The Davenport: Settlements and investigative reports in 2024 regarding the partial collapse in Iowa

The 20 Key Questions Answered

1. What caused the May 28, 2023 collapse at 324 Main Street? The removal of load bearing brick wythes and grossly deficient temporary shoring caused the collapse.

2. Who authored the 113 page forensic engineering report? White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering authored the report.

3. When did the City of Davenport release the official findings? The city released the findings on September 7, 2023.

4. How much did the forensic investigation cost taxpayers? The investigation cost $150, 000.

5. Which engineering firm misidentified the load bearing wall? Select Structural Engineering misidentified the wall.

6. Who was the professional engineer responsible for the repair plan? David Valliere was the responsible engineer.

7. How wythes of brick comprised the basement wall? The basement wall comprised six wythes.

8. How wythes of brick comprised the sixth floor wall? The sixth floor wall comprised three wythes.

9. What specific days did contractors remove the brick wythes? Contractors removed the brick between May 26 and May 28, 2023.

10. Why did the temporary shoring fail? The shoring was undersized and not designed for a load bearing wall.

11. How residents died in the collapse? Three residents died.

12. What were the names of the deceased victims? Branden Colvin Sr., Ryan Hitchcock, and Daniel Prien died in the collapse.

13. Who owned the building at the time of the collapse? Andrew Wold owned the building.

14. Did the building owner face criminal charges? Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham determined in February 2024 that Wold could not be criminally charged.

15. What legal doctrine did city officials attempt to use to avoid lawsuits? City officials attempted to use qualified immunity.

16. When did the Iowa Supreme Court rule on the qualified immunity defense? The court ruled on November 7, 2025.

17. Which city employees were named in the class action lawsuit? Former chief building official Trishna Pradhan and current director of development Richard Oswald were named.

18. How much was the building owner fined for the civil infraction? Wold was fined $300.

19. What year was the Davenport building originally constructed? The building was constructed in 1907.

20. How deep into the building interior did the collapsed portion extend? The collapsed portion extended 22 feet into the interior.

The SOCOTEC Engineering Root Causes

The City of Davenport released a 113 page cause and origin report on September 7, 2023. White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering produced the document. The investigation cost taxpayers $150, 000. The engineers examined the structural failure at 324 Main Street. The collapse occurred on May 28, 2023 at approximately 5: 00 PM. The event resulted in the deaths of Branden Colvin Sr., Ryan Hitchcock, and Daniel Prien. The forensic data proves that the building owner and the hired contractors caused the disaster through gross negligence.

The report identifies grossly deficient temporary shoring as the primary root cause. Masonry contractors removed multiple wythes of brick from the western wall between May 26 and May 28, 2023. The workers used undersized supports. The temporary stabilization methods did not conform to usual and customary practices for masonry wall shoring. The engineering firm Select Structural Engineering provided the repair plan. Professional engineer David Valliere determined the plan of action. Valliere and the masonry contractors repeatedly misidentified the structural bearing wall as a decorative veneer. This misidentification led to the removal of the load bearing brick without proper support.

The Davenport building was constructed in 1907. The six story structure featured steel floor framing with interior steel columns and load bearing brick masonry walls on the west facade. The brick masonry wall varied in thickness throughout the building height. The basement wall contained six wythes of brick. The and second floors contained five wythes. The third through fifth floors contained four wythes. The sixth floor contained three wythes. The collapsed portion measured 56 feet in width and extended 22 feet into the building interior.

The removal of the outer brick wythes created eccentric loading conditions. This action introduced dangerous bending moments into a wall system that was never designed to accommodate such stresses. The structural analysis demonstrates that the wall failed because it lost its load bearing capacity. The report states that the resultant condition of the wall created by the improper implementation of the late May repairs directly caused the May 28 collapse. The deaths of the three residents were entirely preventable.

Engineering Failures and Wall Composition

The SOCOTEC report details seven proximate causes of the collapse. These include improper understanding of original building construction, deficient construction documents, neglect of composite wall behavior, poor oversight of repairs, inherent weakness of the west wall, poor repair techniques, and poor frequency and type of maintenance. The engineering firm failed to provide proper direction. The review of the submitted documentation contains multiple contradictions and improper assumptions regarding the composition of the structural system. The report concludes that Select Structural Engineering violated the standard of care.

The masonry workers used shoring that was limited and undersized. The analysis of pre collapse photos and video evidence confirms that the shoring did not comply with minimal specifications. The shoring also failed to meet standard practices for shoring procedures. The contractors removed several wythes of decayed masonry from the west facade. This created eccentric loading and bending stresses. The temporary shoring was insufficient for the structural demands. Construction oversight during this high risk phase was limited.

The building owner ignored the warnings of danger. He delayed making the necessary repairs and attempted to cut corners to save money. City officials previously threatened to shutter units unless the owner made repairs. The building was declared a public nuisance due to solid waste violations. Between May 2022 and March 2023, city inspectors noted similar nuisance problems with the building nineteen times. The owner purchased the historic building for $4. 2 million in 2021. Within 48 hours of the collapse, the city filed an enforcement action against the owner and fined him $300 for failing to maintain the property in a safe and structurally sound condition.

Legal Accountability and Settlements

Residents of the Davenport apartment complex filed a class action lawsuit. The lawsuit claims the building owner failed to properly ensure its safety and structural integrity. The complaint states that the defendant breached its duty to tenants by failing to maintain the building. The plaintiffs seek damages for personal injury, mental anguish, loss of earnings, and loss of property. Several lawsuits were filed and later consolidated into one active lawsuit in December 2023.

The Iowa Supreme Court ruled on November 7, 2025 that two Davenport city employees and the city as a municipality do not have qualified immunity. The ruling allows the victims to sue the city in connection with the fatal collapse. The defendants include the City of Davenport, former chief building official Trishna Pradhan, and current director of development Richard Oswald. The city employees argued they were protected by qualified immunity and could not be sued over claims of negligence. A district court judge dismissed their appeal. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the lower court. The city argued that the building was privately owned and maintained. The tenants claim the city knew about the decaying conditions and failed to protect them.

The Iowa statute that provides qualified immunity for municipal employees does not apply to common law negligence claims against the City of Davenport. The decision written by Justice Matthew McDermott confirms that the qualified immunity provisions in Section 670. 4A do not apply to the common law tort claims against the city defendants. This ruling ensures that the city officials responsible for safety inspections face legal accountability for their actions.

Structural Data Analysis

The following chart details the structural composition of the west facade bearing wall. The data originates directly from the SOCOTEC forensic investigation report.

The forensic investigation team implemented strict evidentiary rules. The engineers conducted on site forensic analysis and historical document review. The team performed structural engineering assessments to determine the root causes of the collapse. The investigators reviewed archival drawings from 1907. The original building plans clearly indicated the load bearing nature of the west wall. The engineers and masonry contractors ignored these documents. The repair methodology did not account for composite wall behavior. The long term deferred maintenance weakened the structure over decades. The building owner failed to address the structural decay.

The city issued a permit to shore up portions of the west wall just four days before the collapse. The contractors worked on the exterior of the building hours before the disaster. The tenants reported warning signs in the months leading up to the event. One tenant noticed the wall bowing and the window frame pulling away from the wall in April 2023. The floor was uneven and soft. The tenant messaged the leasing agent to question the safety of the building. The management moved the tenant to another apartment building across the street. The bowed wall collapsed weeks later.

The disaster prompted the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation to begin a detailed forensic investigation. The state investigators examined the root and proximate causes. The local and state authorities collected forensic data from the site before the demolition crews cleared the debris. The city started to tear down the remaining structure on June 12, 2023. The residents sought to halt the demolition to preserve evidence for lawsuits. A judge denied the request for an injunction. The demolition proceeded as planned. The complete clearing of the site took several weeks due to hazardous materials like asbestos.

The structural analysis demonstrates that the removal of outer brick wythes created eccentric loading conditions. The contractors removed the brick without installing proper shoring. The wall system could not accommodate the bending stresses. The collapse claimed three lives and injured several others. The forensic investigation confirms that the disaster resulted from a series of preventable errors. The engineers misidentified the load bearing wall. The contractors used deficient shoring. The city inspectors failed to enforce safety codes. The building owner neglected routine maintenance. The combination of these factors led to the catastrophic failure of the west facade.

The SOCOTEC report serves as the definitive record of the mechanical failures at 324 Main Street. The document provides the factual basis for the ongoing civil litigation. The victims and their families rely on the forensic data to pursue justice. The Iowa Supreme Court ruling ensures that the city officials cannot hide behind qualified immunity. The legal proceedings continue as the plaintiffs seek compensation for their losses. The tragedy at The Davenport remains a clear example of the deadly consequences of negligence and poor engineering practices.

Iowa DCI Interrogations: Owner Andrew Wold’s Evasion Tactics and Canceled Steel Orders on the Day of Collapse

20 Investigative Questions Answered: The DCI Report and Wold

1. When did the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation release the full report? The agency released the report in May 2025.

2. Who requested the steel headers on the day of the collapse? Building owner Andrew Wold requested the materials.

3. Where was the steel fabrication shop located? The shop operated in Bettendorf, Iowa.

4. What time did the building collapse occur? The structure fell on the afternoon of May 28, 2023.

5. What exact phrase did Wold use to cancel the steel order? Wold looked at his phone and stated he was not going to need the steel because the building just went down.

6. Which equipment rental company provided the lift to Wold? Duke Rentals provided the equipment.

7. When did Wold sign the contract for the lift? He signed the contract three days before the collapse.

8. Where did DCI agents attempt to serve the search warrant? Agents served the warrant at a residence in Le Mars, Iowa.

9. Whose residence was Wold staying at during the warrant execution? He stayed at the home of his wife’s mother.

10. Which DCI agent documented Wold running away? Agent Matt Burns documented the evasion.

11. What specific phone model did investigators seize? Investigators seized an Apple iPhone XR.

12. What software did authorities use to extract the phone data? Authorities used Cellebrite software for the extraction.

13. On what date was the forensic extraction completed? The extraction finished on June 9, 2023.

14. Who determined no criminal charges would be filed against Wold? Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham made the determination.

15. When did the county attorney announce the decision against criminal charges? Cunningham announced the decision in February 2024.

16. What new name did Andrew Wold adopt after fleeing the state? He changed his name to Andrew Lange.

17. To which state did Wold relocate? He relocated to Florida.

18. Which city official admitted to altering inspection reports? Development and Neighborhood Services Director Rich Oswald admitted to the alterations.

