Judge Howard Shore: Public admonishment in San Diego in April 2025 for offensive comments

The California Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) executed a public admonishment against retired San Diego Superior Court Judge Howard H. Shore on April 3, 2025. This disciplinary order, which serves as a permanent mark on Shore’s judicial record, concluded that his conduct violated multiple canons of the Code of Judicial Ethics. The Commission found that Shore made “undignified, discourteous, and offensive comments” during criminal proceedings, specifically those involving the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). These remarks, according to the CJP, created a reasonable perception of bias against racial minorities.

Specific Allegations and Findings

The April 3 decree detailed specific instances of misconduct that occurred during Shore’s final years on the bench. The Commission focused heavily on Shore’s behavior during hearings related to the RJA, a law designed to allow defendants to challenge charges based on racial bias. The disciplinary report an exchange where Shore used the full “N-word” while posing a hypothetical scenario to an expert witness. Although Shore contended the usage was for illustrative purposes regarding dictionary definitions, the CJP ruled the language “gratuitous” and “offensive.” The Commission also sanctioned Shore for comments that questioned the validity of widespread racism in the justice system. The order noted that Shore expressed views suggesting “certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others” and dismissed statistical evidence of implicit bias. In one ruling by the Commission, Shore stated, “I reject any racial animus on the part of the officers,” a conclusion the CJP determined was made with an appearance of pre-judgment. These comments led to Shore’s disqualification from at least 19 cases after public defenders filed motions citing his inability to remain impartial.

Absence of Candor Regarding Prior Discipline

of the April 2025 admonishment addressed Shore’s dishonesty regarding his previous disciplinary record. In December 2023, the CJP issued a “severe public censure” against Shore for “dereliction of duty.” That 2023 censure established that Shore had been absent from the courthouse for 155 days between 2021 and 2022 without authorization, including missing every Friday for 18 months. The 2025 investigation revealed that Shore subsequently minimized these facts in meetings with San Diego County public defenders. The Commission found that Shore told supervising attorneys he “barely” took vacation and denied missing every Friday, statements the CJP classified as an “absence of candor.” The April 3 order emphasized that Shore’s attempt to downplay his prior misconduct aggravated the severity of the new discipline.

Jurisdictional Authority and Retirement

Shore vacated his position on January 23, 2025, ending a 35-year career. The Commission retained jurisdiction to discipline him under Article VI, Section 18(d) of the California Constitution, which permits the agency to adjudicate misconduct that occurred while a judge held office, even after they retire. The CJP’s decision to proceed with the admonishment post-retirement ensures the misconduct remains a matter of public record.

Timeline of Disciplinary Actions Against Howard H. Shore

Date	Action	Authority	Details
Dec 13, 2023	Severe Public Censure	CJP	for 155 days of unauthorized absence; missing every Friday for 18 months.
Jan 23, 2025	Retirement	San Diego Superior Court	Shore retires following reassignment to civil cases and disqualification motions.
April 3, 2025	Public Admonishment	CJP	for offensive RJA comments, use of racial slurs in hypotheticals, and dishonesty about 2023 censure.

Commission Voting and Rationale

The decision to problem the public admonishment was not unanimous regarding the severity, though the findings of misconduct were upheld. Commission members, including Chairperson Hon. Lisa B. Lench, Mani Sheik, Esq., and Mr. Alton L. Garrett, Jr., participated in the ruling. The Commission rejected Shore’s defense that his comments were intended to “engage in a meaningful exchange” about the law. Instead, the body determined that his statements “constituted gratuitous interjections” that undermined public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity. The order specifically noted that Shore’s misconduct was “significantly aggravated” by the fact that he was already under a severe public censure when of the behavior occurred or was discussed.

The Courtroom Incident: A “Gratuitous” Interjection

The centerpiece of the Commission on Judicial Performance’s (CJP) findings regarding Judge Howard H. Shore’s offensive conduct was a specific courtroom exchange involving the use of a racial epithet. On April 3, 2025, the Commission publicly admonished Shore, citing this incident as a primary example of “undignified, discourteous, and offensive” behavior that violated the Code of Judicial Ethics. The incident occurred during a hearing related to the California Racial Justice Act (RJA), a statute designed to address racial bias in the criminal justice system. Shore, who was presiding over the matter, engaged in a contentious debate with an expert witness on the nature of racial profiling and bias.

According to the Commission’s detailed report, Judge Shore presented a hypothetical scenario to the expert witness to challenge the premise that racial bias is widespread or predominantly directed at minorities by white individuals. In the course of this argument, Shore used the full “N-word.” The Commission’s investigation revealed that the usage was not part of reading evidence into the record or quoting a witness from a case at hand. Instead, it was a voluntary choice of words by the judge to illustrate a theoretical point about cross-racial animus. The CJP report explicitly labeled this usage as “gratuitous,” noting that the legal argument could have been communicated without articulating the slur. The use of such charged language by a presiding judge, in a hearing specifically convened to adjudicate claims of racial injustice, was found to create an atmosphere of hostility and insensitivity.

The Expert Witness’s Formal Complaint

The impact of Judge Shore’s language extended beyond the immediate courtroom shock. The expert witness involved in the exchange, whose professional testimony was central to the defense’s RJA motion, reported feeling deeply disturbed by the judge’s conduct. Following the hearing, the witness submitted a formal two-page letter to the court and defense counsel. In this document, the expert detailed the “visceral” discomfort caused by Shore’s casual use of the epithet and his aggressive dismissal of established sociological data on racism.

The letter argued that Shore’s conduct demonstrated a fundamental inability to preside impartially over cases involving the Racial Justice Act. The expert stated that the judge’s willingness to vocalize the slur in a professional setting, combined with his argumentative stance against the existence of implicit bias, signaled a pre-judgment of the problem. This written complaint became a serious piece of evidence in the Commission’s inquiry, substantiating the claim that Shore’s behavior was not a lapse in decorum a substantive barrier to the fair administration of justice. The Commission this reaction as proof that Shore’s comments had a tangible, negative effect on the participants in the legal process.

Shore’s Defense: The “Meaningful Exchange” Argument

In his response to the Commission’s preliminary investigation, Judge Shore vigorously defended his actions. He argued that his use of the epithet was not intended to offend to engage in a “meaningful exchange” with the expert witness. Shore contended that he was attempting to probe the boundaries of the expert’s definition of racism. His stated goal was to demonstrate that racial bias is not the exclusive domain of any single group and that minorities can also harbor racial prejudice against others. He claimed that articulating the word was necessary to lend weight and specificity to his hypothetical scenario involving inter-group conflict.

The Commission rejected this defense. In its final decision, the CJP clarified that while judges are permitted to question witnesses and test theories, they must do so with “patience, dignity, and courtesy.” The Commission found that Shore’s method of “engaging” the witness was combative and unnecessarily offensive. The decision emphasized that the “educational” value Shore claimed to be pursuing did not outweigh the harm caused by using a slur that is widely recognized as the most offensive in the American lexicon. The CJP concluded that a judge’s desire to win an intellectual debate with a witness does not grant license to use language that public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity.

Broader Context: The “Reverse Racism” Theory

The epithet incident was not an gaffe part of a broader pattern of remarks Shore made during RJA hearings. The Commission’s April 2025 admonishment highlighted that Shore frequently interjected his own personal views on race into legal proceedings. In the same hearing where the epithet was used, and in others like it, Shore openly challenged the legislative intent behind the Racial Justice Act. He expressed skepticism about the concept of widespread racism, at one point offering his own definition of “racism” to the court which included the concept of “reverse racism.”

Transcripts reviewed by the Commission showed Shore stating, “My understanding of the dictionary definition of racism is that it’s the unfair treatment of people belonging to a different race, so that anyone can be a racist, is that correct?” He then proceeded to that the RJA was flawed because it did not account for bias committed by minority police officers or victims. The Commission found these interjections to be “irrelevant” to the specific motions before him, which were focused on the defendants’ claims of bias in their specific prosecutions. By pivoting the discussion to “reverse racism” and the theoretical biases of minorities, Shore appeared to be litigating his own grievances with the law rather than adjudicating the facts of the case.

Judicial Disqualification and

The cumulative effect of the “gratuitous” epithet and the “reverse racism” arguments was a loss of confidence from the legal community. Following these incidents, the San Diego County Public Defender’s Office took the extraordinary step of seeking Shore’s disqualification from all Racial Justice Act cases. This effort was not symbolic; it led to a concrete legal ruling against Shore. In 2024, Orange County Superior Court Judge Cheri Pham, sitting by assignment to review the disqualification motions, ruled that Shore must be removed from hearing RJA matters.

Judge Pham’s ruling mirrored the CJP’s later findings. She determined that a person aware of the facts, specifically Shore’s use of the epithet and his comments on crime statistics, could “reasonably believe” that Shore held a bias against certain racial groups. She noted that his comments suggested a belief that “certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others” and that he would not fairly weigh statistical evidence of implicit bias. This disqualification stripped Shore of his ability to hear of the criminal docket, leading to his reassignment to civil cases prior to his retirement in January 2025. The April 2025 admonishment served as the final, public validation of the concerns raised by the expert witness and the defense bar.

