reportedly leaked into these supply chains. The smuggling routes engage two distinct geopolitical pivots: the Tanzanian corridor to the east and the Rwandan transit hub to the north.

Tanzania has emerged as a preferred destination for smuggled Burundian gold due to its favorable tax regime and logistical access to global markets like Dubai. In 2023, Tanzania reduced its royalty rate on gold exports from 5 percent to 2 percent, a move intended to formalize its own artisanal sector but one that inadvertently incentivized smuggling from Burundi. Traders in Muyinga and Ruyigi provinces, which share long and difficult to patrol boundaries with Tanzania, often bypass official customs. They transport gold across the border to sell at Tanzanian trading centers where the paperwork is “cleaned,” transforming conflict minerals into legally exported goods. In 2024, Tanzanian authorities intercepted over 15 kilograms of gold worth millions of dollars at the port of Dar es Salaam, a seizure that officials privately admitted was likely just a fraction of the total volume flowing from the Great Lakes region.

The situation on the northern border with Rwanda is more complex, entangled with diplomatic hostility and security accusations. The closure of the land border in January 2024, following allegations that Rwanda backed the RED Tabara rebel group, supposedly halted trade. Yet, investigative reports by the United Nations Group of Experts in 2024 suggest that illicit flows merely shifted to clandestine tracks. Rwanda reported mineral export earnings jumping to 1.75 billion dollars in 2024, a figure that far exceeds its domestic production capacity. This statistical anomaly points to the country continuing its role as a regional aggregator. Smugglers use “pistes” or unofficial paths through the dense forests to ferry coltan and cassiterite into Rwanda, where international buyers pay in hard currency. The UN reports indicated that specific rebel factions levy taxes on these movements, using the proceeds to purchase weapons and sustain insurgencies that further destabilize Burundi.

The human element of this trade involves a desperate workforce of artisanal miners, known locally as “creuseurs,” who toil in dangerous shafts without safety gear. They sell their finds to middlemen for pennies on the dollar. These intermediaries then transport the ore using motorbikes or concealed compartments in vegetable trucks. Corruption greases the wheels of this machine. Border officials on both sides are frequently accused of accepting bribes to look the other way. A 2023 survey by Transparency International Tanzania noted that nearly 27 percent of artisanal miners admitted to bribing officials to bypass checkpoints, a statistic that reflects the systemic nature of the problem.

For Burundi, the cost is catastrophic. While the Gakara project remains under “care and maintenance” status, preventing industrial scale export of rare earths, the surrounding earth is still being picked away by illegal diggers. The wealth that should fund hospitals and schools in one of the world’s poorest nations instead evaporates into the accounts of foreign refining firms and regional warlords. Until Burundi can secure its territory and harmonize its fiscal policies with its neighbors, its mineral endowment will remain a source of conflict rather than development.

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14. The Role of the Imbonerakure: Political Youth Militias in the Mining Sector

The struggle for dominion over the mineral wealth of Burundi extends beyond corporate boardrooms and government ministries. On the ground, the fight is physical, violent, and enforced by the Imbonerakure. Nominally the youth wing of the ruling CNDD FDD party, this group has morphed into a paramount economic actor within the extractive industries. From 2020 to 2025, their involvement shifted from sporadic intimidation to systematic control over artisanal mining sites and logistics routes, effectively functioning as a parallel security force for the regime’s resource nationalism strategy.

While the international spotlight focuses on the suspended industrial operations at the Gakara rare earth project, a shadow economy thrives under the watch of these young militants. The suspension of the contract held by Rainbow Rare Earths in 2021 created a vacuum in the formal sector. In its place, or specifically around its periphery in Bujumbura Rural, the Imbonerakure asserted presence to prevent unauthorized access and monitor local communities. Their role serves a dual purpose: ensuring no wealth leaks to the opposition and maintaining a surveillance grid over strategic territories believed to hold vast deposits of bastnaesite and monazite.

The Mechanics of Informal Taxation

In the gold rich provinces of Cibitoke and Bubanza, the militia operates a lucrative protection racket. Investigations from 2023 reveal that artisanal miners, often working in dangerous conditions, must pay “security fees” to local Imbonerakure leaders to access pits. These payments are distinct from official state taxes and flow directly into party coffers or the pockets of local commanders. This system creates a tiered economy where loyalty to the party acts as a license to mine.

“We pay the administration, we pay the police, but the fee that guarantees you will not be beaten or chased away is the one paid to the youth,” stated a miner in Cibitoke during a 2024 confidential interview with rights monitors.

The lethal consequences of this unregulated oversight became evident in May 2024, when landslides in Cibitoke claimed the lives of multiple miners. These victims were working in zones theoretically closed by the government but kept open through bribes paid to the youth militia. The Imbonerakure enforced silence regarding these accidents, burying the news as effectively as the earth buried the workers.