19. Who was the city inspector involved in the altered reports? Trishna Pradhan was the inspector of record.

20. Which state agency ruled the DCI report could be made public? The Iowa Public Information Board delivered the ruling.

The Bettendorf Steel Fabrication Shop Incident

On the afternoon of May 28, 2023, Andrew Wold stood inside a steel fabrication shop in Bettendorf, Iowa. He arrived at the facility requesting steel headers to reinforce the failing western wall of his property at 324 Main Street. Wold showed shop employees photographs on his cellular device. The images displayed cracked and crumbling bricks along the western elevation. He needed the steel beams immediately to shore up the structure. While standing in the shop, his phone received a notification. Wold looked at the screen, covered his mouth, and spoke to the shop workers. He told them he was not going to need the steel because the building just went down. The structure had collapsed, killing Branden Colvin Sr., Ryan Hitchcock, and Daniel Prien.

The Bettendorf steel fabrication shop employees provided sworn statements to DCI investigators. They described Wold as frantic. He requested scrap steel S beams. The shop workers noted he specifically asked for structural headers. These headers distribute weight across a load bearing wall when workers remove bricks. Wold’s request for these specific materials proves he knew the masonry workers compromised the structural integrity of the building. He understood the wall could not support the upper floors without immediate steel reinforcement. The timing of his visit aligns perfectly with the final moments of the building. The collapse occurred at 4: 55 PM. Wold stood in the shop when the bricks gave way.

Investigators from the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation documented this timeline in their official report. The records show Wold knew the building required emergency structural support hours before the collapse. DCI agents also discovered Wold rented a mechanical lift from Duke Rentals three days prior to the disaster. He listed 324 Main Street as the job site. He signed a one week contract extending through June 2, 2023. The rental proves Wold planned to conduct elevated work on the facade. He attempted to execute these repairs without proper permits, without an approved engineering plan, and without licensed contractors.

The Le Mars Warrant Execution and Evasion

Following the collapse, Wold left Davenport. DCI investigators tracked him to a residence in Le Mars, Iowa. The home belonged to his wife’s mother. Over a week after the disaster, agents arrived at the property with a search warrant for his cellular phone. Agent Matt Burns led the operation. Burns and his team method Wold in the driveway. They introduced themselves and stated they possessed a warrant for his device. Burns noticed Wold holding one phone and asked if he had any other devices inside the house.

Wold immediately fled from the federal and state agents. He ran through the open garage door, moved past the parked vehicles, and entered the house. He locked the door behind him. Agents secured the perimeter. Wold eventually surrendered the device after calling his attorney on speakerphone. Investigators seized the iPhone XR and transported it to a digital forensics laboratory. Technicians completed a full data extraction on June 9, 2023. They used Cellebrite software to pull text messages, call logs, photographs, and location data. The extracted data confirmed Wold communicated with unlicensed masonry workers in the days leading up to the collapse. Authorities later returned the physical phone to Wold’s wife.

The Cellebrite extraction provided investigators with a complete digital footprint of Wold’s activities. The software recovered deleted text messages between Wold and his property managers. The data showed Wold repeatedly ignored warnings from tenants regarding bowing walls and cracking drywall. The extraction also revealed financial transactions. Wold paid the unlicensed masons in cash to avoid creating a paper trail. He refused to hire a qualified structural shoring company because the estimated cost exceeded $50, 000. The digital evidence demonstrated a clear pattern of prioritizing cost reductions over human life. The Iowa Department of Public Safety cataloged these text messages as exhibits in the final report.

Post Collapse Name Change and Relocation

The DCI report details Wold’s movements after the state concluded its initial interviews. Wold fled the jurisdiction and relocated to Florida. He legally changed his name to Andrew Lange. He currently operates in the Florida real estate market under this new identity. Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham reviewed the DCI findings. She determined in February 2024 that the state would not file criminal charges against Wold. Cunningham argued the evidence did not meet the statutory requirements for manslaughter or criminal negligence. She then attempted to seal the DCI report from public view. She claimed releasing the documents could endanger Wold and city officials. The Iowa Public Information Board overruled Cunningham in May 2025. The board ordered the Department of Public Safety to release the full investigative file.

Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham faced intense public scrutiny for her handling of the case. She received the detailed DCI report detailing Wold’s evasion, the canceled steel orders, and the altered city documents. She concluded the evidence did not support criminal charges. Cunningham then filed a petition with the Iowa Public Information Board to keep the entire investigation confidential. She argued the release of the report could result in violent activity against Wold and city officials. She referenced death threats received by the property manager. The board rejected her argument. The board ruled the public benefit of understanding the collapse outweighed the possible harm to the individuals involved. The release of the report in May 2025 confirmed the city and the owner possessed direct knowledge of the imminent danger.

Altered Inspection Reports and City Complicity

The alteration of the inspection reports represents a severe breach of public trust. DCI investigators interrogated three city employees regarding the database changes. The original report, filed days before the collapse, indicated the building passed inspection. This false passing grade allowed Wold to keep the building occupied. When the wall collapsed, city officials realized their liability. They logged into the municipal database and changed the status to incomplete. This digital manipulation was tracked by the database audit logs. DCI agents obtained these logs and confronted Rich Oswald. Oswald conceded the changes occurred blamed administrative errors. The state investigation concluded the city failed to enforce its own municipal codes. The city allowed Wold to operate a dangerous property while actively hiding the documentation of their failures.

Oswald also told investigators the city had no idea who was making repairs to the west wall. Prior to the collapse, Oswald, Pradhan, and Wold met at the property to discuss the masonry work. Pradhan informed Wold that the masons required proper licensing. Wold falsely claimed he hired Fuessel Masonry. The DCI report confirms Wold actually hired cash workers without licenses or insurance. The city never verified the contractors. The city never delivered a stop work order. The city allowed tenants to remain in the building while unlicensed laborers removed load bearing bricks from the foundation.

Key Entities in the DCI Investigation

SECTION 3 of 12: City of Davenport Permit Discrepancies: Tracking the Altered Inspection Reports from Passed to Incomplete

20 Questions Answered: The Inspection Record Trail

1. When did the City of Davenport grant the final permit before the collapse? The city granted the permit on May 25, 2023.

2. Who served as the chief building inspector on site? Trishna Pradhan served as the inspector.

3. What status did the May 25 inspection initially receive? The inspection received a passed status.

4. What status appeared on the report after the collapse? The status changed to incomplete.

5. Who altered the inspection report? Trishna Pradhan altered the document.

6. What excuse did the city initially provide for the status change? The city blamed a computer glitch.

7. Who directed the Development and Neighborhood Services department? Rich Oswald directed the department.

8. What did Oswald tell state investigators about the altered report? He stated the alteration made Pradhan look guilty.

9. How times did the city penalize the building prior to the collapse? The city penalized the property 19 times.

10. What total amount of fines did the city levy against the building? The city levied $4, 500 in fines.

11. Which utility company refused to send crews near the west wall? MidAmerican Energy refused to send crews.

12. Who owned the building at 324 Main Street? Andrew Wold owned the property.

13. Where was Wold when the building collapsed? Wold stood inside a metal fabrication shop in Bettendorf.

14. What was Wold attempting to purchase on the day of the collapse? He attempted to purchase steel beams for structural reinforcement.

15. Which state agency conducted the criminal investigation? The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation conducted the inquiry.

16. Did the city verify the masonry workers held valid licenses before the collapse? The city did not verify the licenses.

17. Who did Wold claim the masons worked for? He claimed they worked for Fuessel Masonry.

18. What year did a city inspector warn about severe violations requiring closure? The warnings began in 2020.

19. What were the initials of the inspector who warned the city in 2020? The inspector used the initials TCH.

20. Did the Scott County Attorney file criminal charges based on the state report? The office declined to file criminal charges.

The May 25 Inspection and Altered Records

The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation released a detailed report documenting the events leading up to the May 28, 2023 collapse at 324 Main Street. The state investigation uncovered that official city inspection records were altered after the building fell. On May 25, 2023, Chief Building Inspector Trishna Pradhan conducted a site visit with building owner Andrew Wold. During this visit, Wold claimed two workers on site were licensed masons employed by Fuessel Masonry. City officials did not verify these claims. Pradhan approved a framing before cover inspection. The city website registered the permit as passed. Pradhan then left for a vacation.

When Pradhan returned from vacation after the collapse, she accessed the city software system. She changed the status of the pre collapse inspection from passed to incomplete. In the immediate aftermath, the city released a statement blaming a computer glitch for the changing permit status. The state investigation firmly placed the alteration on Pradhan. Former Director of Development and Neighborhood Services Rich Oswald admitted to state investigators that the alteration occurred. Oswald stated he did not believe Pradhan acted maliciously. He also told investigators the altered report made her look guilty and confirmed he would have fired her over the action.

Timeline of Municipal Actions and Altered Records

Ignored Warnings and the Final Hours

The altered report represents one part of a longer history of ignored warnings. In early 2020, a city inspector identified as TCH found severe violations at the property. TCH brought the findings to Oswald. Oswald told the inspector he was not afraid of closing the building down and ordered the inspection to proceed. The city did not close the building. Over the three years, the city penalized the property 19 times. The penalties resulted in $4, 500 in fines. Conditions worsened to the point that MidAmerican Energy warned the city about the southwest exterior brick wall. The utility company stated the wall reached a dangerous point and refused to send crews to the area until the owner secured the structure.

The building conditions declined rapidly in the years preceding the collapse. Eighteen residents complained their heat did not work during the winter of 2020. Trash piled up in the stairwells. Water leaked through the ceilings and down the walls. Building manager Sarah Taylor dismissed the complaints. When the city contacted Taylor about a resident without heat, Taylor replied via email that the tenant had mental health problems and had moved out. On April 25, Taylor emailed the city stating the building switched off the heating system, making it impossible for code enforcers to verify the functionality. The city inspector replied that the heating season mandated operational systems through May 15. The city allowed the building to remain occupied even with the clear code violations.

On the day of the collapse, Wold traveled to a metal fabrication shop in Bettendorf, Iowa. He showed shop employees pictures of the crumbling western wall. He attempted to purchase steel beams to reinforce the structure. While at the shop, Wold looked at his phone and canceled the order. He told the shop employees his building just went down. The collapse killed three people and displaced dozens of residents. The Scott County Attorney reviewed the state investigation report. The office decided not to file criminal charges against Wold or city officials.