Table: Timeline of Key Events in the “Gratuitous” Epithet Incident

Date	Event	Details
November 3, 2022	The Hearing	Judge Shore presides over an RJA motion in People v. Bonds. He with an expert witness, uses the “N-word” in a hypothetical, and promotes “reverse racism” theories.
Late 2022	Expert Complaint	The expert witness submits a two-page letter to the court expressing “visceral” discomfort and calling for Shore’s recusal from RJA cases.
December 2023	Public Defender Action	San Diego Public Defenders file motions to disqualify Shore from RJA cases, citing the epithet and other offensive remarks.
Mid-2024	Disqualification Ruling	Judge Cheri Pham grants the disqualification motions, ruling that Shore’s comments create a reasonable perception of bias. Shore is reassigned to civil court.
January 23, 2025	Retirement	Judge Shore retires from the bench after 35 years, amidst the ongoing CJP investigation.
April 3, 2025	Public Admonishment	The CJP problem a public admonishment, formally citing the use of the epithet as “gratuitous” misconduct.

Judicial Rejection of Legislative Findings

The April 3, 2025, public admonishment of Judge Howard H. Shore by the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) centered on his persistent refusal to apply the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) as intended by the state legislature. The Commission’s 11-page decision detailed a pattern where Shore did not interpret the law openly attacked its factual premises from the bench. Between 2021 and 2023, Shore presided over multiple hearings where he explicitly rejected the existence of widespread racism in the criminal justice system, a stance that directly contradicted the statutory language of Assembly Bill 2542.

The RJA, enacted to eliminate racial bias from criminal proceedings, relies on the legislative finding that implicit bias and widespread inequities influence judicial outcomes. Transcripts obtained by the Commission show that Shore frequently interrupted proceedings to dispute these findings. In a 2022 hearing, he stated on the record that he disagreed with the Legislature’s assessment of the justice system, asserting that the body had enacted laws without sufficient forethought. The CJP concluded that these comments violated Canon 2A, which requires judges to respect and comply with the law, and Canon 3B(4), which mandates patience, dignity, and courtesy.

The People v. Bonds Incident

A primary focal point of the investigation was Shore’s conduct during the November 3, 2022, hearing in People v. Bonds (Case No. M280282). The defendant sought relief under the RJA, arguing that racial bias played a role in a traffic stop. The statute allows for relief based on implicit bias, not just intentional discrimination. yet, Shore repeatedly conflated the two concepts and aggressively questioned the possibility of bias when the arresting officer was a minority.

According to the verified transcript, Shore asked the defense counsel, “Did you consider the race of the officer conducting the stop?” He then suggested that because the officer was not White, implicit bias against a Black defendant was implausible. This line of questioning ignored the expert consensus and legislative recognition that implicit bias operates independently of an individual’s conscious intent or racial identity. Shore concluded the hearing by stating, “I reject any racial animus on the part of the officers,” a ruling that the CJP found dismissed the core method of the RJA, implicit bias, before the evidence could be fully weighed.

“The statements I made during these various court hearings were my efforts to gain a greater understanding of the facts and the law and were in the furtherance of the discharge of my judicial duty to accurately apply the law to the facts as presented.”

, Judge Howard Shore, in a written response to disqualification motions (2024).

The Commission rejected Shore’s defense that he was “testing” the attorneys’ arguments. The decision noted that his commentary frequently veered into personal opinion that appeared to pre-judge the motions. By stating he did not believe the Legislature’s findings, he created a record that would lead a reasonable observer to doubt his impartiality. This was not a matter of legal interpretation a rejection of the law’s validity.

Conflict with Expert Witnesses

Shore’s skepticism of widespread racism escalated during interactions with expert witnesses. In People v. Spencer-Simmons (Case No. SCD283133), held on February 17, 2022, Shore engaged in a contentious exchange with Dr. Karen Glover, a sociologist and professor at California State University, San Marcos. Dr. Glover testified regarding the sociological definition of racism, which involves power and widespread structures, not just individual prejudice.

Shore interrupted Dr. Glover to against her definition. He posited a hypothetical scenario involving gang violence to suggest that minorities could be racist against each other, thereby attempting to the expert’s testimony on widespread power structures. During this exchange, Shore gratuitously used a racial slur (the “N-word”) to illustrate his point about inter-minority conflict. The Commission found that while Shore did not use the slur as a personal attack, his decision to vocalize the full word in a professional setting was “undignified, discourteous, and offensive.” More serious, the context of the usage, an argument to disprove the expert’s theory of widespread racism, demonstrated a deep-seated resistance to the evidentiary standards of the RJA.

Disqualification and Removal

The practical consequence of Shore’s denial of widespread racism was a mass filing of disqualification motions by the San Diego County Public Defender’s Office. Following his comments in Bonds and Spencer-Simmons, defense attorneys argued that Shore could not be impartial in any case involving the RJA. They Code of Civil Procedure section 170. 1, which mandates disqualification if a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

In a rare move, Orange County Superior Court Judge Cheri Pham was assigned to hear the disqualification motions after Shore refused to recuse himself. Judge Pham reviewed the transcripts and issued a ruling that validated the defense’s concerns. She found that a person aware of the facts “might reasonably entertain a doubt that Judge Shore is able to be impartial” in RJA hearings. Specifically, she noted that his comments suggested he believed “certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others” and that he would likely disregard statistical evidence of implicit bias.

Case Name & Number	Date of Incident	Nature of Denial	Judicial Consequence
People v. Spencer-Simmons (SCD283133)	Feb 17, 2022	Argued against sociological definition of racism; used racial slur in hypothetical to refute expert.	in CJP Admonishment; contributed to disqualification.
People v. Bonds (M280282)	Nov 3, 2022	Denied possibility of implicit bias by minority officers; rejected “racial animus” even with RJA focus on implicit bias.	Ruling overturned by appellate court; in CJP Admonishment.
People v. Baires (SCD295029)	2022 (Various)	Questioned validity of legislative findings on widespread racism; disputed crime statistics.	Shore disqualified from hearing RJA motion by Judge Pham.

Statistical Evidence Rejection

A of the RJA is the use of statistical data to demonstrate disparities in charging, sentencing, and policing. Shore’s comments revealed a fundamental rejection of this methodology. In one transcript by the Commission, Shore asserted, “There is absolutely no evidence that… the proportion of persons in an ethnicity committing a crime must be the same as the proportion of the population.” While statistically true that crime rates vary, the RJA uses these disparities as a starting point to examine bias in enforcement, not just commission.

By framing the argument this way, Shore shifted the load of proof back to a pre-RJA standard, requiring defendants to prove intentional discrimination rather than widespread. Judge Pham’s disqualification order specifically emphasized this point, noting that Shore’s stated views indicated he would “not give weight to statistical evidence” mandated by the statute. This pre-determination rendered him unfit to preside over RJA motions, as he had already decided that the primary evidentiary tool provided by the Legislature was invalid.

widespread Impact on San Diego Courts

The effect of Shore’s conduct extended beyond the individual cases. The San Diego District Attorney’s Office and the Public Defender’s Office were forced to re-litigate motions, causing delays in a court system already load by backlogs. The appellate courts eventually overturned Shore’s ruling in Bonds, sending the case back for a proper application of the law. The appellate panel found that Shore had “misunderstood the statute” and failed to address the “abundant evidence” of unintended bias.

The CJP’s April 2025 admonishment serves as a corrective measure, the damage to public confidence had already occurred. Shore’s open defiance of the Legislature’s findings on racism suggested to defendants of color that the courtroom remained a hostile environment, regardless of the laws passed to protect them. The Commission’s findings emphasize that a judge’s role is to enforce the law as written, not to debate its sociological merits or deny the legislative facts upon which it is based.

The “Spencer-Simmons” Doctrine

The central evidentiary pillar of the Commission on Judicial Performance’s (CJP) April 3, 2025, admonishment rests on a specific line of reasoning Judge Howard Shore advanced during a hearing in People v. Spencer-Simmons (Case No. SCD283133). On February 17, 2022, while presiding over a motion filed under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA), Shore explicitly challenged the legislative findings that underpin the statute. The RJA, codified as Penal Code section 745, asserts that implicit bias and widespread racism contribute to disparities in the criminal justice system. Shore rejected this premise from the bench.

According to the verified transcript in the CJP’s disciplinary order, Shore interrupted defense arguments to posit his own theory regarding incarceration statistics. He stated, “There’s a difference between correlation and causation.” He then dismantled the defense’s presentation of data showing Black defendants are disproportionately incarcerated relative to their population size. Shore argued, “The question is ‘Disproportionate to what?’ And they say ‘Well, to their representation in the population.’ And that’s without regard to whether there’s any evidence that the proportion of persons in an ethnicity committing a crime must be the same as the proportion of the population.”

This statement, implying that incarceration disparities exist because specific racial groups commit crimes at higher rates than others, became the focal point of the misconduct investigation. The CJP found that Shore used his judicial platform to advance a personal theory that directly contradicted the law he was sworn to enforce. By suggesting that “certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others,” Shore created a presumption of guilt based on group identity, negating the RJA’s purpose before the defense could even present its case.

Rejection of Legislative Fact

The Commission’s investigation revealed that Shore did not question the statistics; he attacked the legitimacy of the Racial Justice Act itself. During the same February 2022 hearing, Shore characterized the Legislature’s conclusion on widespread racism as “inaccurate.” He issued a challenge to the courtroom, stating: “I ask people ‘If you really believe that [racism exists in widespread form], I challenge you to take a notebook and go from courtroom to courtroom and watch the proceedings and take notes of everything that you think is being done that is racist and I would like to know what the results are.'”