Border Security and Smuggling Routes

The geopolitical rivalry for rare earths and strategic minerals involves complex logistics. Minerals must leave the landlocked nation to reach global markets. Here, the Imbonerakure controls critical checkpoints along the routes to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. United Nations reports from 2022 to 2024 documented the youth group conducting joint operations with the national army in South Kivu, ostensibly to fight RED Tabara rebels. However, these incursions also secured smuggling corridors for gold and coltan, minerals often trafficked to launder the finances of the ruling elite.

By 2025, the group reportedly received military style training in Cibitoke, overseen by former rebels. This professionalization of the militia signals a intent to tighten their grip on the mineral supply chain. As the government of President Ndayishimiye seeks new partners for its rare earth sector—courting Russian and Chinese interests to replace Western firms—the Imbonerakure provides the requisite boots on the ground to guarantee that these new ventures face no local resistance.

A State within a State

The militia effectively neutralizes the concept of legal recourse for mining companies or local landowners. When the government suspended the operations of Rainbow Rare Earths, ostensibly to renegotiate for “fairer terms,” the physical enforcement of this decree fell to local party structures. The youth wing ensures that the narrative of “resource sovereignty” is not challenged by the local population, who might otherwise protest the loss of jobs and community development projects previously funded by the Western company.

This dynamic complicates the landscape for any future investor. Gaining a mining license from the Ministry in Gitega is merely the first step. The reality of operations from 2020 to 2025 demonstrates that practical control of the mine site requires the tacit approval and paid cooperation of the Imbonerakure. They have become the unavoidable gatekeepers of the Burundian subsoil, transforming political loyalty into a hard currency extracted from the red earth.

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15. Conclusion: Can Burundi Escape the Resource Curse in the Green Energy Era?

The saga of the Gakara rare earth mine serves as a stark warning for the global energy transition. It illustrates the deep chasm between the promise of mineral wealth and the reality of economic stagnation. For Burundi, a nation consistently ranked among the poorest in the world, the high grade veins of rare earth ore in the western hills represented a potential lifeline. Yet, as we move through 2025, that lifeline remains frayed, suspended in a complex web of resource nationalism, geopolitical maneuvering, and stalled negotiations.

The Gakara project, operated by Rainbow Rare Earths, was once touted as the only producing rare earth mine in Africa. It offered a non Chinese source for the magnetic elements essential to electric vehicles and wind turbines. However, the suspension of operations in June 2021 by the Government of Burundi halted this progress. The administration in Gitega cited “unbalanced” contracts and demanded a greater share of the revenue, echoing a trend seen across the continent where governments seek to rewrite the rules of extraction. By late 2024, despite ongoing talks, the mine remained on “care and maintenance,” with Rainbow Rare Earths eventually writing down the value of the asset in its financial reports while shifting focus to South Africa.

This stalemate highlights the central challenge Burundi faces: the “Resource Curse.” This economic paradox occurs when nations with abundant natural resources experience slower growth and less development than countries with fewer resources. The data from 2020 to 2024 paints a concerning picture. While the Gakara mine holds some of the highest grade ore on the planet, with concentrations often exceeding 50% Total Rare Earth Oxides, the contribution of mining to the national GDP remained negligible, hovering near 0.5%. Meanwhile, the World Bank estimated poverty rates stayed stubbornly high, affecting nearly 75% of the population in 2024. The wealth underground has not translated to welfare above ground.

The new Mining Code enacted in 2023 was an attempt by the state to correct this imbalance. It raised the government stake in mining projects to 16% and mandated strict adherence to local development plans. While these measures aim to capture more value for the Burundian people, they also introduce uncertainty for foreign investors who fear shifting regulatory sands. The result is a standoff: the government refuses to allow export without better terms, and Western capital hesitates to invest in a jurisdiction perceived as unstable.

Geopolitics complicates this equation further. The United States and its allies are desperate to secure supply chains outside of Chinese control. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) backed Rainbow Rare Earths, but for their project in South Africa, not Burundi. This signals a preference for jurisdictions with clearer legal frameworks. Conversely, China maintains a dominant position in the processing sector and holds significant political leverage in the region. If Western companies withdraw, there is a risk that state linked entities from rival powers could step in, potentially offering infrastructure deals in exchange for exclusive access to the minerals.

Can Burundi escape this trap? The answer lies in its ability to convert potential into production without scaring away the necessary technical expertise. The demand for rare earths is projected to double over the coming decade, providing a robust market. However, price volatility and the emergence of alternative supplies in stable regions like Australia and the USA mean Burundi cannot rely solely on the scarcity of its product. To succeed, the administration must establish a transparent, stable fiscal regime that guarantees revenue for the state while ensuring security for the operator.

Ultimately, the future of the Gakara mine is a litmus test. If operations resume under a mutually beneficial framework, it could signal a new era where mineral wealth drives genuine development. If the shafts remain closed while poverty persists, it will serve as another tragic chapter in the history of the resource curse, proving that geology alone is not destiny. Governance is.

“`Here is an HTML list containing 10 real news references and reports covering the conflict, geopolitical rivalries, and government crackdowns regarding Burundi’s mineral wealth, specifically focusing on rare earths and the Gakara project.

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References: Rare Earth Rivalries in Burundi