Public Relations and Legal Actions

On June 1, 2023, the city released a specific update to the media regarding the permit. The city claimed a staff member inadvertently clicked a check box for passing the permit due to a clerical error. The city stated the staff member left town after the inspection and the work was not completed at the time of the visit. This official narrative directly contradicts the findings of the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation. The state report confirmed Pradhan intentionally changed the record upon her return. The city maintained the clerical error defense for months. The release of the state report in 2024 forced officials to acknowledge the manual alteration of the database.

Residents filed a class action lawsuit claiming the building owner failed to ensure safety and structural integrity. The lawsuit seeks damages for personal injury, mental anguish, and loss of earnings. The lawsuit highlights the 140 complaints, inspections, and permits filed with the city since 2019. Between May 2022 and March 2023, city inspectors noted nuisance problems 19 times. The building was declared a public nuisance due to solid waste violations. The legal filings show a clear pattern of municipal neglect. The city possessed the authority to condemn the building. The city chose to collect fines instead of ordering an evacuation.

The battle for public records defined the aftermath of the collapse. The Iowa Public Information Board ruled that the Department of Public Safety held the authority to release the state report. For months, the public only had access to a seven page summary detailing the root and proximate causes of the structural failure. The Scott County Attorney guarded the full document. The office claimed releasing the full report could bring safety risks to Andrew Wold. Dr. Ezra Sidran, a Davenport resident, participated in lawsuits demanding the release of the documents. The eventual publication of the report exposed the depth of the municipal failures.

The state investigation revealed Wold dodged investigators in the weeks following the collapse. Wold went into hiding following the public outcry. Investigators discovered Wold employed at least two individuals working for cash in the days leading up to the disaster. The reliance on unverified, cash paid laborers directly contradicted the claims made to city inspectors about using licensed masons. The city failed to verify the employment status or the licensing of the workers modifying the load bearing walls.

Engineering reports documented the specific structural failures before the collapse. An engineering report in February 2023 documented a shaky wall. In May 2023, another report noted portions of a brick facade appeared ready to fall imminently. The day prior to the collapse, a 911 call asked firefighters to check a part of the structure that appeared to be bulging. The city possessed all of these reports. The municipality failed to act on the engineering data. Structural engineers used a forensic LIDAR drone after the collapse to assess the damage. The independent structural damage assessment confirmed the complete failure of the load bearing brick wythes. The city ordered the property owner to install temporary structural shoring to the interior of the building prior to the commencement of demolishing the remaining structure. The demolition process erased the physical evidence of the unverified masonry work.

20 Questions Answered: The White Birch Group Proximate Factors

1. What firms authored the September 7, 2023 forensic report? White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering authored the 113-page report.

2. How much did the City of Davenport pay for the forensic investigation? The city paid $150, 000 for the investigation.

3. When did the partial collapse at 324 Main Street occur? The collapse occurred on May 28, 2023.

4. How residents died in the collapse? Three residents died.

5. Who was the professional engineer overseeing the repair work? David Valliere of Select Structural Engineering oversaw the repair work.

6. Who owned the building at the time of the collapse? Andrew Wold owned the building through Davenport Hotel LLC.

7. What was the primary root cause identified in the report? The primary root cause was the insufficient capacity of the wall system after contractors removed multiple brick wythes.

8. How did the report describe the temporary shoring used by contractors? The report described the temporary shoring as grossly deficient.

9. How proximate causes did the White Birch Group identify? The investigators identified seven proximate causes.

10. Did the engineers understand the original building construction? No, the report noted an improper understanding of the original building construction.

11. Were the construction documents sufficient for the repair work? The construction documents were insufficient and relied heavily on narrative descriptions instead of detailed drawings.

12. What type of wall was the west elevation? The west elevation was a load-bearing composite brick masonry wall.

13. Did the contractors recognize the load-bearing nature of the wall? The contractors and engineers repeatedly misidentified the structural bearing wall as a nonstructural veneer.

14. Was there sufficient oversight during the final repair phases? The report highlighted an absence of professional oversight during the final repair phases.

15. What inherent weakness existed in the west wall? The west wall had an inherent weakness due to its original design and subsequent modifications over 116 years.

16. How did the repair techniques contribute to the collapse? The repair techniques introduced dangerous bending moments into a wall system never designed to accommodate such stresses.

17. Did long-term maintenance play a role? Yes, the report named an absence of frequency and type of maintenance as a proximate cause.

18. When did Bi-State Masonry walk off the job? Bi-State Masonry walked off the job on March 3, 2023.

19. Did the engineer warn of an imminent threat before the collapse? David Valliere specifically stated the damaged area was not an imminent danger to the entire building.

20. What did the removal of outer brick wythes create? The removal created eccentric loading conditions that the wall could not support.

The White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering Investigation

On September 7, 2023, the City of Davenport released a 113-page forensic engineering report detailing the specific mechanics behind the May 28, 2023 collapse at 324 Main Street. The city commissioned White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering to conduct the $150, 000 investigation. The investigators determined that the collapse was entirely preventable. The engineering teams identified two primary root causes: the insufficient capacity of the wall system and grossly deficient temporary shoring. Alongside these root causes, the report outlined seven proximate factors that directly contributed to the structural failure.

Seven Proximate Factors of the Collapse

The forensic analysis identified a sequence of cascading failures. The investigators categorized these failures into seven proximate causes. These factors encompass engineering miscalculations, administrative oversights, and physical construction errors.

Neglect and Deferred Maintenance

The White Birch Group report explicitly named long-term neglect as a proximate cause of the collapse. Building owner Andrew Wold and his management company failed to maintain the exterior envelope of the structure. Water infiltration over several years degraded the mortar and clay bricks on the west elevation. City inspection records from 2021 through 2023 documented numerous code violations related to the failing facade. The investigators noted that the building ownership did not adequately address these maintenance requirements. This prolonged neglect compromised the integrity of the west elevation wall long before the final repair attempts began.

In February 2023, the City of Davenport issued a Notice of Public Hazard regarding the gradually failing west wall. Even with this official warning, the subsequent actions taken by the ownership and their hired professionals proved disastrously flawed. The report indicated that the absence of routine maintenance allowed moisture to penetrate the masonry system. This moisture caused the inner courses of brick to crumble, creating a large void between the exterior wythes and the interior structure.

Insufficient Construction Documents

The forensic investigation revealed a severe absence of proper engineering documentation. David Valliere of Select Structural Engineering produced reports and letters that the White Birch Group deemed entirely insufficient for the scope of work. The available construction documents for the repair work conducted between 2020 and 2023 did not provide adequate details or specifications for a contractor to safely implement the necessary repairs.

Instead of providing detailed structural drawings, Valliere relied heavily on narrative descriptions. This documentation failure severely limited the ability of city inspectors to verify that the ongoing work matched the engineer’s intent. The White Birch Group stated that Select Structural Engineering submitted documentation containing multiple contradictions, questions, and improper assumptions regarding the composition of the structural system.

The engineering firm repeatedly misidentified the structural bearing wall as a nonstructural veneer. The west wall was a load-bearing composite brick masonry wall that supported the steel floor framing. By treating the wall as a simple veneer, the construction documents failed to mandate the heavy-duty shoring required to support the building’s weight during brick removal. The investigators concluded that Select Structural Engineering and Valliere violated the standard of care expected of professional engineers.

The Timeline of Failed Interventions

The timeline of repair attempts leading up to the collapse highlights a series of missed opportunities to stabilize the structure. In February 2023, masonry contractor Bi-State Masonry began work on the prescribed repairs along the west wall. By the end of the month, the workers discovered a large and dangerous void under the facade. A city code enforcer logged that the west wall appeared to have collapsed into the scaffolding.

Following this discovery, David Valliere conducted an emergency site visit on February 28, 2023. He observed that collapsed clay brick had piled up and was against the inside face of the wall. Valliere warned that the condition could soon cause a large panel of the facade to collapse. Even with this observation, he maintained that the damaged area was not an imminent danger to the entire building and its residents.

On March 3, 2023, Bi-State Masonry walked off the job. The contractor refused to continue after Andrew Wold rejected change orders for the unforeseen work required to safely address the void. A different masonry crew subsequently took over the project and completed a portion of the repairs by mid-May. The City of Davenport reportedly approved these completed repairs, and Valliere returned on May 23 for a further inspection. Five days later, the building collapsed.

Structural Miscalculations and Wythe Removal

The SOCOTEC and White Birch Group investigation provided exact specifications regarding the building’s original construction. The 1907 structure featured steel floor framing with interior steel columns and load-bearing brick masonry walls on the west facade. The brick masonry wall varied in thickness throughout the building’s height. The basement level contained six wythes of brick. The and second floors contained five wythes. The third through fifth floors contained four wythes, and the sixth floor contained three wythes.

The repair plan called for the removal of the outer brick. Because the professionals involved treated the wall as a nonstructural veneer, they failed to calculate the structural impact of removing these wythes. The load-bearing capacity of a composite masonry wall relies on the combined strength of all its wythes. When the contractors removed the outer courses of brick between May 26 and May 28, they drastically reduced the wall’s thickness and its ability to carry the vertical load of the upper floors.

The engineering analysis proved that this removal shifted the building’s weight onto the remaining, degraded inner wythes. This shift created an eccentric load, meaning the weight was no longer centered over the supporting wall. The resulting bending stresses overwhelmed the weakened masonry. The temporary shoring, designed only to hold up a nonstructural veneer, immediately failed when subjected to the true structural load of the building.

Improper Repair Techniques and Grossly Deficient Shoring

The physical execution of the repair work directly triggered the collapse. In the three days preceding May 28, 2023, masonry contractors worked on the western wall of 324 Main Street. Following the flawed guidance from Select Structural Engineering, the workers began removing sections of brick. The contractors removed multiple wythes of masonry simultaneously.

To compound this error, the temporary shoring installed by the contractors was grossly deficient. The White Birch Group analyzed pre-collapse photos and video evidence. They determined that the shoring did not comply with standard practices for supporting a load-bearing wall. The supports were limited, undersized, and entirely incapable of holding the building’s weight. The report stated unequivocally that had a proper shoring and construction phasing plan been implemented, the building would not have partially collapsed.

The absence of professional oversight during these final days proved fatal. No structural engineer was present on site to monitor the removal of the brick. The contractors proceeded with an unsafe, incomplete, and improper method. On May 28, 2023, at approximately 5: 00 PM, the compromised western bearing wall buckled under the eccentric load, bringing down a 56-foot wide by 22-foot deep section of the building.

20 Key Questions Answered Regarding Engineering Failures

1. Which engineering firm inspected the Davenport building before the collapse? Select Structural Engineering inspected the building.