This “notebook challenge” demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding or willful ignorance of the concept of implicit bias, which the RJA specifically. Implicit bias, by definition, is frequently invisible to a casual observer and operates through subconscious associations. Shore’s demand for visible, overt racism as proof of the RJA’s validity imposed an evidentiary load that the statute was expressly designed to remove. The CJP noted that this conduct violated Canon 2A, which requires judges to respect and comply with the law. Shore’s comments suggested he had already determined the RJA was based on a falsehood.

The Disqualification Ruling

The legal consequences of Shore’s assertions materialized long before the CJP’s final admonishment. In 2024, the San Diego County Public Defender’s Office, led by Deputy Public Defender Abram Genser, filed motions to disqualify Shore from hearing RJA cases. They argued that a judge who believes minorities are more prone to criminality cannot fairly adjudicate motions regarding racial bias. Due to the sensitive nature of the allegations, the disqualification motion was assigned to an outside jurist: Judge Cheri Pham of the Orange County Superior Court.

Judge Pham’s ruling provided a devastating judicial critique of Shore’s conduct. In her decision, she applied the objective standard of whether a “person aware of the facts” would doubt the judge’s impartiality. Pham concluded that Shore’s comments in Spencer-Simmons and subsequent cases created a fixed appearance of bias. She wrote that a reasonable person could believe Shore “believes certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others and that he not give weight to statistical evidence that indicates there is an implicit bias against certain racial or ethnic groups.”

This ruling stripped Shore of his jurisdiction over RJA matters. Following Judge Pham’s decision, Shore was disqualified from presiding over People v. Parrish Chambers, People v. Rahman Taylor, and People v. Herbert Howell. The San Diego Superior Court eventually shut down the department Shore oversaw, redistributing his caseload. The disqualification served as a verified judicial finding that Shore’s “crime rate” theory constituted a legal inability to be fair.

Statistical Context and Defense Rebuttal

Shore’s assertion regarding racial crime rates ignored the extensive data presented by defense attorneys during these hearings. The Public Defender’s Office submitted reports from the California Department of Justice and academic studies demonstrating that arrest rates frequently reflect policing strategies rather than commission rates. For example, data frequently shows that while Black and White individuals use drugs at similar rates, Black individuals are arrested for drug offenses at significantly higher rates. Shore’s refusal to engage with this nuance, and his insistence on a direct correlation between incarceration and crime commission, demonstrated a “closed mind” on the subject.

Table 4. 1: Conflict of Doctrine , California Legislature vs. Judge Howard Shore

Authority	Core Premise	Stance on Statistics
CA Legislature (PC § 745)	Implicit bias and widespread racism drive disparities in the justice system.	Statistical disparities are valid evidence of chance bias in charging and sentencing.
Judge Howard Shore	“Certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others.”	Rejected disparities as proof of bias; demanded proof of “causation” over correlation.
Judge Cheri Pham (Ruling)	Shore’s comments create a “reasonable belief” of fixed bias.	Shore’s refusal to weigh statistical evidence necessitated his disqualification.

The “Testing the Waters” Defense

Throughout the CJP investigation, Shore attempted to reframe his comments as a pedagogical tool. In his response to the preliminary investigation, he argued that his statements were not expressions of personal belief rather attempts to “engage in a meaningful exchange with the attorneys” and to “test” the strength of their legal arguments. He claimed he was playing devil’s advocate to ensure the RJA motions were strong.

The Commission rejected this defense. The April 2025 admonishment noted that the tone, frequency, and specific content of the remarks went beyond Socratic questioning. A judge “testing” an argument does not declare the legislative basis of the law to be “inaccurate” or challenge the existence of widespread racism based on personal anecdotes. The CJP found that his comments were “undignified, discourteous, and offensive,” and that they “gratuitously” injected his personal views into the proceedings. The persistence of these comments across multiple cases, Spencer-Simmons, Barshel, and Bonds, established a pattern of conduct rather than an attempt at rigorous debate.

Impact on the “Minority Officer” Argument

Shore’s skepticism of widespread bias extended to the identity of the arresting officers. In People v. Barshel (June 30, 2022) and People v. Bonds (November 3, 2022), Shore challenged defense motions by suggesting that racial bias could not exist if the police officer involved was also a minority. He asked, “Do you think the race of the officer is relevant?” and “I reject any racial animus on the part of the officers.”

This line of questioning further alienated the defense bar and contradicted the RJA’s framework, which focuses on the result of the interaction and the widespread factors at play, not the conscious intent or racial identity of the individual officer. By implying that a minority officer is incapable of enforcing a biased system, Shore again substituted his personal sociological theories for the statutory requirements of the Penal Code. This specific refusal to acknowledge the complexity of implicit bias contributed to Judge Pham’s conclusion that Shore could not be entrusted with RJA matters.

Commission’s Final Determination

The CJP’s April 3, 2025, order concluded that Shore’s conduct regarding these assertions violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3, 3B(8), and 4A. The Commission found that his “minorities commit more crimes” assertion was not a legal ruling a manifestation of bias that “demeaned the judicial office.” The order emphasized that while judges possess the discretion to interpret the law, they do not have the license to denigrate the legislative findings that created the law. Shore’s retirement in January 2025 did not mitigate the need of the public admonishment, as the record required correction to uphold public confidence in the judiciary’s impartiality.

The April 2025 admonishment heavily weighed Shore’s prior disciplinary record. The Commission issued a “severe public censure” in December 2023 for unauthorized absences. Shore missed 155 days of work between May 2021 and November 2022. He was absent nearly every Friday for 18 months without notifying the presiding judge. This pattern of truancy occurred while he continued to collect his full judicial salary. The Commission viewed the 2025 misconduct as a continuation of ethical disregard.

The “Ghost Judge” Investigation

The 2023 censure resulted from a meticulous internal investigation initiated by San Diego Superior Court Presiding Judge Michael T. Smyth. Court staff reported difficulty engaging Shore due to his frequent unavailability. They noted his status appeared as “Off” on the Court Activity Calendar for nearly every Friday, yet no Judicial Absence Requests (JARs) existed to authorize these leaves. Smyth, alongside Assistant Presiding Judge Maureen Hallahan, reviewed objective data to verify Shore’s physical presence.

The investigation used three primary data points to reconstruct Shore’s attendance:

• Proximity Card Logs: Records of when Shore used his security badge to enter secure areas.
• Garage Access Data: Times and dates his vehicle entered or exited the courthouse parking structure.
• Chambers Telephone Activity: Logs of outgoing calls made from his judicial chambers.

The data revealed a clear reality. Shore was not present in the courthouse on a single Friday between May 28, 2021, and November 18, 2022. The 155 unauthorized absences exceeded his allotted vacation time by 87 days. During these periods, he did not seek approval from the presiding judge, a violation of California Rules of Court which require authorization for any absence of one-half day or more.

Financial of Truancy

Shore continued to receive his full judicial salary throughout the 18-month period of delinquency. At the time, a Superior Court judge in California earned approximately $232, 000 annually. The San Diego County Public Defender’s Office later calculated the cost of these absences to taxpayers. Deputy Public Defender Jeremy Thornton estimated the value of the unearned salary between $82, 000 and $146, 000. In court filings, the Public Defender’s Office argued that accepting pay for work not performed amounted to theft under the Penal Code, though no criminal charges were filed.

Metric	Investigative Finding
Total Unauthorized Absences	155 Days (May 2021 , Nov 2022)
Friday Attendance	0% (Absent every Friday for 18 months)
Vacation Overlimit	87 Days beyond authorized limit
Salary Status	100% Collected ($232, 000/year approx.)
Disciplinary Outcome	Severe Public Censure (Dec 2023)

Defenses and “absence of Candor”

When confronted by Presiding Judge Smyth in December 2022, Shore initially denied the extent of his absenteeism. He claimed he “barely” took vacation and did not regularly take Fridays off. He later amended this stance, admitting he traveled to Los Angeles on weekends to assist his son and daughter-in-law with a sick grandchild. Shore also his observance of Orthodox Judaism, stating he could not drive on the Sabbath (Friday sundown to Saturday sundown) and thus left early to avoid traffic.

The Commission rejected these justifications as valid excuses for unauthorized absence. The 2025 admonishment specifically highlighted Shore’s “absence of candor” regarding these events. In December 2023, just days before the censure was public, Shore met with Public Defender Katherine Braner and Chief Deputy Alternate Public Defender Megan Marcotte. He attempted to explain his situation to the defense bar leadership. During this meeting, Shore omitted the fact that he missed every Friday and that his absences totaled 155 days. He framed the problem as leaving early for “a couple of years,” minimizing the severity of his conduct to garner sympathy.

Impact on 2025 Admonishment

The Commission the 2023 censure as a “significantly aggravating factor” in the April 2025 decision. The CJP operates on a progressive discipline model. Shore’s history of “dereliction of duty”, a phrase used in the 2023 order, established a pattern of placing personal convenience above judicial obligations. The 2025 investigation found that Shore not only violated the Code of Judicial Ethics through his comments on the Racial Justice Act also demonstrated a persistent inability to adhere to the high standards of integrity required of the bench. The misrepresentations to Braner and Marcotte proved that even after facing censure, Shore continued to distort the truth regarding his attendance record.

Judicial Reaction and Retirement

The severity of the 2023 censure, one step removal, signaled the end of Shore’s viability as a criminal judge. Following the censure, he was reassigned from criminal court to a civil department handling cases under $25, 000. This demotion removed him from the high- felony trials where his RJA comments had caused disruption. Shore retired in January 2025, three months before the CJP issued its final public admonishment. The Commission retains jurisdiction to discipline judges after they leave the bench to ensure a complete public record of misconduct.