2. Who was the lead professional engineer on the site? David Valliere was the lead engineer.

3. What date did the city release the forensic engineering report? The city released the report on September 7, 2023.

4. Which two firms authored the forensic report? White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering authored the report.

5. How much did the forensic investigation cost? The investigation cost $150, 000.

6. What structural element did the engineers misidentify? They misidentified a load bearing wall as a brick veneer.

7. Did the engineering firm recommend an evacuation? No, the firm explicitly stated an evacuation was not necessary.

8. When did Valliere conduct his inspection? He conducted his inspection on February 2, 2023.

9. What did Valliere document during his February 8 emergency visit? He documented a large void space behind the facade.

10. When did Valliere problem his final pre collapse report? He issued the final report on May 24, 2023.

11. What warning did the final report contain? The report warned that large patches of brick appeared ready to fall imminently.

12. Did the masonry workers use sufficient shoring? No, the shoring was grossly deficient.

13. Who filed a lawsuit against Select Structural Engineering in September 2023? Building owner Andrew Wold filed the lawsuit.

14. What did the forensic report identify as the root cause of the collapse? The report identified grossly deficient wall supports as the root cause.

15. Which masonry company worked on the western wall? Bi State Masonry worked on the wall.

16. Did the city rely on the engineering reports to keep the building open? Yes, the city relied on the stamped reports.

17. Who was the chief building official at the time of the inspections? Trishna Pradhan was the chief building official.

18. What state agency holds the authority to discipline licensed engineers? The Iowa Professional Licensing Bureau holds this authority.

19. How days before the collapse did the contractors begin removing brick? They began removing brick three days before the collapse.

20. What happened to the downward force when the brick wythes were removed? The wall buckled because the downward force had nowhere to go.

Select Structural Engineering Failures

On September 7, 2023, the City of Davenport released a $150, 000 forensic engineering report authored by White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering. The document details the precise mechanics behind the May 28, 2023 collapse at 324 Main Street. The investigation concludes that Select Structural Engineering and professional engineer David Valliere violated the standard of care. The forensic analysis points to multiple contradictions, improper assumptions, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the building structural system. The engineering firm repeatedly misidentified the western wall composition. This error directly led to the removal of load bearing brick wythes without sufficient temporary shoring.

The collapse killed Branden Colvin Sr., Ryan Hitchcock, and Daniel Prien. Quanishia Berry survived required a leg amputation on site. The ensuing legal and forensic scrutiny focuses heavily on the documentation provided by Select Structural Engineering in the months leading up to the disaster.

1. The Misidentification of the Load Bearing Wall

The SOCOTEC report identifies a primary engineering failure. Select Structural Engineering determined the repair plan required removing a section of the western wall to replace a brick veneer. The western wall did not feature a veneer. The wall stood as an integral load bearing section of the structure. The forensic engineers state that this misunderstanding led directly to the partial collapse.

Contractors from Bi State Masonry spent three days prior to the collapse removing sections of brick from the western wall. They operated under the assumption that they were removing non structural exterior brick. The removal of multiple wythes of masonry severely compromised the bearing wall. The forensic report states that the temporary stabilization methods specified by the design professionals did not consider that the western wall served as a structural load bearing element.

The failure to properly classify the wall composition represents a severe breach of engineering standards. The building relied on those specific brick wythes to transfer the weight of the upper floors to the foundation. When the masonry workers removed the bricks, the downward force had nowhere to go. The wall buckled and brought the upper floors down with it.

2. The February 2023 Inspection Reports and False Assurances

David Valliere conducted an inspection of the Davenport building on February 2, 2023. He issued a report to building owner Andrew Wold and the City of Davenport later that day. The document noted a localized area on the west exterior wall where brick had cracked and crumbled. Valliere wrote that the main takeaway from the inspection was that the damaged area did not pose an imminent danger to the entire building and its residents. He explicitly stated that an evacuation or lockout of the building was not necessary.

Valliere returned for an emergency visit a few days later. He filed another report on February 8, 2023. This document described a large void space where brick had collapsed within the wall. The collapsed brick put pressure on the facade. Valliere noted that this condition could soon cause a large panel of facade to collapse. He warned of a safety problem and the possible destabilization of the upper areas of brick facade. Even with these observations, Valliere maintained that the building was safe for occupancy. He advised that the damaged area could be safely removed and replaced in incremental sections to avoid local structural failures.

The forensic investigation highlights these reports as contradictory. An engineer cannot simultaneously document a large void space causing a facade to bulge and maintain that the structure poses no danger to residents. The SOCOTEC report states that the documentation contains multiple questions and improper assumptions. The city relied on these stamped engineering reports to keep the building open. Trishna Pradhan, the chief building official at the time, used the Select Structural Engineering assessments to determine that an evacuation was not required.

3. The May 2023 Pre Collapse Memos and Ignored Voids

The situation on the western wall worsened further throughout the spring of 2023. Valliere returned to the site on May 23, 2023. He issued his final report on May 24, 2023. This was just four days before the collapse. Valliere wrote that several large patches of clay brick facade were separating from the substrate on the west face of the building. He noted that these large patches appeared ready to fall imminently. He stated this condition might create a safety hazard to cars or passersby.

Valliere recommended techniques to stabilize the building with a steel column and other supports. He again failed to indicate that the building might collapse. He did not recommend evacuating the residents. The SOCOTEC report emphasizes that Select Structural Engineering underestimated the signs of distress. The building facade was bulging outward by several inches. An east west beam unloaded downward force on the exterior wall and visibly warped the window finishes.

Bi State Masonry contractors expressed serious reservations about the project scope. The workers noted that the job was significantly larger than initially quoted. The masonry company warned that a dangerous void had formed under the facade. They observed clay bricks falling between the facade and the interior brick face. This internal collapse put immense pressure against the outer wall and pushed it outward. Work stopped temporarily as the contractors alerted Wold and the city inspector about the escalating costs and dangers. Select Structural Engineering filed another report four days before the collapse. This report acknowledged the bulging windows failed to mandate an immediate halt to occupancy. The engineering firm advised on stabilization techniques maintained a tone that did not reflect the severe reality of a failing load bearing wall.

4. The Deficient Shoring Specifications

The SOCOTEC report identifies grossly deficient wall supports as the root cause of the collapse. The masonry workers used shoring that was limited and undersized for a load bearing wall. The forensic analysis of pre collapse photos and video evidence reveals that the shoring did not comply with standard practices for shoring procedures.

The report also states that the shoring did not even comply with the minimal specifications provided by Select Structural Engineering. The engineering firm failed to provide sufficient direction to the masonry contractors. When an engineer specifies a repair plan for a load bearing wall, the standard of care requires a detailed shoring and construction phasing plan. The forensic investigators state that had a proper shoring plan been implemented, the building would not have partially collapsed.

The absence of a detailed shoring plan left the masonry workers guessing. They installed scaffolding and minor supports that could never hold the weight of a six story building. The engineering firm held the responsibility to design a support system capable of carrying the load while the brick wythes were removed. The failure to do so directly resulted in the deaths of three men.

5. The Legal Aftermath and Cross Litigation

The catastrophic failure at 324 Main Street triggered a massive wave of litigation. Surviving residents and the families of the deceased filed multiple lawsuits against building owner Andrew Wold, the City of Davenport, and Select Structural Engineering. The lawsuits allege negligence, breach of contract, and wrongful death.

In September 2023, Andrew Wold filed his own lawsuit against Select Structural Engineering. Wold accuses the engineering firm of failing to identify the risk of a collapse. His lawsuit that Select Structural Engineering never opined that the defects in the west wall required an evacuation. Wold claims that the firm expressly stated the Davenport Hotel was not in danger of collapse. He that the collapse could have been prevented had Valliere performed his services in a non negligent manner.

The cross litigation highlights the reliance property owners place on licensed professional engineers. The city code enforcers also relied on the stamped reports. Richard Oswald, a city official, stated that an engineer report stamped by a licensed professional is a qualified report. The city deferred to Select Structural Engineering because Valliere held the state license.

The Iowa Professional Licensing Bureau holds the authority to investigate and discipline licensed engineers. The forensic findings from the SOCOTEC report provide a detailed roadmap of the specific standard of care violations. The legal proceedings determine the exact financial liability of Select Structural Engineering, the forensic reality remains clear. The engineering firm misidentified a load bearing wall, provided false assurances of safety, and failed to design a sufficient shoring plan.

Engineering Claims Versus Forensic Reality

The data shows a clear pattern of minimization. The engineering firm consistently downgraded the severity of the structural decay. The city and the building owner used these downgraded assessments to justify keeping the building open. The forensic report invalidates the engineering logic used by Select Structural Engineering and exposes the fatal consequences of violating the standard of care.

The 20 Key Questions Answered: Part 2

9. Who did Andrew Wold claim was performing the masonry work? Wold claimed licensed masons from Fuessel Masonry were on site.

10. How were the masonry workers actually paid? The workers were paid in cash by Alliance Contracting.

11. Which city inspector altered the inspection report after the collapse? Trishna Pradhan altered the report.

12. What was the original status of the May 25 inspection before it was altered? The original status was marked as passed.

13. When did the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation deliver its report to the Scott County Attorney? The agency delivered the report in April 2024.

14. Who refused to file criminal charges against the building owner? Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham refused to file charges.

15. When did the Iowa Public Information Board force the release of the state investigation? The board forced the release in May 2025.

16. What name did Andrew Wold adopt after fleeing Iowa? Wold legally changed his name to Andrew Michael Langel.

17. Where did the former building owner relocate? He relocated to Venice, Florida.

18. How much Scott County real estate did the owner sell off? He sold approximately $5 million in real estate.

19. Which city official admitted the municipality had no idea who was performing the masonry work? Rich Oswald made the admission.

20. What was the estimated repair cost before the wall collapsed? The repair cost jumped from $40, 000 to $50, 000.

The Illusion of Compliance and Fuessel Masonry

The May 28, 2023 collapse of the Davenport apartment building at 324 Main Street killed three residents and injured several others. The disaster triggered a massive state investigation. The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation delivered its findings to Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham in April 2024. Cunningham refused to file criminal charges. The state report remained hidden from the public until the Iowa Public Information Board forced its release in May 2025. The documents expose a trail of municipal negligence and deliberate deception by building owner Andrew Wold.

Wold had a history of ignoring city warnings. The city had penalized the building 19 times and issued $4, 500 in fines. Wold treated the fines as the cost of doing business. When the western wall began to visibly bulge, MidAmerican Energy refused to send crews near the building until the area was secured. Wold was forced to act. He initially hired Bi State Masonry, the contractor warned that a large void had formed under the facade. The repair cost jumped from $40, 000 to $50, 000. Wold then switched tactics to save money. He brought in his own people.

Days before the collapse, Wold met with city officials at the property. The western wall showed severe decay. City inspector Trishna Pradhan instructed Wold to use licensed masons. Wold told Pradhan and City Development Director Rich Oswald that the workers on site were licensed professionals employed by Fuessel Masonry. Fuessel Masonry is an established local contractor. The city officials accepted this claim without asking for proof.

The state investigation proved Wold lied. State agents tracked down the individuals who actually performed the work. Investigators interviewed a Spanish speaking man in Moline, Illinois. A 14 year old translator assisted with the interview. The worker confirmed that Wold used his own company Alliance Contracting to pay the crew in cash. The state found zero evidence that any of the workers held masonry licenses. Wold used unlicensed labor to execute a highly dangerous repair job.

Municipal Negligence and the Altered Report

The City of Davenport failed to verify the credentials of the workers. Rich Oswald admitted to state investigators that the municipality had no idea who was actually performing the masonry work. Oswald confirmed the city never checked if the workers were licensed. The city never contacted Fuessel Masonry to verify Wold and his claims. The municipal government allowed an unlicensed crew to perform structural repairs on a six story building.

The city had multiple opportunities to stop the work. Oswald knew Wold had a bad reputation. Oswald admitted to state investigators that his office was suspicious about whether Wold was using unlicensed workers to save costs. Even with these suspicions, Oswald and Pradhan did nothing. They walked the site on May 25. They saw the workers. They saw the crumbling wall. They accepted Wold and his verbal assurance. The failure to demand a simple license or a contract document from Fuessel Masonry directly led to the fatal errors.

The negligence continued after the building fell. On May 25, 2023, just three days before the disaster, Trishna Pradhan approved an inspection for the property. The city website listed the inspection status as passed. Pradhan went on vacation. The building collapsed on May 28. When Pradhan returned, she logged into the municipal system and altered the inspection record. She changed the status from passed to incomplete. The city initially blamed a computer glitch for the change. The state investigation firmly placed the blame on Pradhan. Oswald told investigators that the altered report made Pradhan look guilty. The mayor and the city attorney questioned whether Pradhan should be terminated.

The Fatal Errors in Shoring and Demolition

The unlicensed workers made catastrophic mistakes. The engineering firm Select Structural Engineering had prescribed a repair plan. Engineer David Valliere misidentified the western wall as a nonstructural veneer. The wall was actually a load bearing structure comprised of multiple wythes of brick. The workers followed the flawed guidance and removed multiple wythes of masonry. This action severely compromised the structural integrity of the building.

The workers used makeshift methods. They removed the brick without understanding the load route of the six story building. The building was constructed in 1907. It relied on composite wall behavior. The removal of the brick created eccentric loading and bending stresses that the remaining wall could not support. The workers placed temporary shoring that was completely deficient. The shoring consisted of undersized lumber. It was not anchored properly to the ground or the wall. The workers essentially removed the primary support of the building and replaced it with flimsy wood sticks.

The engineering report authored by White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering described the shoring as grossly deficient. The supports did not engage any masonry other than limited portions of the exterior wythe. The spacing of the shoring was insufficient for the amount of brick removed. The workers failed to restrain the shoring at the top interface with the wall and the bottom interface with the pavement. The report concluded that proper shoring would have prevented the collapse. The deaths of Branden Colvin Sr., Ryan Hitchcock, and Daniel Prien were entirely preventable.

On the day of the collapse, Wold visited a metal fabrication shop in Bettendorf to purchase scrap steel beams. He was looking at his phone when he received the news. He covered his mouth and told the shop workers he no longer needed the steel because the building just went down.

The Aftermath and Evasion

Wold actively avoided law enforcement after the disaster. State agents obtained a warrant to seize his phone in early June 2023. They tracked him to his mother in law and her house in Le Mars, Iowa. When an agent arrived, Wold fled inside the house and locked the door. He eventually surrendered the phone after speaking with his attorney.

Wold faced massive civil lawsuits demanding tens of millions of dollars in damages. He began liquidating his assets. Court records show Wold sold approximately $5 million of his Scott County real estate. Plaintiffs in the civil cases accused Wold of selling 20 of his 22 properties for less than market value to hide his money. Dayna Feuerbach, a resident of the building, filed the petition. She accused Wold of ignoring warnings, delaying repairs, and cutting corners to save money. Other residents joined the consolidated lawsuit. They petitioned the court to create a trust to hold Wold and his assets, arguing he was liquidating his real estate to prevent the victims from collecting damages. The plaintiffs eventually withdrew the petition for a court ordered trust after reviewing specific real estate transactions.

Wold then fled the state. In December 2024, Wold filed a petition in Sarasota County, Florida to legally change his name. The court granted the request in January 2025. Andrew Robert Lee Wold became Andrew Michael Langel. He relocated his family to Venice, Florida. He currently works as a licensed real estate agent in Florida under his new name. Even with the three deaths and the documented deception, the Scott County Attorney maintains that Wold committed no crime.

Asset Liquidation Chart

The following chart illustrates the rapid liquidation of Andrew Wold and his real estate portfolio in Scott County following the collapse.

Investigation Findings Data

The 20 Direct Answers Regarding the State Investigation

1. Who received the state investigation report in April 2024? Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham received the report.

2. Which agency conducted the criminal investigation? The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation conducted the inquiry.

3. When did the prosecutor announce her decision regarding charges? She announced her decision in February 2025.

4. Did the prosecutor file criminal charges against the building owner? She refused to file criminal charges.

5. How fatalities occurred during the May 2023 collapse? Three people died during the collapse.

6. How individuals suffered an amputation during the rescue? One person suffered a leg amputation.

7. What did the building owner attempt to purchase hours before the collapse? He attempted to purchase steel headers.

8. Where did the owner go to buy the steel reinforcements? He went to a Bettendorf metal fabrication shop.

9. What did the owner say when he canceled the steel order? He said the building just went down.

10. Which city employee altered an inspection document after the collapse? Chief Building Inspector Trishna Pradhan altered the document.

11. What was the original status of the altered inspection document? The original status was marked as passed.

12. What was the altered status of the inspection document? The altered status read incomplete.

13. Did the state investigation recommend criminal charges? The state report did not recommend criminal charges.

14. Why did the prosecutor refuse to release the full state report? She referenced safety concerns for the building owner and city officials.

15. Which state board reviewed the request to release the public records? The Iowa Public Information Board reviewed the request.

16. Who filed lawsuits to force the release of the documents? Dr. Ezra Sidran filed lawsuits to release the documents.

17. What equipment did the owner rent three days before the collapse? He rented a lift from Duke Rentals.

18. When was the apartment building originally constructed? The building was constructed in 1901.

19. Which official defended the owner by stating he acquired supplies to fix the wall? The Scott County Attorney defended the owner.

20. Which state department was named the lawful custodian of the investigation records? The Iowa Department of Public Safety was named the custodian.

The Delivery of the State Investigation Report

In April 2024, the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation delivered a 113 page forensic report to Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham. The document detailed the events leading up to the May 28, 2023, structural failure at 324 Main Street. The collapse resulted in three deaths and one leg amputation. The state agency investigated the root causes and the proximate causes of the disaster. The forensic engineering firms White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering assisted the state agents in compiling the technical data.

The state investigators identified multiple failures in the building maintenance and repair processes. The report listed specific technical deficiencies that caused the brick facade to detach from the internal structure.

State Investigation Findings on Structural Failures

The state report categorized the causes into root causes and proximate causes. The investigators found severe deficiencies in the wall system capacity and the shoring methods used during the repair attempts.

The Refusal to File Criminal Charges

In February 2025, Cunningham announced her decision regarding the state investigation. She refused to file criminal charges against Andrew Wold or any other party involved in the building maintenance. Cunningham stated the state report did not recommend criminal charges. She maintained that the structural failure did not meet the legal definition of a crime under state law.

Cunningham defended Wold during her public statements. She claimed the property owner actively sought to repair the building. She referenced communication logs showing Wold contacting businesses and acquiring supplies to brace the failing wall. The state investigation confirmed Wold visited a Bettendorf metal fabrication shop on the afternoon of May 28, 2023. He requested steel headers to reinforce the masonry. While looking at photos on his phone at the shop, Wold canceled the order and stated the building just went down.

The state agents also discovered Wold rented a lift from Duke Rentals three days before the disaster. He listed 324 Main Street as the job site and signed a one week contract extending through June 2, 2023. Cunningham used these actions to state Wold did not act with criminal intent. She categorized the event as a horrible tragedy rather than a criminal act.

Altered City Inspection Records

The state investigation uncovered actions taken by city employees immediately following the collapse. City Development and Neighborhood Services Director Rich Oswald admitted to state agents that Chief Building Inspector Trishna Pradhan altered an official inspection document. Pradhan inspected the building before the collapse and marked the framing inspection as passed. After the building fell, Pradhan accessed the city computer system and changed the inspection status to incomplete.

Pradhan resigned from her position in June 2023 amid public anger over the passed inspection. The state agents documented the altered records in their final report. Cunningham reviewed these findings determined the actions did not warrant criminal prosecution. The city administration called the altered record a computer glitch before Oswald admitted Pradhan made the changes manually.

The Secrecy Surrounding the State Report

Following her decision to decline charges, Cunningham refused to release the full 113 page state report to the public. She referenced safety concerns for Wold and city officials. Cunningham claimed individuals harassed Wold and made threats against him. She stated releasing the technical details would not settle the anger of the victims and their families.

The refusal to release the public records generated immediate legal action. Dr. Ezra Sidran filed Freedom of Information Act requests to obtain the documents. The Iowa Public Information Board reviewed the county attorney request to keep the report confidential. On May 15, 2025, the board ruled against Cunningham. The board named the Iowa Department of Public Safety as the lawful custodian of the records. The department subsequently released the full report to the public, exposing the altered city documents and the final actions of the property owner.

Timeline of the State Investigation and Legal Review

The state investigation began on June 1, 2023, at the request of Davenport city officials. Special Agent Ryan Kedley led the inquiry for the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation. The state agents interviewed witnesses, collected physical evidence from the rubble, and extracted data from the mobile phone belonging to Wold. Authorities used Cellebrite software to analyze the phone data before returning the device to the wife of the property owner.