The 2023 censure remains a permanent stain on the San Diego Superior Court’s history. It exposed a absence of oversight in judicial attendance and forced the court to implement stricter reporting. For Shore, the 155 days of unauthorized absence served as the foundation for the finding in 2025: that his conduct, both in attendance and in speech, failed to promote public confidence in the judiciary.

The following section details the forensic accounting and procedural timeline regarding Judge Howard Shore’s unauthorized absences and the subsequent financial.

The “Friday Ghost” Protocol

Between May 28, 2021, and November 18, 2022, the San Diego Superior Court’s Department 25 operated on a four-day week. Judge Howard Shore was not present in the courthouse for a single Friday during this 18-month period. These absences were not logged in the court’s official payroll system, nor were they authorized by the Presiding Judge. The Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) determined that Shore missed a total of 155 days in 2021 and 2022. This figure exceeded his allotted vacation time by 87 days.

The method of absence was simple: silence. Shore did not submit leave slips. He did not inform court administration. He continued to draw his full judicial salary, which in 2022 was approximately $229, 000 annually. When confronted, Shore claimed the absences were necessary to visit an ill granddaughter in Los Angeles. He his observance of Orthodox Judaism, which prohibits driving on the Sabbath (Saturday), as the reason he had to leave San Diego on Fridays. The Commission rejected this as a valid excuse for undisclosed, paid absenteeism, noting that he failed to seek the required administrative approval for such a significant schedule adjustment.

Financial: The “Theft” Calculation

The San Diego County Public Defender’s Office, led by Katherine Braner and Megan Marcotte, conducted an internal audit of Shore’s attendance after noticing the pattern. Their filings described the conduct as a misappropriation of public funds. While the Commission on Judicial Performance stopped short of criminal referrals, the defense bar’s language was explicit.

“This conduct is not theft as defined by the Penal Code only in a technical sense. It represents a substantial transfer of taxpayer resources to a public official for work that was neither performed nor authorized.”

The financial breakdown reveals the of the unearned income. Based on the standard judicial work year (250 days) and the 2022 salary data, the daily rate for a Superior Court judge is approximately $916. The 87 days taken in excess of his vacation allowance amount to roughly $79, 692 in direct unearned salary. When factoring in the full 155 days, of which were taken without the required advance notice, the figure rises to over $140, 000. This calculation does not include the cost of court staff, bailiffs, and clerks who were underused on Fridays, or the widespread cost of delayed case processing.

The Disqualification Wave

The of Shore’s absences triggered a procedural emergency in the San Diego criminal courts. Defense attorneys began filing mass disqualification motions under California Code of Civil Procedure section 170. 1, arguing that a judge who flagrantly violates the law cannot be trusted to enforce it. The Public Defender’s Office filed statements of disqualification in at least 19 separate homicide and felony cases.

Metric	Count/Detail
Disqualification Motions Filed	19+ (Primary Wave)
Key Ruling Authority	Judge Cheri Pham (Orange County)
Basis for Removal	“Insensitive language” & Reasonable doubt of impartiality
Outcome	Removed from multiple Racial Justice Act cases

The local bench recused itself from ruling on these disqualification motions to avoid conflicts of interest. The Judicial Council assigned Orange County Superior Court Judge Cheri Pham to adjudicate the matter. In a decisive ruling, Judge Pham disqualified Shore from hearing cases involving the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). She his “insensitive language and comments” as grounds for a reasonable person to doubt his impartiality. This ruling stripped Shore of his ability to preside over of his criminal docket, leading to his eventual reassignment to civil court before his retirement in January 2025.

The “absence of Candor” Meeting

A serious aggravating factor in the April 2025 admonishment was Shore’s attempt to manage the. On December 4, 2023, nine days before his public censure was announced, Shore requested a private meeting with Public Defenders Braner and Marcotte. During this meeting, he attempted to explain his absences.

The CJP found that Shore displayed a “absence of candor” during this interaction. He minimized the extent of his misconduct, implying the absences were sporadic or administrative oversights. He did not disclose that he had missed every single Friday for 18 months. He also failed to mention that his absences exceeded his vacation balance by nearly three months. The Commission viewed this meeting not as a good-faith apology, as a strategic attempt to preempt the public defender’s reaction to the pending censure. This misrepresentation became a central pillar of the 2025 admonishment, proving that the misconduct extended beyond absenteeism to active deception of officers of the court.

Intersection with Racial Justice Act Rulings

The data on Shore’s absences correlates with a specific period of judicial activity regarding the Racial Justice Act. While working a truncated schedule, Shore issued rulings that dismissed or minimized claims of racial bias in the criminal justice system. Transcripts from this period show him questioning the existence of widespread racism and using inflammatory hypotheticals involving racial slurs.

In one hearing, while discussing the RJA, a law specifically designed to address implicit bias, Shore argued with an expert witness about whether a minority police officer could harbor bias, asking, “Do you think the race of the officer is relevant?” In another instance, he suggested that statistical disparities in incarceration rates were not evidence of bias rather an indication that “certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others.”

These comments, made during the same weeks he was collecting a full salary for a four-day workweek, created a compound ethical violation. He was neglecting his duties on one hand while actively undermining the legislative intent of the RJA on the other. The juxtaposition of his “theft” of time and his rigid, frequently hostile interpretation of justice for minority defendants formed the core of the public admonishment.

Timeline of Escalation

• May 2021: Shore begins taking unauthorized Fridays off.
• June 2022: Shore makes controversial comments during People v. Barshel, criticizing the Legislature.
• November 2022: Presiding Judge Smyth confronts Shore; the Friday absences cease.
• December 2023: Shore receives a “Severe Public Censure” for the absences.
• April 2024: Judge Pham disqualifies Shore from RJA cases.
• January 2025: Shore retires from the bench.
• April 3, 2025: CJP problem Public Admonishment for offensive comments and absence of candor.

The December 4 Summit

The genesis of the “absence of candor” charge traces back to a strategic meeting Shore initiated on December 4, 2023. Facing an imminent public censure for his attendance record, Shore contacted Katherine Braner, the Chief Deputy and Acting Public Defender, and Megan Marcotte, the Chief Deputy of the Alternate Public Defender. He requested an urgent audience, offering to travel to their offices rather than summoning them to his chambers. The Commission’s investigation revealed this was a calculated preemptive strike intended to manage the of his upcoming discipline and preserve his ability to hear criminal cases.

During this 45-minute session, Shore presented a narrative centered on personal tragedy. He detailed the medical condition of his granddaughter in Los Angeles and invoked the memory of a stillborn daughter to explain his need for travel. He told the defense leaders that his absences were a result of leaving early on Fridays to observe the Sabbath and assist his family. He explicitly characterized the disciplinary problem as a failure to file the correct “leave slips” and a bureaucratic misunderstanding regarding vacation time.

Anatomy of the Deception

The Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) ruled that Shore’s explanation to the Public Defender’s leadership was a “minimization of facts” so severe it amounted to an ethical breach. While Shore admitted to “leaving early,” he omitted the serious reality that he had been absent for 155 full days over an 18-month period. He failed to disclose that he had not appeared at the courthouse for a single Friday between May 28, 2021, and November 18, 2022.

More damning was his omission regarding his interactions with court leadership. Shore did not inform Braner or Marcotte that he had previously lied to Presiding Judge Michael Smyth and Assistant Presiding Judge Maureen Hallahan. When confronted by Smyth in late 2022, Shore had insisted he “barely took any vacation” and “definitely did not take every Friday off”, statements the Commission later proved were objectively false. By concealing these lies from the Public Defender’s Office, Shore presented a sanitized version of his misconduct, framing it as a procedural error rather than a pattern of dishonesty and wage theft.

Table 7. 1: The gap , Shore’s Narrative vs. Commission Findings

Shore’s Statement to Public Defenders (Dec 2023)	Commission Findings & Reality (April 2025)
“I left early on Fridays for religious observance.”	Shore was absent for 155 full days, including every Friday for 18 months. He was not “leaving early”; he was not working.
“I failed to file the proper paperwork/leave slips.”	Shore exceeded his available vacation time by 87 days. This was not a paperwork error; it was unauthorized absence while collecting a full salary.
(Omitted)	Shore lied to Presiding Judges Smyth and Hallahan in 2022, claiming he was working in chambers when he was actually in Los Angeles or elsewhere.
“My absences did not impact anyone.”	Court staff reported Shore was “difficult to engage” due to absences. His unavailability forced other judges to cover his docket, disrupting court operations.

Institutional Betrayal and

The deception had immediate professional consequences. When the full text of the severe public censure was released on December 13, 2023, just nine days after the meeting, the Public Defender’s Office realized the extent of Shore’s misrepresentation. The between Shore’s emotional appeal and the documented facts in the censure order eroded the remaining trust between the bench and the defense bar.

Following this, attorneys from the Public Defender’s Office filed statements of disqualification against Judge Shore in at least 19 separate criminal cases. These motions, filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 170. 1, specifically his “absence of candor” during the December 4 meeting. The defense argued that a judge who minimizes his own misconduct to avoid professional repercussions cannot be trusted to adjudicate cases fairly or weigh the credibility of witnesses. The Commission upheld this view, stating that Shore’s conduct violated Canon 1 (integrity of the judiciary) and Canon 2A (promoting public confidence).