The state agents completed their interviews and forensic analysis over a ten month period. They delivered the final compilation to Cunningham in April 2024. Cunningham held the document for ten months before announcing her decision in February 2025. During this ten month review period, the county attorney evaluated the difference between civil negligence and criminal liability under state law. She concluded that while the actions of the owner and the city inspectors might constitute civil negligence, they did not meet the statutory requirements for involuntary manslaughter or reckless endangerment.

The families of Ryan Hitchcock, Branden Colvin, and Daniel Prien expressed severe disappointment with the legal determination. The survivors, including Quanishia White Cotton Berry, continued their civil litigation against the property owner and the engineering firms. The civil lawsuits remain active in the state court system, relying heavily on the technical data uncovered by the state agents.

The Division of Criminal Investigation Report Secrecy

The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation completed a detailed criminal inquiry into the 324 Main Street collapse in April 2024. The 113 page engineering summary authored by White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering surfaced in August 2023. The full criminal investigation report remained sealed for over a year. Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham received the document to determine if building owner Andrew Wold committed indictable offenses. Cunningham announced in February 2025 that her office found no legal grounds to file criminal charges against Wold. She then refused to release the full investigative file to the public.

Cunningham referenced Iowa Code Chapter 22. 7 to justify the secrecy. This specific statute governs peace officer investigative reports. The law mandates the release of such documents unless disclosure plainly and seriously jeopardizes an ongoing investigation or poses a clear and present danger to an individual. Cunningham argued that releasing the document posed a clear and present danger to Wold and city officials. Wold received death threats following the collapse. Cunningham filed a petition with the Iowa Public Information Board in April 2025 to block the release of the records. The petition requested a declaratory order naming the Scott County Attorney as the lawful custodian of the report.

The decision to withhold the document sparked immediate backlash from the community. Relatives of the victims demanded transparency. Branden Colvin Sr., Ryan Hitchcock, and Daniel Prien died in the rubble. Quanishia White Cotton Berry survived the disaster required an emergency leg amputation. The families of the victims argued that the public deserved to know the exact sequence of events that led to the tragedy. They viewed the secrecy as a protective measure for city officials rather than a legitimate safety precaution for Wold.

The Iowa Public Information Board Mandate

Citizens and media organizations fought the suppression of the document. Jon Uhl and Ezra Sidran filed Freedom of Information Act requests to force the disclosure. Uhl manages the Whistle Davenport public records group. He created the Facebook group to serve as a central repository for documents related to the collapse. Sidran is a retired University of Iowa computer science professor. Randy Evans of the Iowa Freedom of Information Council joined the legal pressure campaign. They argued that withholding the document violated Iowa public records laws.

Sidran addressed the Scott County Board of Supervisors in April 2025. He reminded the board that the county previously paid a 93, 000 dollar settlement for illegally withholding public records in a separate case. He warned the supervisors that backing Cunningham would result in another costly legal defeat. Evans argued that since Cunningham officially closed the criminal case, the ongoing investigation exemption no longer applied. Evans also noted that Wold relocated to Florida, which nullified the clear and present danger argument.

The Iowa Public Information Board heard the arguments in May 2025. The board ruled against Cunningham on May 15, 2025. The mandate declared the Iowa Department of Public Safety as the lawful custodian of the Division of Criminal Investigation report. The ruling stripped the Scott County Attorney of the authority to keep the document hidden. The Department of Public Safety released the redacted case report and 2. 2 gigabytes of associated exhibits on May 30, 2025.

Altered Inspection Records and Unlicensed Labor

The unsealed document exposed severe administrative failures within the Davenport city government. The investigation revealed that City Inspector Trishna Pradhan altered an official inspection report after the building collapsed. Pradhan inspected the west wall on May 24, 2023. The original entry on the city portal showed the building passed the inspection. Pradhan left for a vacation the day. The building collapsed on May 28, 2023. Pradhan returned from vacation and changed the inspection status from passed to incomplete.

City Development and Neighborhood Services Director Rich Oswald admitted the alteration occurred during his interview with state investigators. Oswald told investigators the post collapse edit made Pradhan look guilty. He stated he would have fired her over the alteration. The city initially blamed the changed inspection status on a computer glitch before the state report exposed the manual edit. The city government issued a formal statement on June 1, 2025. The statement confirmed Oswald told state investigators he intended to terminate Pradhan.

The report also detailed the city government’s failure to verify the credentials of the masonry workers. Oswald and Pradhan met with Wold at the property on May 25, 2023. Pradhan informed Wold that the masons repairing the brick wythes needed proper licenses. Wold claimed his workers were licensed and employed by Fuessel Masonry. Oswald admitted to state investigators that city officials never verified Wold’s claims. The city had no idea if the individuals removing the load bearing bricks held valid licenses.

Ignored Warnings and Digital Forensics

The 2. 2 gigabytes of exhibits included digital forensics and witness testimonies. State investigators used Cellebrite software to extract data from Wold’s cellular devices. The report noted that Wold initially ran from investigators when they presented a warrant for his phones. Authorities eventually secured the devices, extracted the data, and returned the hardware to Wold’s wife. The extracted data provided a timeline of Wold’s communications with contractors and city officials.

The witness testimonies revealed that multiple individuals warned authorities about the imminent danger. A city worker picking up trash adjacent to the west wall noticed severe structural bowing on May 26, 2023. The worker phoned Tony Behncke to report the hazard. Behncke serves as the operations director at the Downtown Davenport Partnership. The warning occurred just two days before the collapse. The report indicates that no emergency evacuation orders followed the warning.

State investigators documented Wold’s actions in the hours leading up to the disaster. Wold stood in a Bettendorf metal fabrication shop on the afternoon of May 28, 2023. He showed shop workers photos of the crumbling west wall and requested emergency steel beams. Wold received a phone call while inside the shop. He then told the steel workers he no longer needed the materials because the building just went down.

The Owner’s Actions Following the Collapse

The unsealed records track Wold’s movements following the disaster. Wold fled the state of Iowa to avoid public scrutiny. He relocated to Florida and changed his name to Andrew Langel. Property records show Wold sold millions of dollars in Quad Cities real estate assets after the collapse. He liquidated 20 of his 22 properties in the region. Plaintiffs in the consolidated civil lawsuits allege Wold sold the properties market value to shield his assets from legal judgments.

The release of the Division of Criminal Investigation report provided the victims’ families with verified facts for their civil litigation. The consolidated lawsuit demands tens of millions of dollars in damages. The unsealed documents serve as primary evidence against the city government and the property owner. The public records confirm that regulatory oversight failed at multiple levels. The city permitted unlicensed workers to alter a load bearing wall. The chief inspector altered public records to hide the oversight failures. The county attorney attempted to bury the evidence of these failures under the guise of public safety.

Timeline of Legal Actions and Disclosures

The battle to unseal the state investigation involved multiple agencies and legal maneuvers. The chart details the sequence of events from the completion of the state report to its public release.

Key Figures in the Public Records Dispute

Engineering Findings Confirmed by State Investigators

The Division of Criminal Investigation relied heavily on the forensic engineering analysis provided by White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering. The state investigators incorporated the 113 page engineering summary into their final criminal assessment. The engineering firms identified the root causes of the disaster as deficient wall system capacity and grossly deficient temporary shoring. The state investigators cross referenced these engineering conclusions with the witness testimonies and digital forensics.

The engineering report documented the inherent weakness of the west wall. The original construction documents from 1907 contained insufficient detail regarding the composite brick structure. The state report confirmed that Wold and his contractors possessed an improper understanding of the building’s original construction. The contractors applied deficient repair techniques to the crumbling facade. They removed load bearing brick wythes without installing proper steel shoring to support the six stories of masonry above the work zone.

State investigators concluded that the deficient frequency and type of maintenance directly contributed to the structural failure. The building suffered from years of neglect. Water infiltration destroyed the mortar joints over several decades. The state report confirmed that Wold ignored the warnings of danger and delayed making the necessary repairs. The investigation proved that Wold attempted to cut costs by hiring unverified laborers instead of specialized structural engineers.

The Master Consolidated Petition: LACE 137119

The legal battles began mere days after the building fell. In June 2023, a Scott County judge ordered the City of Davenport to immediately halt demolition activity at the site. The plaintiffs requested this injunction to allow independent structural engineers to inspect the rubble, survey the materials, and preserve evidence. The city had rushed to clear the site, prompting the legal intervention. By December 29, 2023, the Iowa District Court for Scott County merged eight separate legal actions into a single Master Consolidated Petition under case number LACE 137119. This consolidation streamlined the discovery process and pretrial motions for dozens of displaced tenants and the families of the deceased. The petition names 19 distinct defendants. The defendants include property owners, engineering firms, masonry contractors, and municipal officials. The plaintiffs demand accountability for the May 28, 2023 collapse at 324 Main Street that killed three men and left one woman with an amputated limb.

The civil litigation serves as the primary avenue for justice. On February 4, 2025, Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham announced her office declined to file criminal charges against building owner Andrew Wold or city officials. Cunningham stated the evidence did not meet the legal standard required for criminal prosecution. The decision shifted all legal focus to the civil courts. The plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages for negligence, breach of contract, and intentional and reckless conduct. The legal teams representing the victims called the absence of criminal charges a travesty. They stated the civil courts represent the final opportunity to secure justice for the victims.

The Plaintiffs: Survivors and Estates Seeking Restitution

The consolidated lawsuit represents a broad coalition of victims. The plaintiffs include the estates of Ryan Hitchcock, Branden Colvin, and Daniel Prien. These three men died under the rubble of the west wall. Their families seek damages for wrongful death and gross negligence. The petitions detail the horrific final hours of the victims and the severe loss experienced by their surviving relatives.

Quanishia “Peach” Berry and her wife Lexus Berry stand as prominent plaintiffs in the litigation. Rescue workers amputated Peach Berry’s left leg above the knee to extract her from the debris after she spent eight hours trapped under the collapsed structure. The Berrys seek $50 million in damages. Their legal team stated they are prepared to take the case to a public jury trial if the defendants refuse to settle. Peach Berry requires a prosthetic leg for the rest of her life and faces extensive medical bills. Her daily life requires entirely new routines, and she suffers from severe psychological trauma related to the collapse.

Other plaintiffs include Dayna Feuerbach and dozens of displaced tenants. These individuals lost their homes, personal belongings, and livelihoods. Their filings accuse the defendants of ignoring clear warning signs and prioritizing financial gain over human life. The tenants demand compensation for lost property, relocation expenses, and emotional distress. residents escaped with only the clothes they wore on the day of the collapse.