“Judge Shore’s express representations, omissions, and minimization of the facts… constituted a absence of candor. Honesty is a minimum qualification for a judge.” , Commission on Judicial Performance, Decision and Order, April 3, 2025.

The Aggravating Factor

The Commission noted that this absence of candor served as a “significantly aggravating factor” in the April 2025 admonishment. While the underlying absences had already been addressed in the 2023 censure, the act of lying about them to officials created a new, distinct ethical violation. It demonstrated a refusal to accept full responsibility even after agreeing to a stipulated discipline. By attempting to manipulate the narrative with the Public Defender’s leadership, Shore compounded his original misconduct, transitioning from administrative negligence to active deceit.

This pattern of behavior contributed to the Commission’s conclusion that Shore’s conduct was “undignified” and “offensive.” The attempt to use a personal family tragedy as a shield to obscure the magnitude of his professional dereliction was viewed as particularly egregious. The April 2025 order stands as a permanent record that Shore not only abandoned his post also attempted to mislead the legal community about the nature of his departure.

The Friday Ghost: Anatomy of 155 Unauthorized Absences

The “Little Girl” defense did not emerge in a vacuum; it was a calculated response to a volume of irrefutable data compiled by court administrators. Before Judge Howard Shore invoked the tragic memory of his deceased daughter, investigators had already established a pattern of absenteeism that the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) later classified as a “dereliction of duty.” The foundational misconduct involved Shore’s physical absence from the San Diego Superior Court for 155 days between 2021 and 2022. Specifically, investigators found that Shore was not present in the courthouse on a single Friday between May 28, 2021, and November 18, 2022.

Court records indicate that the investigation began when staff reported difficulty engaging Shore due to his frequent unavailability. Presiding Judge Michael T. Smyth initiated a review of objective access data, including proximity card usage, courthouse garage entry logs, and chambers telephone activity. This digital trail dismantled any chance claim that Shore was working a standard schedule. The data revealed that Shore’s absences exceeded his allotted vacation time by 87 days. When initially confronted by Judge Smyth and Assistant Presiding Judge Maureen Hallahan on December 1, 2022, Shore denied the extent of the problem, insisting he “definitely did not take every Friday off” and claiming he “barely” took any vacation. This initial denial set the stage for the more elaborate emotional and religious defenses that would follow.

The December 4 Summit: A Preemptive Strike

On December 4, 2023, nine days before the CJP would problem its Severe Public Censure, Shore attempted to manage the through a direct appeal to the leadership of the San Diego County Public Defender’s Office. Shore requested an urgent meeting with Katherine Braner, the Acting Public Defender, and Megan Marcotte, the Chief Deputy of the Alternate Public Defender. In a break from protocol, Shore traveled to Braner’s office rather than summoning the attorneys to his chambers, signaling the personal and desperate nature of the visit.

During this 45-minute meeting, Shore deployed what would become known as the “Little Girl” defense. He disclosed that his son, residing in Los Angeles, had a child suffering from serious medical conditions. Shore connected this current family emergency to a past trauma, revealing that his wife had previously given birth to a stillborn daughter. According to the CJP’s April 3, 2025, report, Shore explicitly told the public defenders he could not “let another little girl die.” He used this emotional narrative to explain his weekly travel to Los Angeles, framing his Friday absences not as a dereliction of duty, as a life-saving intervention for his granddaughter.

Shore paired this medical defense with a religious justification. He explained that as an observant Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited from driving on the Sabbath (Shabbat), which begins at sundown on Friday. He argued that to reach his family in Los Angeles before sundown, he was forced to leave the court early on Fridays. He characterized this routine to Braner and Marcotte as leaving early for “a couple of years” without notifying administration, minimizing the reality that he was absent for entire days, not just afternoons.

Deconstructing the Defense: Sympathy vs. Candor

The Commission on Judicial Performance dismantled Shore’s defense strategy in its 2025 findings, distinguishing between the validity of his family’s medical struggles and the dishonesty of his professional conduct. While the Commission did not dispute the medical reality of his granddaughter’s condition or the tragedy of his stillborn daughter, it ruled that Shore weaponized these facts to obscure the scope of his misconduct. The CJP found that Shore’s comments were “an attempt to garner sympathy and minimize his actions.”

The core failure of the “Little Girl” strategy was the element of deception. Shore’s narrative to the public defenders omitted serious facts that he had already stipulated to in private disciplinary proceedings. He did not inform Braner and Marcotte that he had missed 155 full days. He did not disclose that he had exceeded his vacation cap by nearly three months. Instead, he presented a curated version of events where a devoted grandfather was forced to cut corners for a dying child. The Commission noted that Shore “downplayed and minimized his misconduct” even after the censure was imminent, demonstrating a “absence of candor” that violated judicial canons requiring integrity and honesty.

Table 1: The gap , Shore’s Narrative vs. CJP Findings

Defense Element	Shore’s Claim to Public Defenders (Dec 2023)	Verified CJP Findings (April 2025)
Frequency of Absence	“Leaving early” on Fridays; denied taking every Friday off.	Absent every single Friday from May 28, 2021, to Nov 18, 2022.
Total Time Lost	Claimed he “barely” took vacation time.	155 unauthorized days; exceeded vacation limit by 87 days.
Justification	“Cannot let another little girl die” (Medical/Trauma).	Medical problem real, used to mask procedural violations and absence of authorization.
Religious Context	Sabbath driving restrictions required early departure.	Did not explain why he failed to file Form J-13 or seek permission for religious accommodation.

The Procedural Void: Form J-13 and Judicial Leave

The failure of Shore’s defense also hinged on bureaucratic mechanics. California judges are not independent operators; they are subject to strict administrative rules regarding leave. The standard procedure requires the submission of a “J-13” affidavit or similar leave request forms to the Presiding Judge for any absence exceeding half a day. Shore’s defense collapsed because he never attempted to use the legal method available to him. He did not request Family Medical Leave (FMLA). He did not request a modified schedule to accommodate his religious travel needs. He simply.

Investigators found that Shore continued to collect his full judicial salary during these unauthorized absences. Defense attorneys later calculated that the unearned wages amounted to between $82, 000 and $146, 000. One attorney argued in court filings that “it was hard to imagine a world where this is not theft as defined by the Penal Code.” Shore’s “Little Girl” defense failed to address this financial aspect. By framing the problem purely as a humanitarian emergency, he ignored the administrative reality that he was being paid by taxpayers to be in a courthouse he was not inhabiting.

Impact on the Bench and Public Trust

The strategic deployment of the “Little Girl” narrative backfired, serving as an aggravating factor in the April 2025 admonishment. The CJP viewed the December 2023 meeting not as an act of transparency, as a continuation of the deception. By presenting a distorted version of the facts to the Public Defender’s Office, Shore attempted to manipulate the very lawyers who appeared before him. This eroded trust within the legal community. Following the of the full extent of his absences and the subsequent RJA comments, the Public Defender’s Office filed 19 separate motions to disqualify Shore from hearing Racial Justice Act cases. The “Little Girl” defense, intended to humanize the judge and secure professional courtesy, instead provided further evidence of a judicial officer unable to separate personal tribulation from professional obligation.

In his final correspondence regarding the matter, Shore maintained that his actions were misunderstood. He categorically rejected the Public Admonishment as “unjustified” and argued that the CJP accepted “misleading and inaccurate conclusions.” Yet, the verified data remains: 155 days absent, zero Fridays present for 18 months, and a defense strategy that the state’s highest judicial oversight body ruled was deceptive. The invocation of a deceased child, while tragic, could not the gap between the sympathy Shore sought and the accountability the public demanded.

The Intervention of Orange County Superior Court

In a procedural move that exposed deep fissures within the San Diego Superior Court’s ability to self-regulate, the disqualification of Judge Howard H. Shore from Racial Justice Act (RJA) cases required the intervention of an external jurist. By early 2024, the San Diego bench faced a cascade of disqualification motions filed by the Public Defender’s Office against Shore. These motions alleged that Shore’s on-record comments regarding race, crime statistics, and police bias demonstrated a disqualifying prejudice. The local bench proved unable or unwilling to adjudicate these claims against a colleague who had served since 1990. Consequently, the Judicial Council assigned Orange County Assistant Presiding Judge Cheri Pham to review the motions. Her subsequent ruling in April 2024 did not remove Shore from individual cases; it judicially validated the defense bar’s contention that Shore harbored views incompatible with the impartial administration of the Racial Justice Act.

The Collapse of Local Recusal method

The standard procedure for a disqualification motion under California Code of Civil Procedure section 170. 1 involves the challenged judge either consenting to recusal or filing a verified answer contesting the bias allegations. If the judge contests the motion, a neutral judge must decide the problem., this neutral judge is selected from the same county. In the Shore matter, the volume and severity of the allegations created a widespread conflict. The San Diego Public Defender’s Office, led in these efforts by Deputy Public Defender Abram Genser, filed at least 19 separate requests to remove Shore. The allegations were not limited to a single outburst a pattern of “undignified, discourteous, and offensive comments” spanning multiple hearings. The San Diego bench recused itself en masse, acknowledging that local judges could not avoid the appearance of conflict when ruling on the impartiality of a peer they had worked alongside for decades. This necessitated Judge Pham’s appointment, stripping the San Diego court of jurisdiction over its own internal conduct standards.