The Defendants: Property Management and Contractors

The Master Consolidated Petition the entities responsible for the building’s maintenance and inspection. The primary defendants include:

Wold denies liability for the collapse. In September 2023, Wold filed a cross claim lawsuit against Select Structural Engineering. Wold claims the engineering firm never informed him that the building was in danger of collapse. Wold alleges the firm explicitly told him the structure remained safe for occupancy. Wold states that he relied entirely on the professional expertise of the structural engineers to identify defects and determine necessary repairs. The engineering firm denies these allegations and maintains they provided accurate assessments based on the visible conditions.

The Municipal Defendants: The Battle Over Qualified Immunity

The lawsuit also names the City of Davenport and three former municipal officials as defendants. The named officials are former City Administrator Corri Spiegel, former Chief Building Official Trishna Pradhan, and Director of Development and Neighborhood Services Richard Oswald. The plaintiffs allege these officials acted negligently and in an intentional and reckless manner. The petition claims the city inspectors examined the failing west wall failed to order an evacuation or post warning notices.

The city officials filed a motion to dismiss the claims. They qualified immunity under Iowa Code Section 670. 4A. On April 2, 2024, District Court Judge Mark Lawson delivered a mixed ruling. Judge Lawson granted qualified immunity to Corri Spiegel and dismissed the count against her. He denied qualified immunity for Pradhan and Oswald. Judge Lawson ruled that the law clearly required city officials to serve notice and post an order to vacate when a building poses a known danger. The judge determined the inspectors had a legal obligation to protect the tenants after observing the severe structural degradation.

The City of Davenport appealed Judge Lawson’s decision to the Iowa Supreme Court. The appeal automatically stayed all discovery in the case. The city’s legal team submitted a 56 page brief stating that the inspectors owed a duty to the general public rather than specific individuals. The city claims the inspectors did not violate clearly established statutory rights. The brief cites previous Iowa case law suggesting municipal inspectors do not have a special relationship with building occupants.

The Iowa Supreme Court scheduled oral arguments for October 7, 2025. In August 2025, Iowa Supreme Court Justice Thomas Waterman recused himself from the proceedings. Waterman previously worked for Lane and Waterman. This law firm currently represents the City of Davenport and the former city employees in the lawsuit. The recusal ensures the court maintains impartiality during the high profile hearing.

The Secret Settlement and Public Trust

The civil litigation exposed questionable financial decisions within Davenport City Hall. Following the collapse, Corri Spiegel departed her role as City Administrator. In late 2023, the public learned that the city paid Spiegel a $1 million settlement. The city allocated the funds for emotional pain and suffering caused by prolonged harassment from current and former elected officials. The city also paid Spiegel an additional $600, 000 for lost wages.

The city negotiated this settlement before the October 2023 municipal elections. Officials kept the agreement hidden from the public until after the ballots were counted. The city released the details the day before Thanksgiving. This payout generated intense public scrutiny. Two other city employees also received harassment settlements of $157, 000 and $140, 000. These financial agreements further damaged public trust as the displaced tenants continued to fight for compensation in the courts. Citizens demanded transparency regarding the internal operations of the municipal government.

The route Forward in Civil Court

The absence of criminal charges places the entire load of accountability on the civil justice system. The Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation completed a report on the collapse. Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham refused to release the document to the public. Cunningham stated the report remains confidential under Iowa Code Chapter 22. 7 due to the pending civil litigation. The decision prevents the public from reviewing the state’s official findings regarding the actions of the property owner and the city inspectors.

The plaintiffs continue to demand a public trial. The legal teams representing the victims want to present the internal communications, daily job reports, and inspection logs to a jury. The outcome of the Iowa Supreme Court hearing dictates whether the municipal inspectors face liability for their actions. If the court grants qualified immunity, the plaintiffs can only pursue damages from the private entities. The surviving tenants and the families of the deceased wait for the legal system to assign responsibility for the preventable disaster at 324 Main Street.

Asset Liquidation Tactics: The Sale of 20 Properties by Andrew Wold Investments Amidst 2024 Settlement Negotiations

In February 2024, plaintiffs representing the victims of the 324 Main Street collapse filed a petition in Scott County District Court detailing a massive sell off of real estate assets by former building owner Andrew Wold. The consolidated lawsuit alleged that Wold and his primary holding company, Andrew Wold Investments, sold 20 of their 22 Davenport properties in the months following the deadly May 2023 collapse. The legal filing stated that Wold liquidated these assets for less than market value. Plaintiffs claimed this represented a calculated effort by Andrew Wold Investments to empty its portfolio so that victims could not collect damages in a future settlement or jury verdict.

The corporate structure of Wold’s real estate empire complicated the recovery efforts. Wold operated multiple limited liability companies to hold different parcels of land. Davenport Hotel LLC held the deed to the collapsed building at 324 Main Street. Andrew Wold Investments held the deeds to dozens of other residential and commercial properties across the city. Village Property Management handled the day to day operations and collected the rent checks from the tenants. This compartmentalization allowed Wold to isolate the liability of the collapse to a single corporate entity.

When the plaintiffs filed their lawsuits, they named all the interconnected companies as defendants. The legal strategy aimed to prevent Wold from bankrupting Davenport Hotel LLC while keeping the assets of Andrew Wold Investments intact. The February 2024 court filing exposed the vulnerability of this strategy. By selling the properties held by Andrew Wold Investments, Wold converted the physical assets of the secondary companies into cash. The plaintiffs claimed this cash then became much harder to track and seize.

The speed of the property sales alarmed the legal teams representing the victims. Real estate transactions take months to negotiate, finance, and close. Wold managed to offload 20 properties in less than a year. The plaintiffs stated in their court filings that selling properties market value facilitated this rapid liquidation. Investors purchase distressed properties quickly when the seller accepts a lower price. The plaintiffs viewed the discounted sales as a direct tactic to drain the corporate accounts before a judge could intervene.

The February 2024 petition asked a judge to create a trust to hold the proceeds from the 20 property sales. Lawyers for the collapse survivors and the families of the three deceased men wanted to freeze the funds before Wold could move the capital out of Iowa. A court ordered trust would place a neutral third party in charge of the funds. Wold would lose access to the money until the conclusion of the class action lawsuit. This maneuver aimed to guarantee a financial recovery for the victims.

The effort to freeze the assets ended on April 21, 2024. The plaintiffs officially withdrew the petition for the court ordered trust. The withdrawal notice indicated the plaintiffs made this decision after reviewing specific real estate transactions related to the petition. The court records do not specify which transactions prompted the withdrawal. The withdrawal cleared the way for Wold to finalize the liquidation and move the capital out of the jurisdiction.

Property records confirm the rapid liquidation of the Andrew Wold Investments portfolio. Buyers purchased the property at 2631 North Main Street from Andrew Wold Investments for $120, 000 on April 16, 2024. Another buyer purchased the property at 317 Kirkwood Boulevard from Andrew Wold Investments for $117, 900 on April 3, 2024. These transactions occurred just days before the plaintiffs withdrew their trust petition. Wold had acquired of these properties years earlier under different corporate names.

The city of Davenport took minimal action to restrict Wold from selling his broader portfolio. Following the collapse, the city issued a $300 civil infraction citation against Wold for failing to maintain safe conditions at 324 Main Street. Wold pleaded guilty to the infraction and paid the $300 fine plus $95 in court costs. Davenport City Attorney Tom Warner stated the citation prevented Wold from transferring the 324 Main Street property to avoid paying for the demolition. The city placed no such restrictions on the other 20 properties owned by Andrew Wold Investments.

The city of Davenport faced intense scrutiny for its role in the property sales. The city possessed the authority to deliver nuisance violations and condemn properties. In January 2025, the city deemed another property managed by Village Property Management as substandard. The property at 307 North Harrison Street exhibited decayed foundations and structural failures. Village Property Management operated as one of the companies tied to Wold. Even with these known structural defects across the portfolio, the city did not intervene to stop the sale of the 20 properties.

The conclusion of the criminal investigation removed the final barrier to Wold leaving Iowa. The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation spent months analyzing the structural failures at 324 Main Street. The agency compiled a detailed forensic report and delivered it to Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham in April 2024. Cunningham reviewed the evidence to determine if Wold committed a crime. She concluded that the state could not prove criminal intent or criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. Cunningham announced that Wold would not face criminal charges.

Following the clearance from the county attorney, Wold executed his relocation strategy. He moved his residence from Iowa to Florida. Florida law provides extensive protections for personal assets against civil judgments. The state homestead exemption allows residents to shield the entire value of their primary residence from creditors. By moving the liquidated cash from Iowa to Florida, Wold gained a massive advantage in the ongoing settlement negotiations.

The final phase of the relocation involved a legal identity change. In December 2024, Wold filed a petition in Sarasota County, Florida. He asked the court to change his name from Andrew Robert Lee Wold to Andrew Michael Langel. The Sarasota County judge approved the petition and granted the name change in January 2025.

The new identity allowed Wold to reenter the real estate industry without the immediate stigma of the Davenport collapse. A public profile on Realtor dot com currently lists Andrew Michael Langel as a real estate agent in Venice, Florida. The profile indicates he holds an active license and membership in the National Association of Realtors. The victims of the 324 Main Street collapse continue to pursue their civil claims in Iowa while the former building owner sells real estate in Florida under a new name.

The class action lawsuit involves dozens of plaintiffs. The victims include the families of the three deceased men, the survivors who sustained severe injuries, and the tenants who lost all their personal property. The lawsuit names Andrew Wold, his various limited liability companies, the City of Davenport, former chief building official Trishna Pradhan, and current director of development Richard Oswald. The plaintiffs allege that all defendants shared responsibility for the structural failure.

The city defendants attempted to exit the lawsuit by claiming qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when performing discretionary functions. A district court judge denied the request for qualified immunity. The city appealed the decision to the Iowa Supreme Court. In November 2025, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that Pradhan, Oswald, and the City of Davenport do not have qualified immunity and must face the civil claims. The supreme court ruling ensured the city remained a primary target for financial damages.

The continued involvement of the city in the lawsuit reduced the financial pressure on Wold. With the city facing possible liability, the plaintiffs have a secondary source for settlement funds. Municipalities carry extensive insurance policies and possess the ability to levy taxes to pay judgments. The plaintiffs can pursue the city for damages even if Wold successfully shields his liquidated assets in Florida.