Evidentiary Basis: The Transcripts

Judge Pham’s ruling relied on certified transcripts from Shore’s courtroom, which captured his resistance to the legislative intent of the RJA (AB 2542). The RJA, enacted in 2020, allows defendants to challenge convictions or charges if they can demonstrate that racial bias played a role in their case, utilizing statistical data to show impact. Shore’s comments during these hearings frequently attempted to refute the premise of the law itself. In her review, Judge Pham specific statements that would cause a “person aware of the facts” to reasonably doubt Shore’s impartiality.

The “Proportionality” Argument

One of the central pieces of evidence involved Shore’s rejection of statistical data showing racial disparities in arrest and incarceration rates. During a hearing, Shore stated:

“There is absolutely no evidence that… the proportion of persons in an ethnicity committing a crime must be the same as the proportion of the population.”

Judge Pham determined that this statement indicated a predisposition to believe that certain racial groups are inherently more prone to criminality than others. By asserting this view from the bench, Shore appeared to prejudge the validity of statistical evidence before it was even fully presented or analyzed by experts. This directly contradicted the RJA’s mandate, which specifically validates the use of population-level statistics to prove widespread bias.

The “Minority Officer” Fallacy

In another set of transcripts reviewed by Pham, Shore questioned whether racial bias could exist if the arresting officers were themselves minorities. In People v. Bonds and People v. Barshel, Shore challenged defense counsel with questions such as: * “Do you think the race of the officer is relevant?” * “Did you consider the race of the officer conducting the stop?” Shore’s line of questioning implied that a minority officer is incapable of enforcing widespread racist policies or harboring implicit bias, a legal and sociological fallacy that the RJA explicitly rejects. Judge Pham found that these comments suggested Shore would not give weight to evidence of implicit bias if the involved officers were not white, thereby narrowing the scope of the law based on his personal theories rather than the statute’s text.

Judge Pham’s Legal Findings

Judge Pham issued a 16-page order granting the disqualification motions. Her ruling was grounded in the objective standard of “appearance of bias” rather than a finding of actual malice. She concluded that Shore’s remarks created a factual basis for disqualification under CCP 170. 1(a)(6)(A)(iii).

Summary of Judge Pham’s Disqualification Findings

Shore’s Comment/Action	Judge Pham’s Legal Interpretation	Impact on Impartiality
Stated no evidence exists that crime rates should match population demographics.	Suggests a belief that certain racial groups commit more crimes than others.	Prejudges statistical evidence required by the Racial Justice Act.
Questioned relevance of implicit bias when officers are minorities.	Indicates a misunderstanding or rejection of the concept of widespread/implicit bias.	Signals refusal to apply RJA standards to non-white officers.
Used the “N-word” in a hypothetical argument with an expert.	Described as “insensitive language” and “gratuitous.”	Creates a hostile environment and reasonable doubt of fairness.
Criticized the Legislature for passing the RJA without “thinking it through.”	Evidence of personal disagreement with the law he is sworn to uphold.	Undermines confidence that he enforce the statute as written.

Judge Pham explicitly noted that while Shore argued his comments were meant to “engage in a meaningful exchange” with attorneys, the effect of his words was to signal a closed mind. She wrote that a reasonable person would believe Shore ” not give weight to statistical evidence that indicates there is an implicit bias against certain racial or ethnic groups.”

Procedural Impact and Case Reassignments

The immediate effect of Judge Pham’s ruling was the removal of Judge Shore from specific, high- cases. The ruling directly affected People v. Parrish Chambers (Case No. SCD295029), People v. Rahman Taylor (Case No. SCD274478), and People v. Herbert Howell (Case No. M283989). In the Chambers case, the defendant was Black, and the defense argued that the District Attorney’s office had refused a plea deal comparable to one offered to a similarly situated white defendant. Shore’s removal allowed these motions to be heard by a judge who had not expressed skepticism regarding the existence of widespread racism. Following the ruling, the San Diego Superior Court leadership removed Judge Shore from the criminal division entirely. He was reassigned to the civil division, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to quarantine him from cases involving the RJA and criminal defendants. This administrative reshuffling, yet, did not moot the disciplinary process that was already underway with the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP).

Defense Strategy and the “Changed “

The Public Defender’s Office, particularly the unit handling RJA motions, utilized a “fan-out” strategy to document Shore’s bias. Rather than treating his comments as incidents, they aggregated transcripts from multiple hearings to demonstrate a coherent worldview that conflicted with the law. Defense attorney Danielle Iredale noted that Pham’s ruling “changed the ” of criminal defense in San Diego. Prior to this, challenging a sitting judge for bias based on their judicial philosophy or courtroom comments was viewed as a high-risk, low-reward maneuver. Pham’s order established that judges could be held accountable for “gratuitous interjections” that revealed deep-seated prejudices, even if those prejudices were framed as intellectual debate.

Shore’s Response and “absence of Candor”

In his verified answers to the disqualification statements, Shore attempted to minimize his conduct. He argued that his comments were taken out of context and that he was playing “devil’s advocate” to test the strength of the attorneys’ arguments. He categorically denied harboring any racial animus. yet, Judge Pham’s ruling, and the subsequent CJP investigation, found these explanations unconvincing. The CJP later noted that Shore’s defense frequently involved “misrepresentations, omissions, and minimization of the facts.” For instance, regarding his use of the N-word, Shore claimed it was necessary to make a point about the definition of racism. Judge Pham and the CJP rejected this, labeling the usage as “undignified” and “unnecessary.” The disqualification also intersected with Shore’s previous disciplinary problem. While Judge Pham stated that Shore’s prior “severe public censure” for absenteeism (missing 155 days of work) was not the primary basis for her ruling, the defense argued that the absenteeism and the offensive comments were both symptoms of a judge who had ceased to respect his office or the litigants before him.

Validation by the CJP

Judge Pham’s April 2024 ruling served as a judicial precursor to the CJP’s April 2025 public admonishment. The Commission’s final report heavily referenced the same incidents that Pham had adjudicated. By independently verifying that Shore’s conduct warranted disqualification, Pham provided the CJP with a judicial finding of fact that strengthened the case for permanent discipline. The admonishment the “reasonable perception of bias” standard that Pham had applied, codifying her recusal order into the state’s disciplinary record against Shore. The ruling stands as a rare example of a judge from one county formally declaring a judge from another county unfit to hear a specific class of cases due to bias, signaling a shift in how the California judiciary handles resistance to the Racial Justice Act.

The Coordinated Legal Strike

The San Diego Public Defender’s Office (PDO) executed a decisive legal maneuver against Judge Howard H. Shore, filing 19 separate statements of disqualification under California Code of Civil Procedure section 170. 1. This statute allows attorneys to move for a judge’s removal “for cause” if their impartiality can reasonably be questioned. Unlike the peremptory challenges allowed under section 170. 6, which permit a one-time automatic removal without stating a reason, a 170. 1 motion requires a detailed, sworn statement of facts proving specific bias or incapacity. The filing of 19 such motions in rapid succession represented a widespread vote of no confidence from the county’s primary defense agency.

Chief Deputy Public Defender Katherine Braner and Chief Deputy Alternate Public Defender Megan Marcotte led this initiative. Their declarations did not cite procedural grievances; they targeted Shore’s fundamental fitness to preside over cases involving the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). The motions argued that Shore’s courtroom conduct revealed a deep-seated hostility toward the very laws he was sworn to enforce, specifically those designed to rectify racial disparities in the criminal justice system. The sheer volume of these filings created an immediate administrative bottleneck, forcing the Superior Court to bring in an outside jurist to adjudicate the claims.

The “absence of Candor” Meeting

A central pillar of the disqualification motions was a private meeting Shore requested with PDO leadership on December 4, 2023. According to the filings, Shore summoned Braner and Marcotte to his chambers to discuss his impending public censure for absenteeism. During this meeting, Shore attempted to frame his 155 days of unauthorized absences as a minor administrative misunderstanding. He claimed he “barely” took vacation and that his absences had no impact on court operations. He failed to disclose that he had been absent every single Friday for nearly 18 months, a fact he had already admitted to the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) in a stipulation signed weeks earlier.

The motions argued that this behavior demonstrated a “absence of candor” and a willingness to manipulate facts, even when speaking to officers of the court. Braner and Marcotte’s declarations detailed how Shore minimized his misconduct, presenting a version of events that directly contradicted his sworn admissions to the CJP. This gap became a potent legal weapon. The defense argued that if a judge could not be truthful about his own disciplinary record with senior attorneys, he could not be trusted to fairly adjudicate facts in criminal trials. This specific allegation moved the problem beyond judicial philosophy into the of personal integrity.

Hostility Toward the Racial Justice Act

The core of the 19 motions rested on Shore’s on-the-record comments regarding the Racial Justice Act (AB 2542). The RJA allows defendants to challenge convictions if they can prove that racial bias, explicit or implicit, played a role in their prosecution. The motions detailed multiple instances where Shore openly disparaged the law and the legislature that passed it. In one hearing, Shore characterized the RJA as a form of “affirmative action” for criminals, a statement the defense as proof of an inability to apply the law neutrally.

The filings highlighted a specific exchange where Shore argued with an expert witness regarding the definition of racism. During this “hypothetical” argument, Shore gratuitously used the full N-word in open court. While Shore later claimed he was making a philosophical point about whether minorities can be racist, the CJP and the defense bar viewed it differently. The motions argued that the use of such a charged racial epithet by a sitting judge, regardless of context, shattered the appearance of impartiality. The witness involved in the exchange later submitted a letter stating she was so disturbed by the incident that she believed Shore should not hear RJA cases.