The plaintiffs must navigate a complex legal environment to recover the funds. They must track the cash from the 20 property sales across state lines. They must pierce the corporate veils of Andrew Wold Investments, Village Property Management, and Davenport Hotel LLC. They must challenge the asset protections provided by Florida law. The successful liquidation of the Iowa portfolio transformed a straightforward property liability case into a multi state financial chase.

Verified Data Chart: Timeline of Andrew Wold Asset Liquidation and Relocation

20 Questions Answered: The Davenport Collapse Legal Proceedings

The Davenport Hotel Collapse and Legal Accountability

On May 28, 2023, the west side of The Davenport Hotel collapsed. The six story apartment building failure killed three men and displaced dozens of residents. Following the disaster, victims and their families filed lawsuits against the building owner, Andrew Wold, and the City of Davenport. The litigation named former Chief Building Official Trishna Pradhan and Director of Development and Neighborhood Services Richard Oswald as defendants. The lawsuits allege that city officials failed to vacate tenants after inspecting the failing west wall.

The Davenport Collapse Verified Metrics 3 Fatalities 19 Nuisance Complaints (May 2022 to March 2023) 50 Displaced Tenants

District Court Rulings and Qualified Immunity Claims

The city defendants filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuits. They claimed protection under Iowa Code Section 670. 4A, which outlines qualified immunity for municipal employees. On April 2, 2024, District Court Judge Mark Lawson partially denied the motion. Judge Lawson ruled that former City Administrator Corri Spiegel was protected by qualified immunity and released her from the lawsuit. Yet, the judge denied immunity for Oswald and Pradhan. The ruling stated that the law required city officials to serve notice and post an order to vacate the premises.

The Iowa Supreme Court Appeals Process

Following the District Court decision, the City of Davenport, Oswald, and Pradhan filed an interlocutory appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court. The appeal halted all discovery in the lower court. On July 3, 2024, the Iowa Supreme Court signed an order allowing the appeal to proceed to briefing. Initial media reports incorrectly stated that the court denied qualified immunity at that time. The City of Davenport published a clarification on July 12, 2024, confirming that the July 3 order did not reach the substance of the appeal and maintained the stay on discovery.

Final Rulings on Common Law Negligence

The Iowa Supreme Court heard oral arguments in October 2025. On November 7, 2025, the court delivered a unanimous decision written by Justice Matthew McDermott. The court ruled that the qualified immunity provisions in Section 670. 4A do not apply to common law negligence claims against the City of Davenport and its employees. This ruling allows the consolidated lawsuits by the victims’ families and displaced residents to proceed against Oswald and Pradhan.

Investigative Reports and Settlements

Separate from the civil litigation against city officials, investigations examined the root causes of the collapse. The city partnered with White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering, identifying insufficient wall system capacity and insufficient shoring as primary factors. In April 2024, an investigative report was delivered to Scott County Attorney Kelly Cunningham. Cunningham determined that Wold cannot face criminal charges, classifying the event as a structural failure rather than a crime. In a separate legal matter, court records from October 2024 show that Wold reached a settlement in an assault lawsuit filed by Tyler Frick.

The 20 Key Questions Answered

1. What year did the city document severe violations at 324 Main Street? The city documented severe violations in 2020.

2. Which city official stated they were not afraid of closing the building down? Director of Development and Neighborhood Services Rich Oswald made that statement.

3. Did the city close the building down in 2020? The city did not close the building down.

4. Who reported bricks falling from the facade in August 2020? Assistant Fire Marshall Jim Morris reported the falling bricks.

5. How housing violations did Neighborhood Services compile in May 2021? The department compiled 74 housing violations.

6. Who ordered all inspections stopped on August 2, 2021? Rich Oswald ordered all inspections stopped.

7. What did residents report happening inside the building in 2021? Residents reported water leaking through the ceiling and down the walls to the ground.

8. How times did the city penalize the building in March 2022 for trash violations? The city penalized the building 19 times.

9. How much was the fine for the March 2022 trash violations? The fine was $4, 500.

10. What utility company refused to work near the building in February 2023? MidAmerican Energy refused to work near the building.

11. Why did the utility company refuse to work there? The company determined the southwest exterior brick wall had reached a dangerous point.

12. What did photographs from early February 2023 show? The photographs showed the exterior west wall buckling and bricks bulging outward.

13. What did Select Structural Engineering note on May 23, 2023? The firm noted large patches of clay brick facade separating from the substrate.

14. Which city inspector altered a report after the collapse? Chief Building Inspector Trishna Pradhan altered the inspection report.

15. What was the original status of the May 25 inspection? The original status was marked as passed.

16. What did the altered status say? The altered status said incomplete.

17. When did a contractor warn a Downtown Davenport Partnership employee about the unstable wall? The warning occurred on May 27, 2023.

18. How did city staff respond to the May 27 warning? City staff visited the property and took no immediate action.

19. What other property managed by Village Property Management faced code violations in January 2025? The property at 307 North Harrison Street faced violations.

20. What defects did inspectors find at the North Harrison Street property? Inspectors found interior moisture problems and structural failure of the foundation.

Chronology of Ignored Warnings and Photographic Evidence

The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation released a detailed report in June 2025 detailing the timeline of municipal oversight failures at 324 Main Street. The records show a steady drumbeat of code violations and inspection orders stretching back to 2016. City officials possessed photographic evidence of water infiltration and structural decay between 2016 and 2023. They received direct warnings from contractors and utility companies. They watched the property degrade in real time yet took no decisive action to evacuate the residents.

2016 to 2020: Early Signs of Water Infiltration and Severe Violations

The 2025 state investigation revealed that the city issued multiple official notices to vacate between 2016 and 2019. Photographs from this period show crumbling brick and failing mortar along the western elevation. The August 2023 White Birch Group and SOCOTEC Engineering report confirmed that improperly maintained composite clay brick masonry walls degrade over time due to water infiltration. The building ownership did not adequately address exterior maintenance requirements. This neglect compromised the integrity of the west elevation wall.

City records from early 2020 show a department preparing to inspect the building for a rental permit. A city inspector with the initials TCH wrote that the violations at the property were severe. TCH brought this to the attention of Director of Development and Neighborhood Services Rich Oswald. Oswald told the inspector he was not afraid of closing the building down and ordered the inspection to proceed. The inspection proceeded. The city did not close the building down.

In August 2020 Assistant Fire Marshall Jim Morris reported that bricks were falling from the building facade onto the sidewalk. He noted the wall above the sixth floor was coming loose. City officials met with the owner and contractors. They secured the wall with lumber. The city began including Andrew Wold in emails involving the building inspections during this time.

2021: The 74 Violations and Halted Inspections

Neighborhood Services compiled a list of 74 housing violations in May 2021. Photographs showed the brick wall beginning to fail. The city issued a Final Official Notice. None of the violations were fixed. Director of Neighborhood Services Rich Oswald ordered all inspections stopped on August 2, 2021. Tenants moved into apartments with open housing violations.

Widespread water leaks occurred throughout 2021. Residents reported water leaking through the ceiling and down walls all the way to the ground. One resident reported that a third floor bathroom flooded and stayed that way for multiple days. A business owner on the ground floor reported water leaking into their commercial space. The constant water infiltration accelerated the decay of the masonry walls. The water saturated the mass brick wall and caused the encased steel beams to rust. The rusting steel expanded and pushed the wall outward through a process known as rust jacking. This created a vicious pattern of accelerating decay.

2022: Overflowing Dumpsters and Blocked Exits

The city executed its largest enforcement action in March 2022. Trash filled the dumpsters and accumulated alongside them. The garbage blocked exits and piled up in the stairwell. The code enforcer logged the violations. The city penalized the building 19 times and levied a $4, 500 fine. Andrew Wold failed to appear in court for these violations.

Residents regularly contacted city code enforcers about problems in the building. Eighteen tenants complained that their heat did not work in the winter. The landlord distributed small space heaters to compensate. The elevators remained out of order. Windows and ceiling tiles were broken. Five complaints detailed the hot water being off for days.

February 2023: Utility Company Refusal and Photographic Proof

The situation on the western wall worsened significantly by early 2023. MidAmerican Energy issued a warning on February 2, 2023. The utility company stated the condition of the southwest exterior brick wall had reached a dangerous point. Utility crews refused to work in the area until the exterior had been shored up with scaffolding. The contracted engineering firm for the building owner claimed the defects were benign at the time.

City of Davenport inspectors visited the site in early February 2023. They took photographs depicting the aggressive and advanced state of decay. The structural instability of the exterior west wall was obvious. The photographs clearly depict the wall buckling under the load it is supporting. The bricks are visibly bulging outward. Chief Building Official Trishna Pradhan inspected the building on March 1, 2023. She wrote that the site was secure.

May 2023: The Final Days of Altered Records

The warnings grew increasingly urgent in May 2023. Engineer David Valliere of Select Structural Engineering visited the site on May 23, 2023. He noted large patches of clay brick facade separating from the substrate on the west face of the building. He wrote that these large patches appeared ready to fall imminently. He warned this could create a safety hazard to cars or passersby. He still determined that this was not an imminent threat to the building or its residents.

Trishna Pradhan inspected the building again on May 25, 2023. The city website originally marked this inspection as passed. A contractor warned a Downtown Davenport Partnership employee that the wall behind the building was unstable on May 27, 2023. The employee sent photos to city officials and placed a 911 call. City development staff visited the property. They concluded it was in about the same condition as earlier in the week. They took no immediate action.

The building partially collapsed on May 28, 2023. Trishna Pradhan altered the May 25 inspection report after the collapse. She changed the status from passed to incomplete. Rich Oswald later told state investigators that altering the report made Pradhan look highly suspicious. Pradhan resigned from her position shortly after the collapse.

January 2025: Continued Violations at Connected Properties

The pattern of ignored maintenance warnings continued into 2025. The City of Davenport inspected a property at 307 North Harrison Street on January 14, 2025. Village Property Management managed this property. This same company managed 324 Main Street at the time of the collapse. The company is tied to Andrew Wold.

The initial inspection report stated the code officer found no deficiencies needing immediate attention. Photos circulated on social media showing decayed conditions in the basement. The city made a return visit to view a separate basement area not disclosed during the inquiry. The city filed a Complaint Notice and Order to Village Property Management on January 23, 2025. The code officer listed multiple violations. These included a questionable electrical system and excessive accumulation of trash. The report noted a decayed foundation and structural failure of the building foundation. The inspector also documented an interior moisture problem. The city deemed the property substandard.