Further transcripts in the motions showed Shore rejecting the premise of widespread racism entirely. In one ruling, he stated he did not believe police officers stopped Black defendants due to implicit bias, adding, “I don’t see that evidence here at all,” before the evidence had been fully presented. He also suggested on the record that statistical disparities in incarceration rates existed because “certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others.” The PDO argued that this statement alone constituted a prejudgment of every RJA motion that would come before him, as it explicitly rejected the statistical evidence the law mandates judges to consider.

The Ruling by Judge Cheri Pham

Because the motions challenged a San Diego judge, the Judicial Council assigned Orange County Superior Court Judge Cheri Pham to hear the disqualification proceedings. This external review ensured neutrality. Judge Pham’s ruling validated the Public Defender’s concerns. She granted the disqualification in the majority of the challenged cases, issuing a decision that reinforced the of Shore’s comments.

Judge Pham wrote that a “person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that Judge Shore is able to be impartial.” She specifically his comments suggesting that minority groups commit more crimes, noting that such a belief is fundamentally incompatible with the RJA’s requirement to weigh statistical evidence of bias. Judge Pham found that Shore’s “insensitive language” and his “gratuitous interjections” created a reasonable perception of bias. This ruling was not a finding that Shore was a racist, rather a legal determination that his conduct had destroyed the necessary appearance of neutrality required by the Due Process Clause.

Allegation in Motion	Shore’s Defense	Judicial Finding (Judge Pham/CJP)
Racial Bias: Shore stated “certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others.”	Claimed he was citing FBI statistics and engaging in “meaningful exchange.”	Sustained: Comments create a reasonable doubt regarding impartiality in RJA cases.
Offensive Language: Gratuitous use of the N-word during a hearing.	Argued it was a “hypothetical” to test an expert’s definition of racism.	Sustained: Use was “undignified, discourteous, and offensive.”
absence of Candor: Misled PDO chiefs about the severity of his absenteeism censure.	Denied misleading them; claimed he was explaining his personal situation.	Sustained: Shore “minimized” his misconduct and violated ethical canons on integrity.
Prejudgment: Stated the legislature “didn’t think” the RJA through.	Asserted his right to criticize legislation.	Sustained: Comments indicated he would not follow the law as written.

widespread Paralysis and Reassignment

The practical effect of 19 simultaneous disqualification motions was the immediate paralysis of Shore’s criminal calendar. In the San Diego Superior Court, where judicial resources are finite, having a judge blocked from hearing nearly two dozen active felony cases created a logistical nightmare. Each motion required a written response from the judge (which Shore provided, categorically denying the allegations) and a review by an outside judge. This process consumes weeks, during which the underlying criminal cases remain frozen.

The success of the motions signaled to the court administration that Shore could no longer function in a criminal department. If the Public Defender’s Office intended to file a 170. 1 motion in every RJA case assigned to him, the court would face a perpetual pattern of litigation over the judge rather than the defendants. Facing this reality, the Presiding Judge reassigned Shore to a civil department. This transfer removed him from the RJA cases that had sparked the revolt also served as a tacit admission that his credibility in the criminal division had been irreparably damaged.

Shore’s “Categorical” Rejection

Throughout the disqualification process, Judge Shore maintained a stance of defiance. In his verified answers to the motions, he “categorically rejected” the accusations of bias. He characterized the PDO’s coordinated filing as a “bad-faith attack” designed to judge-shop rather than address legitimate legal grievances. He argued that his comments were being taken out of context and that his “hypotheticals” were standard judicial inquiry. Shore insisted that his history of 35 years on the bench proved his dedication to fair justice.

Even after his retirement in January 2025, Shore continued to dispute the findings. In a statement to legal news outlets, he denied that his conduct violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He attributed the CJP’s adverse findings to a misunderstanding of his intent. Yet, the record stands: the 19 motions achieved their objective. They documented a pattern of behavior that two independent bodies, the CJP and Judge Pham, found to be inconsistent with the standards of the California judiciary. The motions did not just remove him from specific cases; they created the evidentiary record that underpinned his final public admonishment.

The Strategic Exit: January 23, 2025

Judge Howard H. Shore officially concluded his 35-year tenure on the San Diego Superior Court bench on January 23, 2025. This retirement occurred just months before the California Commission on Judicial Performance issued its final public admonishment. Legal analysts and court insiders viewed the timing as a calculated maneuver to preempt further disciplinary escalation. The Commission retains jurisdiction over former judges for conduct that occurred while they were active. Shore faced a mounting pile of evidence regarding his courtroom conduct. His departure allowed him to secure his pension benefits while avoiding the chance ignominy of removal from office. The Commission proceeded with its investigation regardless of his status. This persistence ensured that the misconduct became a matter of permanent public record.

Post-Retirement Admonishment: April 3, 2025

The Commission released its Decision and Order Imposing Public Admonishment on April 3, 2025. This document finalized the disciplinary process that had shadowed Shore for over a year. The order “undignified, discourteous, and offensive comments” made during criminal proceedings. These remarks specifically targeted the California Racial Justice Act. The Commission found that Shore’s behavior created a reasonable perception of bias. This ruling marked the second time in fifteen months that Shore faced sanctions. The April 2025 admonishment stands as a “medium level” discipline. It ranks a public censure yet serves as a formal condemnation of judicial behavior. The timing of the release confirms that judicial accountability method continue to function even after a magistrate leaves the courtroom.

The “Double Jeopardy” of Disciplinary Actions

Shore’s record distinguishes him as one of the few judges to face two separate major disciplinary actions within a short window. The April 2025 admonishment followed a “severe public censure” issued in December 2023. The 2023 censure addressed his chronic absenteeism. Investigators found that Shore missed 155 days of work between 2021 and 2022. He failed to appear at the courthouse on any Friday during that period. Shore attributed these absences to family medical problem and his observance of the Sabbath as an Orthodox Jew. The Commission rejected these justifications as valid excuses for unauthorized leave. The 2025 admonishment focused on entirely different conduct involving his speech and judicial temperament. This dual-track disciplinary record paints a portrait of a jurist who struggled with both administrative duties and courtroom decorum.

Specific Allegations: The Racial Justice Act Comments

The core of the April 2025 admonishment involved Shore’s hostility toward the Racial Justice Act (RJA). The RJA allows defendants to challenge convictions based on racial bias. Transcripts revealed that Shore frequently interjected personal opinions during RJA hearings. He denied the existence of widespread racism in the judicial system. He suggested that “more minorities commit crimes than Caucasians” during open court proceedings. The Commission noted these comments were gratuitous and irrelevant to the legal matters at hand. Shore claimed he intended to engage in “meaningful exchange” with attorneys. The Commission ruled that his words instead projected an appearance of prejudice. These statements led to his disqualification from hearing RJA cases by an Orange County judge in 2024.

The “Hypothetical” Slur Incident

A particularly damaging incident detailed in the 2025 report involved Shore’s use of a racial slur. During a hearing, Shore used the full N-word while posing a hypothetical scenario to an expert witness. The Commission described this usage as “gratuitous” and “unnecessary.” Witnesses reported being disturbed by the judge’s willingness to vocalize the epithet in a formal setting. Shore defended his action by stating he was illustrating a point about racial bias. The Commission rejected this defense. They concluded that the use of such charged language by a presiding judge public confidence in the judiciary. This specific incident catalyzed the motions to disqualify him from future cases involving racial bias claims.

Financial and Salary Controversies

The retirement decision in January 2025 carried significant financial weight. By retiring before any chance removal proceedings could initiate, Shore protected his judicial pension. The 2023 censure regarding his absences had already sparked public outrage over his compensation. Defense attorneys calculated that Shore collected between $82, 000 and $146, 000 in salary for days he did not work. The Commission’s censure called this a “dereliction of duty” yet did not mandate repayment. His 2025 retirement ensures he continues to draw benefits based on his decades of service. Critics this system allows judges to escape the full financial consequences of their misconduct. The Commission absence the statutory authority to claw back salary paid during periods of unauthorized absence.

Comparative Judicial Exits in 2024-2025

Shore’s case fits a broader pattern of California judges leaving the bench amidst investigations. Data from the Commission on Judicial Performance shows an uptick in such departures. In 2024 alone, five judges retired or resigned with proceedings pending. This figure represents the highest number since 2016. The case of Lassen Superior Court Judge Tony R. Mallery offers a sharp contrast. Mallery contested his charges and was removed from office in 2024. Shore chose the route of negotiation and early exit. He waived his right to formal proceedings in January 2025. This waiver expedited the final admonishment spared him the spectacle of a contested hearing. The table illustrates recent disciplinary outcomes for California judges.

California Judicial Disciplinary Outcomes (2023-2025)

Judge	Court	Outcome	Date	Primary Misconduct
Howard H. Shore	San Diego Superior	Public Admonishment (Retired)	April 2025	RJA comments, offensive speech
Howard H. Shore	San Diego Superior	Severe Public Censure	Dec 2023	155 unauthorized absences
Tony R. Mallery	Lassen Superior	Removal from Office	2024	Retaliation, false representations
Michael J. O’Gara	Los Angeles Superior	Public Admonishment	2024	Social media misconduct

The “Zombie Jurisdiction” of the CJP

The admonishment of Howard Shore highlights the “zombie jurisdiction” of the Commission on Judicial Performance. Article VI, Section 18(d) of the California Constitution grants the Commission authority over former judges. This power prevents judges from “washing away” misconduct simply by resigning. The Commission can problem public admonishments or censures up to six years after a judge leaves office. For Shore, this meant the investigation into his RJA comments continued direct after his January 23 retirement. The resulting order in April serves as a warning to other jurists. Retirement stops the daily work does not stop the ethical accounting. Legal scholars note that this method is important for maintaining the historical integrity of the judiciary.

Defense and Denial

Judge Shore maintained his innocence throughout the 2025 proceedings. In a statement released following the admonishment, he categorically denied that his comments reflected bias. He characterized the complaints as a “vicious and bad-faith attack” by the Public Defender’s Office. Shore argued that his remarks were taken out of context. He claimed his “political correctness” comments were critiques of legislative drafting rather than social commentary. He also expressed sadness that the Commission accepted the allegations. His legal team, led by Heather L. Rosing, submitted written objections before the final ruling. These objections failed to sway the Commission’s decision to impose public discipline.

Impact on the San Diego Legal

The departure of Judge Shore and the subsequent admonishment have reshaped the San Diego Superior Court. The Public Defender’s Office had filed disqualification motions in at least 19 cases prior to his retirement. These motions argued that Shore could not be impartial in cases involving minority defendants. His exit resolves these immediate conflicts. The court administration has since reassigned his caseload. The admonishment also serves as a precedent for how judges must handle RJA hearings. It establishes clear boundaries regarding judicial commentary on legislative policy. The San Diego legal community views the April 2025 order as a necessary correction. It affirms that the bench must remain a neutral arbiter of the law rather than a forum for personal grievances against it.

Legacy of the “Best Bench in the State”

In his farewell email, Shore described the San Diego Superior Court as the “best bench in the state.” His own legacy on that bench remains complicated. He served for 35 years and presided over high- criminal trials. Yet his final years were defined by truancy and controversy. The dual sanctions of 2023 and 2025 overshadow his earlier decades of service. The permanent record includes findings of “absence of candor” and “misrepresentation” alongside the offensive comments. Future legal historians view his tenure as a case study in the limits of judicial independence. The system corrected itself, albeit through the slow grind of administrative discipline rather than immediate removal.

Broader for Judicial Independence

The Shore case has sparked debate regarding the balance between judicial independence and accountability. Supporters of the Commission that the April 2025 admonishment proves the system works. It caught and punished a judge who violated ethical canons. Critics the process took too long. Shore missed work for two years before facing the 2023 censure. He made offensive comments for months before the 2025 admonishment. The gap between misconduct and consequence allowed him to preside over numerous cases while under a cloud of suspicion. The “retirement loophole” also remains a point of contention. Shore leaves with his full pension intact. The Commission can mark his record cannot touch his retirement benefits. This limitation remains a structural feature of California’s judicial oversight system.

The April 2025 Admonishment: A Final Rebuke

On April 3, 2025, the California Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) issued a public admonishment against retired San Diego Superior Court Judge Howard H. Shore. This disciplinary action, coming three months after Shore’s January 2025 retirement, marked the second time in less than two years that the state oversight body formally sanctioned the jurist. The Commission’s 2025 findings paint a portrait of a judicial officer who not only abandoned his physical post for extended periods also actively undermined the integrity of the court through racially charged commentary and deceptive interactions with legal counsel.

The CJP’s order detailed a pattern of misconduct that violated multiple canons of the Code of Judicial Ethics. While the 2023 censure focused on his physical absence, the 2025 admonishment targeted his demeanor and impartiality, specifically regarding his open hostility toward the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). The Commission concluded that Shore’s conduct “eroded public confidence in the judiciary” and created a reasonable perception of bias against racial minorities.

Count I: Hostility Toward the Racial Justice Act

The core of the April 2025 disciplinary order centers on Judge Shore’s repeated disparagement of the California Racial Justice Act (AB 2542). Enacted to combat widespread bias in criminal proceedings, the RJA allows defendants to challenge convictions if they can demonstrate that race played a factor in their charging or sentencing. The Commission found that Judge Shore used his position on the bench to launch personal and political attacks against this legislation.

During hearings in 2022 and 2023, Shore made statements that the Commission described as “undignified, discourteous, and offensive.” In one documented instance, Shore explicitly denied the existence of widespread racism in the judicial system, a statement that directly contradicts the legislative findings underpinning the RJA. He criticized the California Legislature for passing the law, suggesting that lawmakers had not “thought through” the of the statute.

More egregiously, the Commission comments where Shore suggested that statistical disparities in incarceration rates were not evidence of bias rather an indication that “certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others.” This rhetoric, delivered from the bench, prejudged RJA motions before they could be fully argued, leading the CJP to conclude that Shore exhibited a “absence of impartiality” that disqualified him from fairly administering the law.

Count II: Gratuitous Use of Racial Slurs

The Commission’s investigation revealed a specific incident involving the gratuitous use of a racial slur. During a hearing involving an expert witness on racial profiling, Judge Shore engaged in a hypothetical argument regarding the definition of racism. In the course of this exchange, Shore used the full N-word.

The CJP report noted that the use of the epithet was “largely irrelevant” to the legal problem at hand. The Commission rejected Shore’s defense that he was posing a philosophical question, ruling instead that the use of such language by a presiding judge was “gratuitous” and “offensive.” This specific conduct contributed to a hostile courtroom environment and further cemented the perception of racial insensitivity.

Count III: The “Ghost Judge” Scandal (2021, 2023)

While the April 2025 admonishment focused on bias, it heavily referenced the “severe public censure” Shore received in December 2023 to establish a pattern of misconduct. The facts of that prior sanction remain relevant as they constitute the “aggravating factors” in the 2025 order.

Between May 2021 and November 2022, Judge Shore was absent from the courthouse for 155 days without authorization. This included missing every single Friday for 18 consecutive months. During this period, Shore continued to collect his full judicial salary, a sum that defense attorneys later estimated amounted to between $82, 000 and $146, 000 in unearned wages.

Shore initially defended these absences by citing his obligations as an observant Orthodox Jew, stating he needed to travel to Los Angeles to visit an ill grandchild and could not drive after sundown on Fridays. yet, the Commission found that he frequently left on Thursdays or early Friday mornings, well before the Sabbath began, and failed to notify the presiding judge or utilize valid vacation time. The CJP labeled this conduct a “dereliction of duty” and a “flagrant disregard” for his obligations to the public.

Comparative Analysis of Disciplinary Actions

Table 1: Disciplinary Record of Judge Howard H. Shore (2023-2025)

Metric	Severe Public Censure (Dec 2023)	Public Admonishment (Apr 2025)
Primary Violation	Unauthorized Absenteeism (155 Days)	Racial Bias & absence of Candor
Key Finding	“Dereliction of Duty” for missing work while paid.	“Undignified and offensive” comments on RJA.
Specific Incident	Absent every Friday from May 2021 to Nov 2022.	Used N-word in court; denied widespread racism.
Aggravating Factor	Failure to obtain approval from Presiding Judge.	Misrepresenting the 2023 censure to counsel.
Outcome	Stipulated Censure (Highest sanction short of removal).	Public Admonishment (Permanent record).

Count IV: absence of Candor and Deception

The April 2025 order exposed a new of misconduct related to Shore’s attempt to manage the of his 2023 censure. On December 4, 2023, nine days before the censure was made public, Shore requested a private meeting with Katherine Braner, the Public Defender, and Megan Marcotte, the Chief Deputy Alternate Public Defender.

During this meeting, Shore attempted to explain his upcoming discipline. The Commission found that Shore “downplayed and minimized” his misconduct, telling the attorneys he “barely” took any vacation and “did not regularly take Fridays off.” These statements were demonstrably false, as he had already stipulated to the Commission that he had missed every Friday for a year and a half. The CJP ruled that these misrepresentations constituted a “absence of candor” and a violation of the ethical duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary.

Judicial and Disqualification

The cumulative effect of Shore’s comments and absenteeism led to a revolt among the San Diego defense bar. Following the of his RJA comments and the 2023 censure, the San Diego County Public Defender’s Office filed motions to disqualify Shore from hearing criminal cases. They argued that a judge who denies the existence of widespread racism cannot fairly adjudicate motions under the Racial Justice Act.

In a significant ruling, Orange County Superior Court Judge Cheri Pham, who was brought in to hear the disqualification motions to avoid local conflicts, granted the requests in 19 separate cases. Judge Pham wrote that Shore’s comments could lead a reasonable person to believe he “believes certain racial or ethnic groups commit more crimes than others” and that he would “not give weight to statistical evidence” regarding implicit bias. This ruling stripped Shore of his ability to preside over of his criminal docket prior to his retirement.

Retirement and Legacy

Judge Shore retired on January 23, 2025, ending a 35-year career on the bench. In his farewell email to colleagues, he described the San Diego Superior Court as the “best bench in the state” and did not address the pending disciplinary matters. yet, the April 2025 admonishment ensures that his judicial record concludes with a formal finding of bias and misconduct.

The CJP’s decision to problem the admonishment after his retirement serves a specific administrative purpose: should Shore ever seek to return as a temporary assigned judge (a common practice for retired jurists known as “sitting on assignment”), this disciplinary record would likely preclude his appointment. The order stands as a permanent public record that the comments made regarding the Racial Justice Act were not “insensitive” ethical violations that compromised the fairness of the court.

The San Diego Superior Court has since reassigned Shore’s caseload. The Public Defender’s Office issued a statement following the admonishment, validating their decision to seek his disqualification and emphasizing the need of judicial adherence to the principles of the Racial Justice Act.

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